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Co-Advisors: Alan J. Tomkins and Brian H. Bornstein

This dissertation investigates the role of trust in predicting cooperation with a
natural resources management institution. It begins with an exploration of the legal
landscape against which the relationship between land owners and natural resources
management institutions is contextualized, presents a review of the often ostensibly
disparate trust literature and a framework for its integration, and proposes and tests a
model of trust and cooperation in the natural resources context. The results provide mixed
support for the model as proposed but confirm the importance of trust in this context and
suggest implications for policy, especially the potential importance of increasing
institution- specific trust via efforts that focus, in particular, upon increasing the trustor’s
willingness to accept vulnerability.
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OVERVIEW
Natural resources governance is a complicated endeavor in today’s world. While
much of this complication arises from biological, chemical, and ecological issues, the
nature of modern natural resources governance is such that without the cooperation of the
broader public (or at least specific stakeholders) effective governance is essentially
impossible. This dissertation investigates the role of one potentially important driver of
the cooperation necessary for effective natural resources governance, namely trust. To
that end, this dissertation presents three chapters that advance the scientific understanding
of the role of trust in cooperation with natural resources management institutions.
Chapter One provides legal contexts for the evaluation by addressing the issue of
cooperation with natural resources governance from a legal perspective. The chapter
begins with a discussion of the role of natural resources institutions in the United States
with a focus on the major challenge to their effective function, namely private property,
and argues that the sometimes opposing interests of land owners and these institutions
create the potential for conflict. The chapter then reviews the case law in which natural
resources actions have been formally challenged on privately owned land and shows that
in the three states with the highest percentages of privately owned land, private land
owner challenges to agency action are rarely successful. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the importance of a specific basis of trust in these challenges, namely,
procedural fairness.
Chapter Two takes a step back and addresses the fundamental and persisting
question of the nature of trust by proposing a framework of trust that has the potential to
incorporate a great deal of the existing relevant scholarship. Specifically, it argues that
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attitudinal trust, as a willingness to accept vulnerability in dealings with another, is a
major driver of intention to act trustingly and trusting behavior. Additionally, the
framework argues that attitudinal trust is itself driven by various bases of that trust;
constructs that share an ability to reduce either vulnerability itself or increase its
subjective acceptability. The chapter then reviews the three major bodies of trust
literature in light of the proposed framework and shows that the scholarship on trust from
the organizational, risk management, and government literatures are largely consistent
with the framework as proposed.
Chapter Three provides an empirical test of several hypotheses embedded in the
framework proposed in Chapter Two within a model of trust and voluntary cooperation in
the context of natural resources governance. The chapter uses two studies with Nebraska
land owners to test 1) the separability of the constructs, and 2) the influence of trust on
cooperation. The chapter also presents and tests the sophistication moderation hypothesis
(Hamm et al., 2013a) that argues the effects of the bases of trust on cooperation will
themselves be moderated by the sophistication (i.e., knowledge and experience) of the
trustor such that with less sophistication, more general constructs will be most predictive.
With additional sophistication, however, more institution-specific constructs are expected
to increase in predictive ability. The results provide some, albeit complicated, support for
the hypotheses. In particular they suggest that 1) the constructs are separable but
especially highly correlated, 2) trust does have a small, but significant, independent
influence on cooperation intention and cooperation behavior, and 3) it is trust in the
institution requesting cooperation and not trust in other related institutions or others
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generally that is most predictive. Finally, the chapter fails to provide strong support for
the sophistication hypothesis.
Thus, the dissertation finds that although natural resources institutions in the
United States are particularly well positioned to address natural resources issues, their
ability to effectively manage natural resources may be facilitated beyond the brute force
of the law by ensuring high levels of trust in them. Further, the dissertation finds that
within the conceptual morass of cross-domain trust scholarship, there is evidence of a
framework that it able to provide some degree of clarity for the construct. Finally, the
dissertation finds some support for a proposed model but identifies potential issues within
it such as the similarity of responses to the various bases of trust and possible limits of
the sophistication moderation hypothesis.
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CHAPTER ONE: STATE NATURAL RESOURCE AUTHORITY AND LAND
OWNER CONFLICTS AND THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF TRUST

Natural resource problems are among the most important facing the world today.
From mass extinctions decreasing biodiversity world-wide (Singh, 2002) to impending
water crises in the western United States (Barnett, Pierce, Hidalgo, Bonfils, Santer, Das,
Bala, Wood, Nozawa, Mirin, Cayan & Dettinger, 2008) and across the globe (Jury &
Vaux, 2005), one needs do little more than open a newspaper to find any number of
similar examples of natural resources in peril. In the United States, a number of
institutions are involved in addressing these problems. Typically, state and federal
legislative bodies enact statutory responses to these problems that give jurisdiction to
natural resource institutions (e.g., the U.S. Departments of the Interior and Agriculture
and state natural resource authorities) whose actions are then reviewable by relevant
courts. Historically, federal legislative bodies in particular have played a major part in
addressing these environmental problems, especially in the 1970’s and 1980’s, as most of
the major environmental laws in place today were passed or amended during this period
(Stewart, 2001-2002). Since then, however, legislatures have played a much smaller role,
in large part because they have had a considerably more difficult time garnering the
necessary cross-partisan support for such initiatives, leading some to refer to this period
of environmental regulation as one of “political gridlock”(Stewart, 2001-2002, p. 24; see
also Zellmer, 2013). Regarding the courts, although their supervisory role in
environmental regulation was significantly expanded by Congress in 1946 through the
Administrative Procedure Act (Administrative Procedures Act, 1946, §557) and again in
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the 1970’s through the novel inclusion of citizen suit provisions in the major
environmental statutes themselves (e.g., Clean Water Act, 1972, §1365; Clean Air Act,
1963, §7604), their role since has remained relatively unchanged. Specifically, the courts,
and especially tort law, are the primary avenue for addressing individual damages from
past environmental harm in this country (Menell, 1991), but it is precisely this reactive
stance that limits their role in proactive environmental regulation.
Natural resource institutions stand as the United States’ primary answer to
proactively meeting the environmental challenges of today’s world. These agencies are
typically empowered by legislative initiatives to regulate natural resources while the
courts take a supervisory role, typically only evaluating the past actions of these state
authorities when formally challenged by affected parties, typically via the Administrative
Procedures Act (1946, §557) or statutory citizen suit provisions (e.g., Clean Water Act,
1972, §505). Natural resources authorities exist at both the state and federal level.
Although federal natural resources institutions like the U.S. Departments of Agriculture
and the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service maintain significant control over
natural resource management, especially on federal land and through federal legislation
like the Endangered Species Act, the majority of day-to-day, natural resource
management falls to state authorities (Fischman, 2005; see also Kleppe v. New Mexico,
1976). These institutions are tasked with developing and implementing comprehensive
management schemes in their jurisdictions for which they usually enjoy considerable
discretionary latitude because of ambiguous statutory charges and a general stance of
deference in the federal and state courts (Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources
Defense Council Inc., 1984; Skidmore v. Swift, 1944).
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Natural resources management is the critically important but notably complicated
responsibility of these state natural resources authorities. The subsequent review
discusses one important such complication, namely conflicts between state authorities
and land owners. In particular, it reviews the formal resolutions of these conflicts (i.e.,
case law) and suggests that these cases are overwhelmingly decided in favor of the state
authority, in large part because of the explicit deference afforded these institutions by the
courts. This chapter then takes up an important potential implication of this
institutionalized deference, namely the possibility of the perception of unfairness in the
resolution of these conflicts, and applies the relevant social science literature to these
conflicts to identify the aspects critical to fostering this basis of trust in this context.
Land Owner/Natural Resource Institution Conflicts
The effectiveness of natural resource institutions is limited by a fundamental
value in the United States, namely, the right to private property (U.S. Const. Amend. V).
Nationally, the majority of U.S. land is privately owned (Natural Resources Council of
Maine, n.d.), and many argue that this privately owned land is especially environmentally
critical for two major reasons: 1) because privately owned land is often attractive for
purchase for the same reasons that make it environmentally important, and 2) because
environmental management schemes must be geographically comprehensive to be
effective (Clark & Downes, 1996). For example, endangered species protection is one
area of natural resources management that is often especially reliant on private land
action (Koch, 2002; Underwood, Ober, Miller & Munn, 2012; Zellmer & Johnson, 2002).
These threatened and endangered fauna do not respect property lines and frequently cross
into and out of private property. Habitat protection efforts that only involve public land
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are frequently limited to small, fragmented sections of some (especially mid-western)
states’ land area and, because a great deal of resource intense land (lake-front property,
nutrient rich soil, etc.) is likely to be privately owned, may well fail to help these species
where they are most in need (Koch, 2002). Natural resources management efforts that do
not involve privately owned land are therefore, at best, less effective and, at worst,
entirely undermined.
Thus, there is certainly a compelling interest in allowing natural resource
institutions some level of jurisdiction over private property but in many ways, this flies in
the face of many land owners’ understandings of private property. Although the concept
is somewhat ambiguously defined by the courts (e.g., U.S. v. General Motors
Corporation, 1945), much of the public accepts an understanding of property ownership
that argues for total control of the property in question (Zellmer & Harder, 2008).
Undoubtedly, this notion of total control of private property is less than accurate in most
contexts as most property is subject to some kind of regulation (Singer, 2006).
Accordingly, this idea has been only somewhat influential in the development of
American property law. Where it is much more important, however, is in understanding
property owners’ expectations, as they often expect total control of their land.
This situation is further complicated by the often fundamentally competing
interests of land owners and state natural resource authorities. Hardin’s notion of the
tragedy of the commons is particularly useful for explicating this conflict (Hardin, 1968).
Common pool resources are those for which it is difficult or unethical to exclude
individuals but of which there is a limited supply and one individual’s use decreases the
resource available to others (Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard & Policansky, 1999).
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Implicit in Hardin’s discussion of the commons is the belief that land owners’ interests in
these common pool resources often lie in their immediate use. Conversely, however,
natural resource institutions’ interests typically lie in their sustained use or even outright
conservation. Although both groups do have some level of interest in the other’s position
(i.e., land owners need the long-term protection of the resource in order to continue to use
it, and natural resource institutions need the immediate use of the resource to generate
funds), the fundamental misalliance of these interests often creates conflicts between the
interests of land owners and natural resource institutions. It is, therefore, not uncommon
for these mismatches of interests to create situations in which land owners are
encouraged or compelled to act in ways contrary to their interests and so may feel denied
their rights of property ownership, potentially motivating them to resist compliance or
even to challenge the institution.
Because the effective management of natural resources requires the navigation of
these conflicts with land owners, understanding how these conflicts have been resolved is
critical. Informal (i.e., out of court) resolutions are common in this area of law and likely
even more common than more formal (i.e., in court) resolutions. Problematically,
however, these informal processes often only consider the private concerns of the parties
involved, may include a variety of issues that could not be raised more publicly, and are
rarely well-documented. Formal court decisions, however, represent a documented,
officially sanctioned process for resolving disputes that set precedents for future cases
and even have some influence over future informal resolutions. The following
subsections review the case law resolving these land owner/state authority conflicts in
three U.S. states. Cases were identified via a Westlaw search of cases in which state
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natural resource authorities and land owners had opposing interests – thereby identifying
cases in which these conflicts were formally addressed. The states (Kansas, Iowa, and
Nebraska) were chosen because they have the highest percentage of privately owned land
in the United States (all more than 95%). In these states, natural resources management
efforts that implicate large portions of land must involve, or at least implicate, privately
owned land. Thus, these states were chosen because they are likely to have these state
authority/land owner conflicts. Note, however, that despite the focus on states with a
majority of privately owned land, only a small number of cases were identified that met
the criteria (land owner/state authority conflicts over action on privately owned land).
Although the primary focus falls to the cases that meet these criteria, where relevant, this
review will occasionally note other major cases which fall technically outside of the
scope of this review (e.g., challenges to these state authorities brought by other
institutions in the interests of their land owners) but which are informative to its overall
purpose of exploring the formal resolution of these land owner/natural resource
institution conflicts. These cases will be clearly identified in the text.
Kansas
Kansas is the U.S. state with the highest percentage of privately owned land
(Natural Resources Council of Maine, n.d.). As less than one percent of its total land area
is under public ownership (480mi2), virtually the entire state is privately owned (Natural
Resources Council of Maine, n.d.). Although a number of institutions are implicated in
the management of its natural resources, two institutions have been especially involved in
legal conflicts with land owners; namely, the Kansas Department of Agriculture and the
Kansas Department of Wildlife, Parks, and Recreation. The Kansas Department of
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Agriculture finds its authority interspersed throughout Article 5 of the 74th chapter of the
Compiled Statutes of the State of Kansas (Kan. Statutes Annotated ch. 74, Art. 5). The
Kansas Department of Wildlife, Parks, and Recreation’s authority also lies in the Kansas
statutes which invest the secretary with the power to “adopt…such rules and regulations
as necessary to implement, administer, and enforce the provisions of the wildlife, parks
and tourism laws of the state” (Kan. Statutes Annotated, §32-807(a)). Although parks and
tourism are usually outside of the scope of privately owned land, the Department’s
authority over wildlife often implicates private land.
A number of conflicts between these institutions and land owners have been
addressed in the courts. Kansas courts find their authority to review these conflicts in a
state statute which permits judicial review of final agency action for any person to whom
the action is directed, who is a party in the proceedings, subject to a challenged rule, or
eligible under another provision of law (Kan. Statutes Annotated §§77-601, 77-607, 77611). The courts have interpreted this statute as permitting them to review final agency
action without deference on questions of law (Denning v. KPERS, 2008), but in practice,
it is not unusual for the courts to explicitly defer to the agencies, especially when the
agency’s superior expertise in technical matters is relevant (Frank v. Kansas Department
of Agriculture, Division of Water Resources, 2008).
The majority of the cases identified challenged the actions of the Kansas
Department of Agriculture’s Division of Water Resources, which consolidates the
authority of the previous Kansas Water Commission and the State Irrigation
Commissioner (Kan. Statutes Annotated, §§74-506c, §74-506b). Overall, the Division
has a great deal of latitude regarding water regulation in Kansas and has typically
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received deference from Kansas courts. For example, in Frank, the Department
determined that a land owner was in violation of a permit allowing him to create a ground
water pit. The Department determined that the pit had obstructed a stream in violation of
a Kansas regulation (Kan. Administrative Regulations, 5-40-1(k)(3)). The regulation
itself was somewhat ambiguous, but the chief engineer had interpreted it such that it
created a presumption of a stream in any area in which the land owner could not prove
that one had not existed since 1929, when the law was passed. Petitioner Frank’s appeal
centered primarily on the reasonableness of this interpretation. The court, after noting that
less deference is granted to agencies when facts are undisputed (Denning v. KPRES,
2008; Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group, 2007; Foos v. Terminix, 2004; Marbury v.
Madison, 1803), determined that, because the facts were disputed here, the agency’s
reasonable interpretation deserved deference, especially in light of the agency’s relevant
expertise.
Despite this presumption of deference, however, some land owner challenges
have been successful. In Wheatland, an Electric Cooperative appealed a Division of
Water Resources decision limiting the water the Cooperative could use under its existing
water right (Wheatland Electric Co-op. Inc. v. Polansky, 2011). At the request of the
Cooperative, the Division amended its water right but in so doing, limited the
Cooperative’s consumptive use and initiated proceedings to declare a partial
abandonment of the original water right due to non-use. The Kansas Court of Appeals
held that the Division was within its rights in decreasing the Cooperative’s consumptive
use, but it remanded the case because the Division’s partial water right theory was in
violation of Kansas law (Kan. Statutes Annotated 2009 Supp., 82a-718(a)), which
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requires a total non-use determination for abandonment. In a second such case, land
owners challenged a permit granted by the Division of Water Resources to the city of
Wichita, Kansas that would allegedly impact the land owners’ senior water rights
(Cochran v. State Department of Agriculture, Division of Water Resources, 2011). The
Division argued that the relevant Kansas regulations provided standing for challenging
permit decisions only to the permit applicant, but the district court found a basis for a
broader notion of standing. On appeal, the state supreme court, after explicitly noting that
it no longer granted deference to an agency’s interpretation of statute (Cochran v. State
Department of Agriculture, Division of Water Resources, 2011), upheld the lower court’s
construction of standing. Although both of these cases were technically losses for the
state authorities, it is important to note that the determinations were something less than
substantive victories. Both rulings merely sent the land owners back into district court
with directions to reevaluate the case. In Wheatland, the court was simply required to
reevaluate the case under a different legal theory (Wheatland Electric Co-op. Inc. v.
Polansky, 2011), and in Cochran the court was simply required to acknowledge that the
land owner had the requisite standing for judicial review (Cochran v. State Department of
Agriculture, Division of Water Resources, 2011). It seems, then, that the majority of the
reviewed cases in Kansas are decided in favor of the natural resource authority, but even
when cases are decided in favor of the land owner, the final resolution of the conflict is
no more likely to be in favor of land owners than the outright wins for the agencies. Thus,
in Kansas, it appears that agencies are typically successful in the final resolution if not
also in court.
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Iowa
With only 1.04% (370mi2) of its land area publicly owned, Iowa has the second
highest percentage of privately owned land in the United States (Natural Resources
Council of Maine, n.d.). As in Kansas, several institutions are implicated in the
management of the state’s natural resources, but the Iowa Department of Natural
Resources “has the primary responsibility for state parks and forests, protecting the
environment, and managing fish, wildlife and land and water resources in this
state.”(Iowa Code Annotated, §455A.2)
Unsurprisingly, a number of conflicts between land owners and the Department
have made their way into court. All of the cases reviewed involved conflicts over land
use, and most of the cases involved challenges to Department actions pursuant to land
owners’ illegal waste handling. For example, in State v. Shelley, an Iowa court of appeals
heard a challenge to an order requiring the land owners to cease disposal of metal and
wood that the land owners had placed to reduce erosion on their property (State, Iowa
Department of Natural Resources v. Shelley, 1993). The land owners were ordered by the
DNR to cease disposal, remove the waste, and pay $1000 penalty for violation of a state
solid waste disposal code (Iowa Code Annotated, §455B.301(20)). At this point in the
process, the land owners were entitled to challenge the decision directly with the agency
but failed to do so and continued to fail to comply. The case was subsequently brought to
the district court by the DNR and the court issued a compliance order to the land owner.
The court of appeals found that because the land owners were able to challenge the
decision directly with the agency before it became a final agency action, they were
precluded from challenging it in court.
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Like this case, the majority of the cases reviewed were decided in favor of the
natural resources authority, suggesting some level of deference to these agencies in Iowa
courts as well. In fact, one of the opinions (Organic Technologies Corporation v. State ex
rel Iowa Department of Natural Resources, 2000) directly discussed this deference, citing
a statute in the Iowa Code (Iowa Code Annotated, §17A.19) which states that a court may
not interfere with agency findings when “there is a conflict in the evidence or when
reasonable minds might disagree about the inference to be drawn from the evidence”
(Organic Technologies Corporation v. State ex rel. Iowa Department of Natural
Resources, 2000, p. 815). Despite this deference, however, Iowa courts do seem
somewhat willing to find in favor of land owners in less ambiguous situations, at least in
the context of tort claims for damages. In one such case, the Department was sued for
damage to a land owner’s property caused by a water control structure and improper
drainage on Department land (Schmitz v. Department of Natural Resources, Fish, and
Wildlife Division, 2003). In this tort context, the court was willing to find for the land
owner in regards to the improper drainage but limited the damages to the previous two
years for failure to file a timely claim. It also rejected negligence claims for failing to
exercise due care over a control structure for lack of sufficient evidence to meet the land
owner’s burden of proof.
As in Kansas, the state natural resources authorities in Iowa are often victorious in
land owner challenges, whether substantively or via procedural outcomes as in State v.
Shelly; however, at least one such case was resolved in the land owner’s favor, albeit less
than a complete victory (Schmitz v. Department of Natural Resources, Fish, and Wildlife
Division, 2003). Notwithstanding this slightly pro-land owner stance, the courts in Iowa
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do typically decide cases for the state authority, even overlooking problems in the
application of their policies to find in their favor (e.g., State ex rel. Iowa Department of
Natural Resources v. Shelley, 1993). Thus it seems that Iowa courts also take a largely
deferential stance toward its state natural resource authorities, placing the “burden of
demonstrating the required prejudice and the invalidity of the agency action on the party
asserting invalidity” (Iowa Code Annotated, §17A.19(8)(a); see also, Iowa Code
Annotated, §17A.19(10)).
Nebraska
The final state reviewed was Nebraska, 1.6% of whose land area (785.76mi 2) is
federally or state owned (Natural Resources Council of Maine, n.d.). The Nebraska
Department of Natural Resources consolidates the powers of the previous Department of
Water Resources and the Nebraska Natural Resources Commission (Neb. Revised
Statutes, §61-205) and so stands as the premier natural resources institution in the state.
Notably, the Department maintains complete authority over the state’s surface water
rights as used for “irrigation, power, or other useful purposes except as… limited by
statute” (Neb. Revised Statutes, §61-206).
As in Kansas and Iowa, the regulatory actions of the NDNR have also been
challenged by land owners in court and also, like in those other states, the courts have
typically found in favor of the Department. Applying the criteria discussed above (land
owner challenges to natural resource institution actions), four cases were identified
involving the NDNR. In the first, the land owner challenged the Department’s
determination of a boundary of a wildlife refuge (Scofield v. Nebraska Department of
Natural Resources, 2008). One of the boundaries was identified by the NDNR as a canal,
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but the land owners argued that it was a private irrigation ditch and therefore either not an
appropriate boundary or a taking that required just compensation. The Nebraska Supreme
Court explicitly stated that the state’s agencies enjoy a presumption of validity in their
determinations and that the burden falls to the challenger (Scofield v. Nebraska
Department of Natural Resources, 2008; see also, Jacobson v. Solid Waste Agency of
Northwest Nebraska, 2002). Although the court agreed with the district court and found
that NDNR had acted appropriately by setting the boundary in the end, the court
remanded the case because the district court had incorrectly held that the land owner
failed to state a claim for relief that the use of their creek as a boundary was a taking that
required just compensation. In a second case, the land owner alleged that the Department
had been negligent in failing to appropriately regulate ground water pumping that
adversely affected surface water use (Spear T. Ranch v. Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources, 2005). The state supreme court again deferred to the agency’s interpretation
of the state’s water resource statutes, and agreed with the NDNR that it had no duty to
regulate ground water, which is traditionally regulated by the state Natural Resources
Districts (Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District v. North Platte Natural
Resources District, 2010), undermining the land owner’s claim.
In contrast to the first two cases, the last two cases resulted in decisions explicitly
for the property owner. The first involved a land owner challenge to a Department action
limiting junior water users in favor of a senior water user, arguing that the senior user had
forfeited some of its rights and that the Department’s action was precluded under the
futile call doctrine (In re 2007 Administrations of Appropriations of Waters of the
Niobrara River, 2012). While the challenge was pending in court, the Department
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recorded higher water levels and so reversed the closing notices but later, after measuring
another low discharge, reinstated them. The land owners appealed the closing notices in
the Boyd County Court and, though the closing notices were declared invalid, were
awarded a 20 year condemnation award that granted them preference over the senior
water user. Subsequently, in evaluating the challenge over the alleged water rights
forfeiture, the state supreme court held, in part, that the validity of the senior water user’s
rights could be evaluated even in the face of a condemnation award and remanded the
case to the Department to determine whether the senior water user’s appropriations had
been partially or entirely forfeited. The last case involving the Department and land
owners centered on a disputed tax levied by the Department (Garey v. Nebraska
Department of Natural Resources, 2009). Although the case itself is somewhat beyond
the scope of this paper in that it was not a land owner dispute about a private land
management action, it is worthy of note that the state supreme court did find in favor of
the land owners, finding that the tax was illegal under the state constitution (Neb. Const.
art. VIII, §1A).
Although the Department is the primary natural resource institution in the state of
Nebraska, the regulation of some important natural resources is relegated to the state’s 23
Natural Resource Districts (Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District v.
North Platte Natural Resources District, 2010). These NRD’s were set up in Nebraska to
govern actions relating to…
(1) erosion prevention and control, (2) prevention of damages from flood
water and sediment, (3) flood prevention and control, (4) soil
conservation, (5) water supply for any beneficial uses, (6) development,
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management, utilization, and conservation of ground water and surface
water, (7) pollution control, (8) solid waste disposal and sanitary drainage,
(9) drainage improvement and channel rectification, (10) development and
management of fish and wildlife habitat, (11) development and
management of recreational and park facilities, and (12) forestry and range
management (Neb. Revised Statute, §2-3229).
Although the NRD’s are technically afforded the same deference as any other state
agency (Wagoner v. Central Platte Natural Resources District, 1995; see also, Haven
Home Inc. v. Department of Public Welfare, 1984; In re Application of United Telephone
Company, 1988; In re Application of Jantzen, 1994), in practice, they are victorious much
less often. In the three identified cases (Krauter v Lower Big Blue Natural Resources
District, 1977; Bamford v. Upper Republican Natural Resources District, 1994; Wagoner
v. Central Platte Natural Resources District, 1995), the NRDs were essentially defeated
twice. In the first case, the land owner challenged an order from the Central Platte River
Natural Resources District to cease and desist all ground water withdrawals until he came
in compliance with their order to submit soil samples (Wagoner v. Central Platte Natural
Resources District, 1995). The district court affirmed the order, finding it within the
jurisdiction of the NRD, but the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding that the NRD
lacked the jurisdiction to compel the soil samples (Wagoner v. Central Platte Natural
Resources District, 1995).
In the second case, the land owner challenged a Natural Resources District’s
action in condemning his land through eminent domain. The district court found no need
to condemn the entire land parcel and required the NRD to acquire an easement for the
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needed land. The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the district court, arguing that the
NRD had overstepped its power by not sufficiently explaining its rationale for
condemning the entire property (Krauter v. Lower Big Blue Natural Resources District,
1977).
The final institution in Nebraska with jurisdiction over natural resources is the
Nebraska Game and Parks Commission, which maintains authority over “state parks,
game and fish, recreation grounds, and all things pertaining thereto” (Neb. Revised
Statutes, §37-301). The Commission has been challenged only twice by land owners in
cases which fit the criteria being examined here, once on the grounds of a statute
forbidding boating on a private lake (Kuester v. State, 1974) and once for the exercise of
eminent domain for the purpose of including the property in a state park (Duerfeldt v.
State Game and Parks Commission, 1969), and was upheld in both cases. Although
deference was not explicitly discussed in either case, the deference afforded other
Nebraska agencies is just as relevant to the Commission and in practice the courts were
willing to interpret ambiguities in line with the agency.
In addition to these cases, three other cases that technically fall outside of the
criteria of this review were identified and merit discussion here. Although the purpose of
this review is primarily to discuss direct land owner/state authority conflicts, some
guidance can be garnered by investigating cases in which natural resources authorities
have challenged each other in court in the interests of the land owners they regulate. In
the first two cases, an irrigation district challenged the Department of Natural Resources
(Frenchman-Cambridge Irrigation District v. Department of Natural Resources, 2011)
and a natural resources district (Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District v.
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North Platte Natural Resources District, 2010). In both cases, the irrigation district
sought judicial review for a contested allocation and, in both cases, the state supreme
court held that the irrigation district was precluded from review for lack of standing. The
court held that, although irrigation districts have members who are directly impacted by
the allocations, the districts themselves do not have the requisite standing for judicial
review against the NDNR or NRDs. In the third case, the Middle Niobrara Natural
Resources District challenged the Department of Natural Resources directly, arguing that
the Department had erred in declaring a river basin fully-appropriated – a determination
that precludes additional allocations (Middle Niobrara Natural Resources District v.
Department of Natural Resources, 2011). In its analysis, the state supreme court
reviewed the Department’s determination and, after holding that the NRD had the
requisite standing, held that the Department’s rationale was inappropriate because the
Department had failed to follow regulations requiring it to use the best available scientific
data (Neb. Revised Statute,§46-713). The court therefore reversed, holding that the
Department’s determination was arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, invalid.
Thus, as in Iowa and Kansas, Nebraska courts seem notably deferential to state
natural resources authorities. Nebraska courts find their authority to review agency action
in the state Administrative Procedures Act (Neb. Revised Statutes, §84-917(1)), and in
these reviews, the courts typically defer to state agencies unless their decisions are found
to be “plainly erroneous” (Sunrise Country Manor v. Nebraska Department of Social
Services, 1994, p. 735). Of the cases reviewed, many explicitly discuss this presumption
of validity in these institutions’ regulations, placing the burden squarely on the regulated
land owner in legal challenges. Interestingly, however, this deference does not seem to
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translate into a greater probability of victory for the state’s Natural Resource Districts.
The cynical explanation of this lies simply in their reduced resources. These local NRD’s
are much smaller than either of the state-wide authorities and potentially less able to
support in-house legal resources. Whatever the reason, though, it does seem clear that
land owner challenges are much more likely to succeed against these institutions.
Summary
Overall, the courts in these three states seem to be notably deferential to state
authorities. Although these institutions are certainly not free to do as they will with
private property, it does seem that when these institutions act, the courts are often willing
to support their actions. Rationally, this deference is not terribly surprising. Neither
legislatures nor courts are well-suited for addressing the technical details involved in
natural resources regulation. Legislatures typically explicitly delegate their regulation
powers to state natural resources authorities, and the courts typically follow suit,
deferring especially when technical expertise is relevant. In practice then, property
interests seem to be consistently trumped by states’ interest when there is statutory and
factual support for the agency’s decision.
The Importance of Fairness-Based Trust
Although the courts’ deference to state authority would seem to be an all-out win
for natural resource institutions, it is not without its concerns. The legal system in this
country prides itself on fairness and, in fact, draws a good deal of its legitimacy from it
(Tyler, 2006a). By deferring to natural resources authorities, however, the courts run the
risk of appearing biased and unwilling to allow land owners any real influence in the
ultimate decision, potentially bringing the fairness of this conflict resolution process into
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question. That is, these negative outcomes may create a presumption that the underlying
procedures are themselves unfair. It is certainly unlikely that courts would truly disregard
the land owners’ arguments and the state institutions’ propensity to win is likely much
more the result of their superior expertise in both natural resource science and legal
maneuvering. Regardless, the perception of fairness is often predictive of behavior
independent of the effect of objective (distributive) fairness (Tyler, 2006b). Thus,
objective fairness is likely to be insufficient without subjectively perceived fairness.
Research investigating this basis of trust has a long history in social science. Since
the 1970’s, researchers have actively published on the topic (e.g., Thibaut & Walker,
1975) and have consistently found that people react much more positively when
procedures used by the authority are perceived as fair (e.g., De Cremer & Tyler, 2007).
This effect has been identified in regulatory contexts such as taxation (e.g., Murphy,
Tyler, & Curtis, 2009), law enforcement (e.g., Tyler, 2004), and natural resource
management (e.g., Syme, Nancarrow, & McCreddin, 1999). The positive effects of
procedural fairness are argued to occur because they legitimize the decision (Tyler,
2006a) and have been shown to be so robust that they persist even in the face of unfair
outcomes that are either observed (Hegtvedt, Johnson, Ganem, Waldron & Brody, 2009)
or personally experienced by the individual (Hegtvedt, Clay-Warner, & Johnson, 2003).
Applied to these conflicts, the argument is that land owners’ experience of fair
procedures in resolving their conflicts informs them that they are valued within the
process which, in turn, encourages their acceptance of the decision (Tyler, Casper, &
Fisher, 1989). Although a number of components of procedural fairness have been
championed by various researchers in the literature, they tend to center around ideals of
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meaningful participation in the process. In particular, researchers have identified
important influences of perceptions of voice in the process and influence on the decision.
Applied to land owner/state institution conflicts, these perceptions may signal to the land
owner that the decision reached is a good one even if it is not in the land owners’ favor.
Scholars have consistently found associations between perceptions of fair
treatment and pro-institutional reactions; however, there is considerable evidence
suggesting that the importance of perceptions of fairness may go beyond experiences of
fairness to expectations of fairness. Researchers in the organizational field in particular
have investigated a construct called anticipatory injustice – the expectation of injustice in
a future interaction with an authority – which, in the organizational literature, is usually a
future or current employer. Much like the research on fairness experiences, fairness
expectations have been shown to be important for willingness to approach the authority,
the perceiver’s own self efficacy, and, critically, the perception of fairness in future
experiences such that those who most strongly expect fairness are most likely to perceive
it (Bell, Ryan, Wiechmann, 2004; Bell, Wieschmann, & Ryan, 2006; Rodell & Colquitt,
2009).
Another relevant vein of research regards when fairness perceptions themselves
are important. A growing body of research has begun to investigate the situations in
which fairness is most influential. In a leading publication on the subject, Kees van den
Bos and E. Allan Lind (2002) applied the uncertainty management perspective to fairness
evaluations and outlined several studies that suggest that a primary utility in fairness
perceptions lies in their ability to address the uncertainty inherent in interactions with
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others. The authors argued that fairness perceptions are most important when the
trustworthiness of the actor is unknown.
In summary, the research outlined above makes three specific arguments that are
important for understanding and increasing perceptions of fairness in the context of these
land owner/state authority conflicts. First, it argues that the reason for the importance of
perceived procedural fairness lies in its ability to signal that the individual is valued in the
process. Second, it argues that voice in the process and the ability to influence the
decision are critical components of perceived procedural fairness. Third, the research
argues that these perceptions of procedural fairness will be most important in the face of
uncertainty about the decision maker. The following subsections discuss each of these
considerations in light of these land owner/state authority conflicts in turn.
Procedural Fairness and Group Value
As presented above, Tyler and colleagues have argued that the reason that
perceptions of procedural fairness influence pro-institutional reactions is because they
signal to the person interacting with the authority (in this case the land owner) that he or
she is a valued part of the process (e.g., Tyler, 1989). The need for personal value in these
land owner/state authority conflicts is no less important than in the context of the criminal
justice system; the domain in which the majority of this research has been conducted.
Much like defendants in the criminal justice system, land owners are entering a forum
that is likely unfamiliar to them and in which significant liberties are at risk. In this
situation, it is easy to understand how a perception that this system is motivated to act
against or simply ignore the land owner is likely to encourage land owners to disengage
from or even subvert the process. It is, therefore, important that land owners perceive that
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they are indeed valued and that, even if their interests are not served by the ultimate
determination, they remain an important part of the process.
The case law reviewed above, however, paints a somewhat bleak picture for this
perception of value in the process. All else being equal, each of the values of this process
(e.g., land productivity, conservation) should carry the day as often. Undoubtedly, the
fact that land owners are rarely victorious in these challenges is far from proof that they
are not valued in the process, but it is easy to see how it, at the very least, could create
that impression that the courts’ other values are more important, especially in situations
where these defeats were especially salient (e.g., if the perceiver was a party in such a
defeat, or if the perceiver lived in an area in which a number of these defeats occurred).
Rectifying this situation by requiring that land owners be successful more often is
laughable and, in many ways, misses the entire purpose of judicial review; namely, to
identify the right resolution of the conflict (though this review makes no argument as to
how “right” is or should be defined). Thus it is important that these perceptions of value
be encouraged in other ways, and creating an expectation of procedural fairness is one
such method.
Components of Procedural Fairness
Assuming, then, that procedural fairness evaluations are important, the next
question regards how they can best be encouraged. One common approach to this
question in the social sciences is the investigation of the components or factors that drive
these assessments. Using statistical modeling techniques, which seek to identify
constructs that account for independent variance in other constructs (in this case, usually
regression), social scientists have identified a plethora of potential components of
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procedural fairness but, to date, there does not appear to be a clearly accepted answer to
the name or even number of these components. Instead, the state of this literature is such
that it still suffers from a number of nomenclatural (e.g., different names for essentially
the same thing) and statistical (e.g., unaccounted for measurement error) concerns. What
is clear, however, is that the far majority of these components center around a handful of
concepts that, even on their face, are relevant to the perception of fairness. Specifically,
these components usually implicate perceptions of having voice in the process and the
ability to influence the decision.
In the context of these conflicts, land owners have good reason for perceiving
both the presence and absence of voice in the resolution process. Most obviously, land
owners typically have a right to voice in challenges to agency action. Most state and
federal statutes allow judicial review for persons with standing (usually roughly defined
as suffering some injury from the action). These judicial reviews present an opportunity
for the aggrieved land owner to be heard in a formal setting with an at least ostensibly
neutral decision maker. While this would seem to mean that this component is
sufficiently met, further evaluation reveals a somewhat more nuanced situation. The
primary issue in relying on these legal challenges as the formal opportunity for land
owners to be heard lies in the fact that, in reality, only a small minority of these potential
challenges ever make it into a courtroom. Some of these conflicts are never even brought
to the attention of the state authority, necessarily precluding any formal mechanism for
voice. Importantly, these situations challenge the definition of a conflict (in that the state
authority is unaware of the conflict’s existence), but they are no less important to land
owners who grudgingly accept the direction of the state authority for lack of sufficient
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motivation, knowledge, or resources to challenge it. Of the conflicts that do rise to the
attention of the state authorities, though, most will include some mechanism for being
heard. Although they vary from institution to institution, most of these state authorities
have some process for hearing concerns of interested parties. Unfortunately, however,
like the judicial reviews upon which many of these mechanisms were modeled, many of
these mechanisms are at least at risk of being overcrowded. The existence of these
opportunities for voice, therefore, requires some mechanism for denying the opportunity
to some. While this rationale is entirely accessible for most people, it is important that
effort be expended to ensure that it is perceived as fair.
A second component of procedural fairness perceptions is the ability to influence
the process. In many ways, this component has considerable overlap with the previous
one in that voice in the process often signals to the individual that she had some influence
on the ultimate decision, even if it was not outcome determinative. Importantly, however,
where this component is distinct from voice is that it is often influenced retrospectively.
It is entirely conceivable that an individual may feel that he was afforded the opportunity
for voice during the process but, upon evaluating the resulting decision, he may feel that
his participation was never given the opportunity to actually influence the decision.
Given the small minority of cases in which land owners are successful in judicial
reviews, it is likely that many of these land owners may feel that their participation was
less than influential, and potentially, entirely disregarded by the institution. One major
opportunity to rectify this perception is transparency, by which the state authorities and
courts present their rationale and explicitly show how the land owners’ participation was
considered in reaching the decision. Typically this is done by publishing opinions, but it
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is important to remember that these opinions may well be opaque to land owners. The
legalese and technical jargon that often plague these documents may effectively preclude
land owners from understanding them and therefore, understanding how their
participation influenced the decision.
Fairness in Light of Uncertainty
A final concern regarding procedural fairness in these conflicts arises from the
research investigating the situations in which procedural fairness evaluations are most
important. Researchers have consistently shown that procedural fairness evaluations are
more strongly connected to positive reactions to authorities when the participant is more
uncertain (i.e., unknowledgeable or inexperienced) regarding the authority or the
situation generally (Van Den Bos & Lind, 2002; see also, Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, &
PytlikZillig, 2012). Applied to these conflicts, this argues that individuals who are more
uncertain about the courts, state authorities, the process, and/or the decision itself are
likely to be most influenced by procedural fairness. While there are certainly a number of
land owners who have a great deal of knowledge and experience regarding these
institutions and the resolution of these conflicts, there can be no doubt that there are many
who remain particularly uncertain, as most of the public is relatively uninformed about
policy issues in general (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1990) and the courts and state
authorities are no exception. In particular, the process of challenging state authorities
both in court and in the state authority’s internal review process is likely to be beyond the
scope of most land owners’ experience if not knowledge. Additionally, these court
decisions themselves are often difficult to truly understand with many courts ruling only
on the issues they have to and leaving many of the details to future courts or state
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authorities for interpretation. Thus, these state authority/land owner conflicts may be
situations in which the perception of fairness is of especially critical import.
Conclusion
State institutions are critical to addressing the natural resources challenges of the
modern world. In the United States, the high percentage of privately owned land
necessarily dictates that these institutions be afforded some level of jurisdiction over
private property. Although this jurisdiction is important for the management of natural
resources in general, the natural orientation of natural resource institutions to sustained
use and of land owners to immediate use often puts these interests in conflict. Given the
importance of navigating these conflicts for effective natural resources management, an
understanding of how best to resolve these conflicts is critical. Although only a small
number of cases were identified that fit the scope of this paper, they suggest that state
institutions are frequently successful in these formal resolutions. The majority of the
cases reviewed were resolved in favor of the natural resources authority and in many of
the cases, especially in Kansas and Nebraska, the courts explicitly avowed some level of
institutionalized deference to the agency. While this deference is reasonable in this
context, especially because of the comparatively greater expertise of the authorities, this
deference creates the potential for concerns about the fairness of the process.
The relevant research suggests that for most individuals, perceptions of fairness
will be a major driver of their reactions to the institution, such that those who perceive
the process to be fairer are more likely to comply and cooperate with the institution.
Applying this literature creates three specific concerns in the resolution of these conflicts:
1) These conflicts create a situation in which land owners are likely to question their
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place as a valued part of the decision-making process, a perception that has been shown
to be influenced by experiences and, potentially, expectations of procedural fairness. 2)
The perception of procedural fairness is likely to be strongly influenced by perceptions
that the land owner has had voice in the process and that his participation has had the
ability to influence the final decision. 3) Because these conflicts both create and are
resolved in situations about which many land owners are likely to be uncertain,
procedural fairness concerns are likely to be of especially critical import. In conclusion,
then, the effective management of natural resources in this country will be considerably
more likely in the face of public perceptions of procedural fairness. As such, state natural
resources authorities would be well-served in efforts intended to increase these
perceptions.
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CHAPTER TWO: AN ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK OF TRUST IN THE
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

From individual interactions (e.g., Rotter, 1971) to the effective functioning of
societies (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2007; Warren, 1999), trust is an important part
of virtually every human interaction. This importance has spawned a broad body of
research such that scholars from almost every social science discipline and many of the
natural sciences have written extensively on the topic. These scholars have approached
trust from a number of theoretical perspectives applying various definitions and
methodologies creating a noteworthy lack of consistent conceptualization or
operationalization of the construct in the relevant literature. In fact, in a recent review of
empirical literature from a single area of trust scholarship – environmental risk
management – Earle (2010) identified 150 measures of trust in 132 studies. The trust
conceptualizations (called “forms” in his paper) were broadly categorized following a
well-cited argument in the trust literature (Rosseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998) that
identifies two major types of trust, namely, relational trust (which Earle terms “trust”)
and calculative trust (which is termed “confidence”). Within these two major types, the
forms were further divided as a function of their dimensionality. For example, Cobb and
Macoubrie (2004) utilized a single item operationalization of trust which simply asked
“How much do you trust business leaders within the nanotechnology industry to
minimize the potential risks to humans?” Contrastingly, de Jonge, van Trijp, Renes, and
Frewer (2007) utilized a multidimensional operationalization of confidence that included
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four items measuring optimism (e.g., “I am confident that food products are safe”) and
another three which measured pessimism (e.g., “I worry about the safety of food”).
Similarly, in a review of organizational trust research, McEvily and Tortoriello
(2011) found 129 different measures of trust in 171 studies. In fact, they find only 22
measures that have been used more than once and of those 22, only five were used more
than five times (Cook & Wall, 1980; McAllister, 1995; Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974); and
of those five, two measures came from the same publication (Mayer & Davis, 1999). This
lack of consistency in the measurement of trust confounds a comprehensive
understanding of the construct because it significantly complicates the comparability of
the constructs measured and, therefore, the generalizability of their results. Thus, it may
be that all similarly worded “trust” items do, in fact, tap the same underlying construct,
but it may also be that they measure distinct constructs that, even more troublingly, may
be differentially correlated with relevant outcomes in specific situations.
Lamenting this “verbal and conceptual morass” (Barber, 1983, p. 1), and
especially its role in preventing the unified advancement of a comprehensive social
science of trust, has become a centerpiece of many of the major reviews of the literature.
In his review of the generalized trust literature across domains, Nannestad (2008, p. 416)
argues, “the results [of trust studies] do not normally tell much – if anything – about the
merits of one theoretical concept of trust versus the merits of another, as empirical studies
are seldom designed to distinguish between different concepts of trust and their
implications.” Balliet and Van Lange (2012) make a similar point in their meta-analytic
review of trust and cooperation in social dilemmas, pointing out that despite the
considerable emphasis on trust in the social and natural sciences, numerous
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conceptualizations persist. In the organizational context, McKnight and Chervany (1996)
review the, then, existing definitions of trust and argue that, despite some common
thematic elements, trust is still not well-understood, while Kramer (1999), in “assessing
the state of this rapidly growing [organizational trust] literature” (p. 569), argues that “a
concise and universally accepted definition of trust has remained elusive” (p. 571). More
recently, Colquitt, Scott, and LePine’s (2007) meta-analytic review of trust echoes this
point, arguing that the “multidisciplinary perspective [of trust research]… has created
confusion about the definition and conceptualization of the trust construct” (p. 909).
Other scholars, however, have been much more positive regarding the state of the
literature. In an oft-cited cross-domain review of trust, Rosseau, Sitkin, Burt, and
Camerer (1998) argue that, “despite the common concern regarding our very different
disciplinary lenses (i.e., ‘blinders’), we observe considerable overlap and synthesis in
contemporary scholarship on trust” (p. 402). In fact, in each of the three major areas of
trust literature (organizations, risk management, and government), at least one recent
review has made some argument as to an increasing consensus regarding aspects of trust
in their respective domains (e.g., Earle, 2010 [risk management]; Levi & Stoker, 2000
[government]; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011 [organizations]). Specifically, the trust
literature appears to be increasingly converging on an acceptance of trust as a willingness
to accept vulnerability in dealings with others (McEvily & Tortiorello, 2011). The nature
of free will within our species dictates that at any given moment, any person may act in
another’s favor or not. The extent of this vulnerability, obviously, will depend on the
specific interaction but, without question, there is some level of uncertainty (and
therefore vulnerability) inherent in every human interaction. Even long-standing, social
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interactions characterized by trust (e.g., marriages) can be marred at any times by the
negative actions of one or both parties. In fact, some researchers have referred to this as
the “fundamental social dilemma,” such that in every interaction, individuals must decide
whether to accept this vulnerability or reject the interaction (Lind, 2001, p. 61). Trust,
then, is the willingness to accept this vulnerability in dealings with an “other” (e.g.,
Hetherington, 2005; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Moellering, 2013; Rosseau,
Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998; Warren, 1999).
Proposed Framework of Trust
The proposed framework of trust borrows especially heavily from two existing
trust models. The first was proposed by McKnight and Chervany (1996), who, after
evaluating the 60 most frequently cited or conceptually distinct trust definitions from the
management, communication, sociology, economics, political science, and psychological
trust literatures, concluded that trust is, in fact, a collection of discrete but interrelated
constructs. Following the lead of the Theory of Planned Behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen,
1975), the authors hypothesize that the attitudinal constructs (dispositional trust, trusting
beliefs and system trust) lead to an intention to trust which then leads to engaging in
trusting behavior. From McKnight and Chervany’s model, the proposed framework
borrows its overall structure, especially its postulation that attitudinal trust leads to an
intention to act trustingly which subsequently leads to trusting behavior (see Figure 1).
The three constructs differ in manifestation (as an attitude, intention or behavior), but
share an emphasis on accepting the vulnerability that arises from the uncertainty that is
inherent in all human interaction because of human agency. Although there are certainly
other drivers of intention to trust and trusting behavior (e.g., ability to act, perception of
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risk, etc.), the proposed framework hypothesizes that each construct will share important
predictive variance with its subsequent construct. 1
************************************************************************
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
************************************************************************
The second model from which the proposed model borrows heavily was proposed
by Mayer and colleagues (1995). The model posits that trust is driven by the trustor’s
evaluation that the target is worthy of that trust because it has sufficient technical ability,
benevolent intentions, and integrity (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Although not
without challengers in the literature, the central argument, that trust is driven by
evaluations of the trust target, is widely accepted by trust researchers (e.g., Earle,
Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2008; Hardin, 2013; Levi & Stoker, 2000). From this model, the
proposed framework borrows its notion of the bases of attitudinal trust. Specifically, it
hypothesizes that a willingness to accept vulnerability – the essence of trust – is based
upon relevant evaluations. The proposed framework therefore suggests that the bases of,
or reasons for, a trusting attitude will include constructs like the trustor’s propensity to
trust across situations (dispositional trust); factors within a system that encourage the
trustor’s trust (system trust); Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) ability, benevolence, and
integrity constructs; and other relevant evaluations. Thus, within the proposed
framework, these bases are limited only by the fact that they must be concepts which lend
themselves to either the lessening (but not removal) of vulnerability or increasing its

1

Note that the recursivity of this framework is, at this point, an open question; however, it stands to reason,
and is not inconsistent with existing literature, that the trusting behaviors may themselves impact the
attitude as suggested, for example, by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995).
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acceptability within the trustor.2 For example, a belief that the target shares the values of
the trustor would be an appropriate basis within this framework, because this belief
should lead the trustor to believe that the target is guided by similar principles and is,
therefore, likely to come to a similar conclusion. Race, however, would not be a basis of
trust within this framework, as simply being of a specific racial descent has no influence
on actual vulnerability or its perception. Importantly, however, the experience of being a
member of a majority race may, for example, influence the perception that the target
shares one’s values, which as mentioned above, is an appropriate basis within the
framework.
Although this means that the list of potential bases of attitudinal trust is
expansive, these bases are likely to vary somewhat reliably as a function of the situation.
For example, bases that require some level of knowledge (e.g., I trust because I know the
target is generally “good”) cannot be strong drivers of trusting attitudes when the
trustor’s knowledge is low. Similarly, bases that require some level of experience (e.g., I
trust because the target has treated me well in the past) must yield to other bases when the
trustor has no relevant experience. Conversely, some bases are likely to become more
important in some situations. For example, when faced with a technical situation, beliefs
regarding the target’s technical competency are likely to be more important drivers of
trusting attitudes.
Attitudinal trust is, therefore, something of a meta-construct in that it is a fairly
global evaluation that is determined, to some degree, by any number of potential bases. It
is important to note, though, that it remains unclear from the literature whether this meta2

It is unclear from the literature at this point whether these bases of trust make individuals less vulnerable
by increasing their certainty about the interaction or if it simply eases their concerns about a persisting
vulnerability (see Earle, 2010).
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construct is itself directly measurable (e.g., with single-item measures like “do you trust
X”) or if responses to these questions are simply another of the differentially predictive
bases of the willingness to accept vulnerability. Stated differently, it is not clear from the
literature whether responses to questions like “do you trust X” directly tap a willingness
to be vulnerable itself or if the responses are a more global evaluation of the target upon
which a willingness to be vulnerable is subsequently based. To avoid this potential
confusion, the following review will use “trust” to refer to the broader willingness to be
vulnerable and the names of the bases of that trust when referring to them specifically.
Scope of Review
Although this framework of trust is meant to be applicable to all human
interactions, a comprehensive review of the entire trust-related literature would be
unwieldy. Instead, the review will focus on literature that empirically addresses
individual, target-specific3 trust from the perspective of three, relatively well-developed,
bodies of literature that have progressed more or less independently of each other
(organizations, risk, and government4). This literature, although somewhat disparate, tells
a very consistent story when viewed through the lens of the proposed framework.
Although the most important bases of trust, operationalizations of attitudinal trust, and
specific trust intentions and behaviors vary as a function of the domain, the overall
structure of the proposed framework is widely supported in the trust literature across
domains.

3

By “target-specific” it is meant that the trust evaluation is specific to the target. This is in contrast to
constructs like social capital, moral trust, and dispositional trust which instead refer to either a target nonspecific perception of or predisposition within the trustor.
4
Note that the because of their place within government, the literature regarding trust in the courts will be
reviewed with trust in government but as a distinct subsection because of the courts’ important differences
from the rest of the institutions of government.
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Note that the bodies of literature identified in this review are not exhaustive.
Attitudinal trust has been discussed in a number of other literatures and domains that are
more or less distinct from the three identified above – for example, natural resources
management (e.g., Leahy & Anderson, 2008), technology acceptance (e.g., GrabnerKrauter & Kaluscha, 2003), and fashion (e.g., Cademan, Frendberg, & Savic, 2012).
Behavioral trust, in particular, has also been the subject of extensive research within
game theoretic frameworks that are particularly common in behavioral economics (see
Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006). These important literatures are neglected in this
review, however, for two major reasons. First, regarding attitudinal trust and its bases, the
three bodies of literature identified here are arguably the most developed to date. Scholars
have discussed the relevance of trust since the 1960’s in the organizational (e.g., Shepard,
1967) and government literatures (Stokes, 1962) and, although the seminal publication in
risk-management was only in the 1990’s (Slovic, 1993), the literature has exploded with
work since then. Importantly, the considerable emphasis on trust from behavioral
economics is not addressed here because it has paid relatively little attention to the
attitudinal aspects of trust (Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillispie, 2006) which are the primary
focus of this review. The majority of this work has instead focused only on trust as a
behavior (or, occasionally, an intended behavior) and has sought primarily to increase or
decrease behavioral cooperation between players in a game theoretic paradigm. Second,
most of the other bodies of research either fit within these three perspectives (i.e.,
applying the same conceptualizations and constructs) or are offshoots of them (i.e., they
bring these or slightly modified versions of these conceptualizations and constructs into
new areas). For example, as discussed in Chapter Three, trust in natural resources
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regulation frequently applies conceptualizations of trust from the risk management
literature (e.g., salient values similarity and the Trust, Confidence, and Cooperation
model). In fact, a noteworthy portion of the trust in natural resources management
literature is conducted by well-known risk management researchers (e.g., Cvetkovich and
Siegrist). As a result, discussion of these important areas is not necessary for a
comprehensive understanding of how the presented framework applies to trust research.
Note, however, that these other literatures are generally not inconsistent with the
framework as presented.
Trust in Organizations
Trust in organizations is arguably the largest and most developed major body of
trust research within the scope of this review. Organizations, as collections of individuals
with a common goal, have long captured the interest of researchers and practitioners who
work to increase their ability to achieve their goal for which trust has been commonly
recognized as important (Bigley & Pearce, 1998; McEvily, Perron, & Zaheer, 2003). In
contrast to the other literatures reviewed, the organizational literature benefits greatly
from an increasingly ubiquitous understanding of what trust is (McEvily & Tortoriello,
2011). In particular, two heavily overlapping definitions of trust are often considered to
be the most cited in this literature, collectively eliciting roughly 2000 citations according
to the Web of Science (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). The first argues that trust is “the
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor,
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). The second definition was proposed by Rosseau, Sitkin, Burt
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and Camerer, who, after reviewing the definitions of trust from across literatures –
including the one proposed by Mayer and colleagues (1995) – argue that most scholarly
writing accepts a definition similar to the one that they propose: “trust is a psychological
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon the positive expectations
of the intentions or behaviors of the other” (1998, p. 395). Thus, organizational trust is
typically premised upon the personal vulnerability of individuals to the actions of others
that is inherent in interactions within an organization because of the potential that others
may exploit the cooperation of the trustor (Lind, 2001). It is, therefore, theoretically
important in this literature because it allows individuals within organizations to reduce or
accept this vulnerability and work together efficiently.
Because of the close interaction of individuals in organizational settings, the
majority of research in this area investigates trust between familiar individuals
proximately located within a single organization, for example, an employee’s trust in her
“supervisor” (Colquitt & Rodell, 2011, p. 1191). Laboratory studies have also sought to
simulate this familiarity by having participants work directly with confederates (e.g.,
Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). In these studies, the vulnerability of the trustor is apparent
in that proximate individuals have the most potential for the exploitation of cooperation
(e.g., an immediate supervisor who exploits his employees’ hard work for personal
recognition). Some scholarship, however, has investigated trust between geographically
distant individuals who may have considerably less familiarity. For example, Mortensen
and Neeley’s evaluation of the role of reflected knowledge asked employees to discuss
their trust in collaborators from “the distant office with which they most often interacted”
(2012, p. 8). This interest in trust between geographically distant individuals is especially
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common in the context of the internet (e.g., van Slyke, Belanger, & Communale, 2009),
where individuals within and across organizations interact without ever being in close
proximity. Additionally, although the majority of the research in the organizational
context addresses trust in an individual, some does discuss trust in an organization as a
whole (e.g., public perceptions of corporations). In the case of geographically distant or
organizational targets, the vulnerability may be somewhat less apparent; nonetheless, this
notion of trust as a willingness to accept vulnerability remains applicable in both cases as
the exploitation of vulnerability is still possible. Indeed, the greater distance or
differential status of the individual and organization may even facilitate exploitation.
Bases of Trust
There are a number of proposed bases for organizational trust. One of the most
commonly discussed in this literature is trustworthiness, a context specific evaluation of
the characteristics of the target that make it worthy of being trusted (i.e., less likely to
exploit the vulnerability of the trustor; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Although a
number of dimensions of trustworthiness have been proposed in the organizational
literature, the identification of common themes in these dimensions has led researchers to
propose that there are at least three important dimensions; ability, benevolence, and
integrity (Mayer, Davis, Schoorman, 1995). When considered in light of this notion of
trust as a willingness to be vulnerable in dealings with another, ability is the belief that
the target has the technical competence to accomplish the positive expectations of the
trustor. Benevolence and integrity are beliefs that the target is motivated to accomplish
these expectations but differ in that, for benevolence, the motivation is external (care for
the trustor) while, for integrity, it is the target’s own internal principles that motivate his
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or her behavior. These dimensions have frequently been applied in research and have
been shown to be important predictors of a willingness to be vulnerable in organizational
settings. In fact, Colquitt, Scott, and LePine (2007) conducted a meta-analysis of 132
independent samples in which the influence of these components of trustworthiness on
trust was tested, and they found an overall effect for all three constructs on a willingness
to accept vulnerability, such that ability has the strongest independent relationship
followed by benevolence and integrity.
Another important basis of trust in the organizational literature is that of
organizational justice. Interest in organizational justice spiked in the 1960’s and 1970’s
resulting in a great deal of research on the topic and a number of relevant theories
(Greenberg, 1987). Although this research is somewhat disparate, it shares a common
root in attempting to explain how individuals evaluate decisions to which they are subject
(Colquitt, 2001). While there has been disagreement as to the dimensionality of
organizational justice over the years (e.g., Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001; Greenberg,
1993; Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993), most of the current discussion applies a
dimensionality similar to that identified by Colquitt (2001). After evaluating the relevant
literature, he identified what he argued to be four distinct dimensions of organizational
justice: interpersonal, informational, distributive, and procedural fairness. The first and
second dimensions find their roots in research on interactional justice that argues that
appropriate treatment by decision makers is important for trustors’ concepts of justice
(e.g., Bies & Moag, 1986). Within this broader notion of interactional justice, researchers
have found support for two separate sub-dimensions: interpersonal justice (characterized
by notions like propriety and respect) and informational justice (characterized by notions
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like truthfulness and justification). The third dimension, procedural fairness, follows the
propositions of Thibaut & Walker (1975), who argue that individuals care deeply about
the fairness of the procedures used by an authority in coming to a decision relevant to
them. Thus, this construct is characterized by notions like outcome control and
impartiality. The final dimension of organizational justice is distributive justice. Because
he argues that most of the relevant literature has focused on increasing productivity,
Colquitt’s (2001) conceptualization of distributive justice follows the work of Deutsch
(1975), who argues that the perceived fairness of the outcomes of decisions also has an
important influence on evaluators’ concept of justice. It is, therefore, conceptualized in
this study – and much, but not all, of the literature – by applying equity theory (an
evaluation of appropriateness of the ratio of the effort applied and the benefit received;
e.g., Adams, 1965). These four dimensions of organizational justice are important bases
of a willingness to accept vulnerability in dealings with another because by showing that
the target respects the trustor (interpersonal justice), is forthcoming about relevant
information (informational justice), and/or is fair in both process (procedural fairness)
and outcomes (distributive justice), they suggest that the trustor’s vulnerability is unlikely
to be exploited.
In addition to these major bases (trustworthiness and organizational justice), there
are a number of bases that are much less commonly cited in the organizational literature.
One in particular, however, has been the subject of increasing scholarship and is therefore
worthy of note; namely, anticipatory injustice. The seminal publication argues that
anticipatory injustice is the trustor’s expectation that the target will act unjustly toward
the trustor (e.g., by exploiting the trustor’s vulnerability; Shapiro & Kirkman, 2001). The
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authors argue that these expectancies should be important in a number of organizationally
relevant situations, especially those in which the trustor is forced to make a judgment
about future cooperation (e.g., in a hiring interview), and their propositions have been
largely supported (Bell, Ryan, & Wiechmann, 2004; Bell, Wiechmann, & Ryan, 2006;
Ritter, Fischbein, & Lord, 2005).
Intention to Trust and Behavioral Trust
As suggested above, the organizational trust literature is chiefly concerned with
the effective function of organizations. Thus, the majority of the trusting intentions and
behaviors discussed in this literature revolve around increasing the efficiency of the
organization through increases in specific constructs like cooperation (e.g., DeCremer &
Tyler, 2007; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1997) and compliance
(e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2009; Murphy & Tyler, 2008). Because of this
emphasis, a significant body of organizational research has investigated organizational
citizenship behavior (OCB), a multi-dimensional construct intended to quantify the
behaviors of employees who go beyond their required tasks for the good of their
organization. Although OCB has been conceptualized as having as few as two
dimensions (e.g., altruism and compliance; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983), most
scholarship seems to argue for approximately five (e.g., conscientiousness,
sportsmanship, altruism, courtesy, and civic virtue; Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1993).
These behaviors simultaneously make individuals most likely to contribute to the success
of the organization (Organ & Ryan, 1995) but also place them at greatest risk for
exploitation. The organizational literature has, therefore, frequently pointed to the
importance of attitudinal trust in increasing OCB (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Van
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den Bos & Lind, 2002), but the strength or even existence of a relationship between trust
and a specific OCB dimension often depends on the base(s) of trust that are measured. Of
the bases of trust in this context, the relationship between organizational justice and OCB
is probably the best supported in the literature. For example, Moorman, Niehoff, and
Organ (1993) find direct relationships between procedural fairness and courtesy,
sportsmanship, and conscientiousness in addition to indirect effects via affective and
continuance commitment and work satisfaction. In a more recent study conducted in
India, Gupta and Singh (2013) also found that although all of Colquitt’s (2001)
organizational justice dimensions were associated with most of the OCB dimensions,
only empowerment justice (a dimension specific to Indian contexts) was associated with
compliance behavior, and its relationship was marginal (p < .10).
Summary
Organizational trust is one major area of trust research. Within this domain, trust
is usually thought of as a willingness to accept personal vulnerability to the actions of
others in the context of an organization. The majority of this literature operationalizes
attitudinal trust as held in reference to an individual with whom the trustor has direct
contact, but work has also investigated trust in geographically distant others and
organizations themselves. A number of bases of this willingness to accept vulnerability
exist, but three important ones are trustworthiness (characteristics of the trusted that make
them worthy of trust), organizational justice (evaluations of the fairness of interactions),
and anticipatory injustice (expectations of unfairness in interactions). The outcomes of
attitudinal trust in the organizational literature usually relate to the increased efficacy of
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organizations, and particular attention has been paid to associations with organizational
citizenship behaviors (OCB).
Trust and Risk Management
The second major body of trust literature within the scope of this review is that of
trust in risk management. Risk, as the “chance of injury, damage or loss,” is often a
particularly evasive concept for much of the public (Slovic, 1999, p. 690) and the
subjective risk perceptions of the public are often much different than the objective,
calculative evaluations of the probability of specific harms by experts (Amin, Jahi, Nor,
Osman, & Mahadi, 2007). Lacking the ability and/or motivation to thoughtfully evaluate
risks, public perceptions of them are often strongly influenced by non-technical factors
like sex, worldviews, and trust in the entity responsible for managing the risk (Slovic,
1999). Fundamentally, then, within this body of literature, trust is thought of as a
heuristic method by which individuals deal with the complexity involved in evaluating
their vulnerability to the managed risk (Slovic, 2010). Trust in this scholarship is,
therefore, similar to the organizational literature in that both seek to decrease or assuage
the personal vulnerability inherent in human agency (in this case the agency of the risk
managers who may or may not adequately manage the risk). Importantly, however,
because of the relatively more distal relationships of many trustors and risk managers,
much of this literature focuses less on individual trust in specific others and more on trust
in often ill-defined groups. For example, Siegrist and Cvetkovich asked their participants
to respond to their perceptions of the “authorities regulating the following items” (2000,
p. 715). Similarly, Allum asked the public to report their evaluations of “scientists
working on G[enetically]M[odified] foods” (2007, p. 939). Although this lack of
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specificity flies in the face of arguments by researchers in other contexts who believe that
trust can only be experienced between specific individuals (e.g., Hardin, 1999), there is
little question that trustors are vulnerable to the actions of risk managers like natural
resources authorities and regulatory institutions in managing risks like electromagnetic
fields, genetically modified foods, and forest fires regardless of whether the target is
perceived as a specific individual or ill-defined group.
Bases of Trust
Risk researchers have proposed a number of potential bases for trust in risk
management, notably including salient values similarity, confidence, care for the
trustor/public and technical competence. Salient values similarity is one of the most
developed of these bases and has been primarily investigated as a counter-point to
confidence in the Trust, Confidence, and Cooperation (TCC) model. Salient values
similarity is an evaluation within the trustor that he or she shares important (salient)
values with the trusted institution (Winter & Cvetkovich, 2008). Thus, it is an evaluation
of the motivations of the trusted entity but is distinct from an expectation about how the
entity itself will act in the future, which they term confidence (Siegrist, 2010). The TCC
model, therefore, follows a common division in research on impression formation – that
of morality and performance information (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), such that
salient values similarity is driven by evaluations of morality information (e.g., the
benevolence, integrity, care, and fairness of the entity), while confidence is driven by
evaluations of performance information (e.g., the entity’s ability, competence, and the
rules or regulations by which its future conduct is prescribed; Earle, Siegrist, & Gutscher,
2007). In the TCC model, the authors argue that salient values similarity (which they
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refer to simply as trust) and confidence are two independent attitudinal trust pathways
that provide the trustor with important information relevant to accepting his or her
vulnerability to the target’s agency in the management of the risk. This information, in
turn, increases behavioral trust which they operationalize as cooperation (Earle, Siegrist,
& Gutscher, 2007). In a notably comprehensive test of this model, Siegrist, Earle and
Gutscher (2003) surveyed 1313 Swiss citizens regarding their trust and confidence in
managers of the risk from mobile phone radiation and largely supported the relationships
hypothesized by the model.
The second set of bases of attitudinal trust arises from literature regarding the
“dimensions of trust.” Following work from outside the risk management literature (e.g.,
Barber, 1983), risk researchers have proposed a number of potential “dimensions” of trust
(e.g., Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992; Renn & Levine, 1991), notably including
competence and care. Much like benevolence from the organizational literature, care
refers to the belief of the trustor that the trusted entity has some level of “care or concern
for other people” (Allum, 2007) and is therefore likely to appropriately manage the risk
for which they are responsible. Also, complementary to the organizational literature,
competence (akin to ability in organizations) is the belief that the trusted entity has the
necessary knowledge and experience to adequately manage the risk (Peters, Covello, &
McCallum, 1997). As in the organizational context, competence and care influence a
willingness to accept vulnerability by suggesting that the trust target is both capable of
and motivated towards accomplishing their positive expectations.
A final, increasingly common basis of trust in this literature is fairness (e.g.,
Besley, 2010; Lauber & Knuth, 1997; Lawrence, 1995). As in the organizational
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literature, fairness is hypothesized to provide important information to the trustor about
the target which influences the willingness to accept his or her vulnerability to the
management actions of the target. Importantly, though, very little of this research has
developed within this literature and instead, most risk researchers directly apply Tyler
and colleagues’ work regarding procedural fairness (discussed further in the next
section).
Intention to Trust and Behavioral Trust
Intention to and behavioral trust in the risk management literature revolve
primarily around reactions to risk, in particular, the acceptance of the risk itself and risk
management action. Regarding risk acceptance, researchers have consistently found
support for an association between trust and its bases and increased public acceptance of
risks like electromagnetic fields (Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2003), algal blooms
(Huang, Sun, Ban, & Bi, 2010), and high-speed railways (Marincioni & Appiotti, 2009).
Despite this generally supported association, however, some research seems to suggest
that the relationship may be somewhat complicated. For example, Siegrist (2000) finds
support for a model that suggests that trust in risk managers indirectly influences
acceptance of risk by decreasing the perceived risk and increasing its perceived benefit.
Additionally, although Poortinga and Pidgeon (2006) find an association between trust
and the acceptability of risk from genetically modified foods, they fail to find a
significant association with an intention to purchase or eat it. Nevertheless, the far
majority of research seems to argue that risk acceptability is influenced by trust in the
risk management entity, regardless of the mechanism or its association with actual
behavior.
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Trust has also been consistently shown to be important for public acceptance of
management actions like the management of endangered species (e.g., Cvetkovich &
Winter, 2003) and fire risk (e.g., Vaske, Bright, & Absher, 2007). For example, Winter
and Cvetkovich (2008) find that trust (specifically, salient values similarity) maintains an
important predictive influence on approval of fire risk management techniques like
controlled burns and restrictions of use, even when controlling for knowledge about fire
management and issue concern. In addition to this passive acceptance of management
action, trust has also been associated with more active voluntary action. Earle and
Siegrist find an association between attitudinal trust and responses to items like “I would
support the efforts of the decision makers in any way I can” (2008, p. 1403). Notably,
however, some research indicates that the relationship between trust and active
participation may be curvilinear, as in work by Yandle, Hajj, and Raciborski (2011), who
find an inverted “U” shaped distribution of participation and trust. The authors argue that
with too much or too little trust, individuals may disengage and that only with moderate
levels of trust can participation be expected.
Summary
Trust in risk management is a second important area of trust scholarship. Within
this literature, attitudinal trust is usually thought of as a heuristic method for dealing with
the complexities in risk evaluation and accepting the vulnerability involved in allowing
another to manage a risk to you (e.g., electromagnetic fields, genetically modified foods,
natural resources management, etc.). The bases of this willingness that are most common
in this literature are salient values similarity (an evaluation of the important values shared
by the trustor and the risk management entity), confidence (an expectation about the
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future behavior of the risk management entity), the “dimensions of trust” (evaluations of
the care and competence of the risk manager), and fairness (an evaluation of the fairness
of the procedures used by the risk manager). Because of the interest in the efficient
management of risks, the primary trust behaviors discussed in this literature are the
acceptance of risk and evaluations of specific risk management actions, but the
relationships between trust and many of these outcomes are somewhat complicated.
Trust and Government
The last major body of scholarship in which trust has been investigated is that of
trust in government. As with the other bodies of literature, attitudinal trust in government
is theorized to be a willingness to accept vulnerability, but in this context, the
vulnerability arises specifically from allowing government to have authority
(Hetherington, 2005; Levi & Stoker, 1999; Offe, 1999; Warren, 1999). At a policy level,
trusting individuals give up some of their autonomy and allow the government some level
of control over their lives. Although government is expected to act in the best interests of
its people, it may instead seek to disadvantage or even undermine various groups.
Examples of these kinds of extreme government action are replete in history (e.g.,
Apartheid in South Africa), but they are increasingly uncommon in today’s developed
world. Instead, much of the contemporary vulnerability occurs on a process level. In the
United States and other democratic countries, government is elected to represent the
people. Trusting individuals, therefore, allow government to speak for them and ensure
that their interests are represented. As at the policy level, governmental agency allows for
the possibility that governments may not honor the interests of their constituency, thereby
stifling their voice in the process of government. Indeed, the increasingly polarized nature
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of modern politics virtually guarantees that on most noteworthy political issues, a large
number of people will disapprove of whatever action governments take (e.g., the
Affordable Care Act). As the willingness to accept the vulnerability inherent in its
agency, trust in government is, therefore, important because it allows for the effective
function of government. As Hetherington argues, “government will, on average, solve
fewer problems when political trust is low” (2005, p. 15).
Unlike most other bodies of trust scholarship, trust in government benefits from
widely accepted measures of the construct. Beginning in the 1960s, Stokes (1962)
introduced four questions to the American National Election Study (ANES) that have
become the mainstays of the field.5 These four questions ask respondents how much of
the time they feel they can trust the government in Washington, how much tax money
they feel is wasted, whether government officials are out for themselves, and how much
of the government is crooked. Although slightly different items have been used in other
surveys both in the U.S. (e.g., the General Social Survey) and abroad (e.g., the European
Social Survey), most are very similar to these four and have produced a great deal of at
least ostensibly comparable results. In fact, it is often the evaluation of the data from
these surveys that has led researchers to believe that trust in government has dropped in
the recent past (Levi & Stoker, 2000; see also Hetherington & Globetti, 2002; Lipset &
Schneider, 1987; Rudolph & Evans, 2005). Scholars have noted these troubling declines
in established democracies (Rothstein, 2009), and the United States does not seem to be
immune (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000). Ever since the especially precipitous decline
in the Vietnam War/Johnson/Nixon years (Nye, 2010), scholars have embarked on a
5

Note however, that these questions were originally intended to measure general evaluations of
government and not “trust” specifically. This has provided much of the impetus for those who question
whether they truly tap trust at all (see Levi & Stoker, 2000).
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concerted effort to explain the decreases in trust in government in the United States, but a
number of important concerns remain. Chief among them is the question of whether the
declines in trust represent specific distrust in the current administration of government or
are a more diffuse evaluation of the political process as a whole (see Chanley, Rudolph,
& Rahn, 2000). That is to say, despite the ubiquity of the items, there remains
considerable discussion of what these trust items are actually measuring, especially
regarding these specific and diffuse concerns (see Citrin, 1974; Hetherington, 1998; Levi
& Stoker, 2000; Miller, 1974a; Miller, 1974b; Mishler & Rose, 2001).
Bases of Trust
Like the other bodies of literature, researchers have discussed a number of
potential bases of attitudinal trust in government. There is little question that attitudinal
trust in government is a complex process (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000) fed by
“many streams” (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001a, p. 12), leading to some speculation
that there are no consistent bases across situations (Boukaert & de Walle, 2003).
Impartiality or trustworthiness of government officials, absence or reduction of risk
through certainty or transparency, participation, and belief in the political process have all
been discussed as potential sources of trust in government (Boukaert & de Walle, 2003),
but without question, the most commonly discussed basis in the literature is satisfaction
(Hetherington, 2005; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001a; Miller, 1974a). Although often
pursued in its own right and not as a basis of trust, the argument is that constituencies use
their perception of the performance of their government to determine whether the
government actually values their interests (Hetherington, 2005) and thus the probability
that it will exploit their vulnerability. Thus, much like confidence in the risk management
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literature, individuals draw upon their satisfaction with the previous behavior of
government to form expectations of its future behavior. The focus on satisfaction in the
political trust literature arises primarily from the nearly ubiquitous use of the ANES
questions to measure political trust. Research has frequently shown that major drops in
responses to these questions follow public dissatisfaction with major political mishaps
like Watergate and Vietnam in the 1960’s and Iran-Contra in the 1980’s (Hetherington,
2005; but see Hetherington, 1998, who argues for a reversed causality such that political
trust leads to satisfaction). Likely because one of the ANES questions directly references
Washington, satisfaction with the incumbent federal government, and more specifically
its economic policies, is often most connected to political trust (Levi & Stoker, 2000).
Note, however, that research has suggested the potential for priming effects from recent
information such that this is not always the case, and responses may instead reference
whatever institution of government is most salient to the respondent at that moment (e.g.,
responses may follow satisfaction with the U.S. Supreme Court after a landmark case;
Hetherington, 2005). Although this ambiguity in target is especially problematic in light
of evidence that Americans often feel very differently about various government
institutions (e.g., Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995), it is clear that satisfaction plays a
major role in constituents’ perception of and reactions to their government and, because
of its role in establishing expectations, their willingness to accept the vulnerability
inherent in its agency.
A second important basis in this literature is legitimacy. Although variously
defined, legitimacy is usually thought of as a right to make rules as held by an authority
(Lake, 2009) and, therefore, the government’s right to its constituency’s acceptance of
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vulnerability. Referred to as the “central issue in social and political theory” (Beetham,
1991, p. 41), it is this right to rule that permits government to effect social order without
resorting to a resource intensive instrumental approach (Horne, 2009) and insulates them
from overthrow or collapse (Gilley, 2006). In spite of this importance, however, scholarly
understanding of legitimacy is somewhat limited, especially because it is frequently
inconsistently operationalized across studies. Unlike attitudinal trust in government, there
are no widely accepted measures of legitimacy, and scholars even disagree on critical
questions of the scope of the construct itself. For example, Tyler and colleagues often
equate legitimacy with a felt obligation to obey the law (roughly authoritarianism as
directed to a specific institution) and frequently measure it as such (e.g., Tyler, 1997).
Other researchers have argued that legitimacy is necessarily much more than simple
obedience or felt obligation to obey (Hechter, 2009), and some have gone so far as to
argue it can only be measured in light of an “objective precondition” of disagreement
with the policy in question making legitimacy roughly the attitudinal equivalent of
objectionable policy acceptance (Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2002, p. 366). Also,
although legitimacy is usually thought of as an internal attitude, there is an argument to
be made that in the case of strong, pervasive feelings of legitimacy or illegitimacy in
groups, it might be better measured as a social norm because the social context may be
more relevant than the internalized attitudes (Horne, 2009).
A third, but much smaller, basis in this literature is encapsulated interests.
Advanced primarily by Hardin (e.g., 2002; 2013; see also Offe, 1999), the conceptual
argument posits that trust is based on an evaluation within the trustor that the target has
so sufficiently internalized the interests of the trustor as to “encapsulate” them. This
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internalization creates a perceived motivation within the target to act in the interests of
the trustor and provides a basis for the trustor’s acceptance of vulnerability (Cook, Hardin
& Levi, 2005). This basis of trust is theorized to be especially reliant on knowledge of the
target, so much so that it has led to arguments that most of the public cannot actually trust
government “except by mistaken inference” (Hardin, 1999, p. 23). It is, therefore, often
this basis of trust that is implicated when scholars argue that government cannot be
trusted (e.g., Hardin, 2013; Hardin, 1999; cf. Mollering, 2013). Although an important
question in this literature, it is important to note that a lack of knowledge and experience
with government in no way insulates these less sophisticated individuals from
vulnerability to its actions. Indeed, there is an argument to be made that less
knowledgeable and/or experienced individuals are actually more vulnerable to their
government for lack of knowledge about the issues or how to effectively participate in the
political process. Thus, regardless of the trustor’s level of experience or knowledge, trust
remains relevant in this context, though it will likely be driven by other, less knowledgeor experience-reliant bases for low sophisticates.
Intention to Trust and Behavioral Trust
Much like the organizational and risk management literatures, intentional and
behavioral aspects of trust in government tend to center around notions of enhancing its
ability to function effectively. As argued by Warren, “a society that fosters robust
relations of trust is probably also a society that can afford fewer regulations and greater
freedoms, deal with more contingencies, tap the energy and ingenuity of its citizens, limit
the inefficiencies of rule-based means of coordination, and provide a greater sense of
existential security and satisfaction” (1999, p.2). A great deal of research on trust in
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government, therefore, focuses on relationships with constructs like support (Levi, 1997;
Rudolph & Evans, 2005) and approval (e.g., Chaney, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000;
Hetherington, 1998; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001b) and often finds support for
positive relationships between these constructs and trust and/or its bases. Although these
more passive constructs are important for governments, they often require the more
active acquiescence of the public (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000). Research in this
body of literature has, therefore, also sought to understand the connection between trust
and more active responses to government-like participation (Levi & Stoker, 2000) and
compliance (Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009). Importantly, however, a major recurring theme
in this literature is the frequent failure to identify associations between behavior and trust
or the identification of weak relationships. For example, research frequently fails to
identify a lack of association between trust and political participation (e.g., Miller, 1980;
Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). This lack of association comports in many ways with the
spirit of governance in the United States, as much of the founding of this country was
predicated on a level of distrust of government. Indeed, some researchers have argued
that it is, in fact, less trusting individuals who are more politically involved (Citrin,
1974). Providing some guidance for understanding the role of trust, Hetherington (1999)
finds a strong relationship between trust and vote choice which he distinguishes from
turnout. Thus it seems that political trust itself may not be a strong motivator of political
behavior, but when the trustor is otherwise motivated to political participation, trust may
play an important role in the option the trustor supports. Stated differently, although high
trustors may be no more likely (and potentially even less so) than moderate or low
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trustors to engage politically, when an individual does engage, her actions are likely to be
determined to some degree by her trust.
Courts
An important and well-studied subset of the trust in government literature is that
of trust in the courts. Although institutions of government, the courts are notably distinct
from other governmental institutions. Unlike other governmental officials, court officials
are often somewhat insulated from the political process (e.g., many are not subject to
popular election). Additionally, the courts control “neither the purse nor the sword”
(Gibson & Caldeira, 2003, p.2), creating an especially heavy reliance on the positive
perceptions of the public (Caldeira, 1986). As Benesh notes, “without some reservoir of
good will or some level of support for and confidence in the justice system, people may
be less willing to participate in the system as a juror and less likely to bring conflicts into
the system for resolution” (2006; p. 697). Also, somewhat unlike other institutions of
government, these institutions stand as third party arbitrators in disputes that are often
traditional zero-sum games, where two opposing parties square-off with competing
interests (e.g., a defendant and plaintiff in civil court). In the majority of these situations,
at least one party must “lose” creating a very real, personal vulnerability, especially when
the deprivation of life or liberty is on the table. The effective functioning of these
institutions is, therefore, heavily predicated upon the amount of acquiescence they are
able to command in the face of a non-preferred outcome.
As with other institutions of government, one important basis of attitudinal trust
in the courts is legitimacy. In fact, scholars have posited that it is “perhaps the most
important political capital that courts possess” (Gibson, 2008, p.59). In this context,
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legitimacy is generally thought of as a “normative concept, having something to do with
the right – moral and legal – to make decisions” (Gibson, 2008, p.61) and therefore, the
trustor’s willingness to accept his or her vulnerability to those decisions. Court
legitimacy, however, is rarely discussed without a reference to a second basis of trust,
procedural fairness. Procedural fairness (also referred to as process fairness or procedural
justice) is the belief that the procedures used by the decision makers are fair (Thibaut &
Walker, 1975). Within the court context specifically, it is a belief that the trustor has had
his or her “day in court,” in that s/he was an important part of the decision-making
process (Tyler, 2006b, p. 663). Although researchers have found support for a number of
procedural fairness factors (see Finkel, 2000, for a more general discussion of these
factors), the usual story is that in assessing the fairness of legal procedures, the public
relies heavily upon having voice and being treated with dignity and respect by a neutral
decision-maker who is motivated to find the truth and not simply advance his or her own
self-interest (Tyler, 2006a). Although the direction of causality is somewhat contested
(see Gibson, 1991; Mondak, 1993), the general belief is that procedural fairness is a, and
potentially the, major driver of the perceived legitimacy of the courts (Tyler, 1997).
Another common basis of trust in the context of the courts is confidence. As in the
risk management literature, confidence provides a basis from which the trustor can
determine his or her acceptance of the vulnerability inherent in allowing the courts
authority, but its relationship with trust in this context is not well-understood (Cook &
Gronke, 2005). Indeed, the majority of the court relevant research that has investigated
confidence has tended to roughly equate it with trust, often alternating between terms or
referring to a singular “trust/confidence” construct (e.g., Kelleher & Wollak, 2007; Levi,
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Sacks, & Tyler, 2009; Miller & Listhaug, 1990). A few researchers have been more
intentional about their conceptualizations of confidence in courts and in so doing, have
identified a lack of equivalence between the constructs (Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence,
2003). An increasing body of research has sought to deconstruct the variance in
confidence evaluations (Benesh & Howell, 2001) and has identified a number of
important predictors of confidence including procedural fairness (Benesh, 2006) and
perceptions of government generally (Hamm, PytlikZillig, Herian, Tomkins, Bornstein,
& Hoffman, 2013). Additionally, a growing body of research has argued that experience
with the courts may be an important construct for understanding the most important
drivers of confidence for individuals, such that constructs like procedural fairness and
perceptions of government generally might be more predictive for individuals with more
experience (Benesh, 2006; Hamm, PylikZillig, Herian, Tomkins, Bornstein, & Hoffman,
2013).
Behavioral trust in the courts has also long been a major area of research for both
legal and social science scholars. Although referring specifically to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Mondak is particularly illustrative of the courts’ situation generally when he says,
“The Supreme Court is an inherently weak institution. To give impact to its decisions, the
Court depends on legislators for funding, the executive for enforcement, and the public
for compliance” (1997, p. 1114). Much of the research on citizen perceptions of the
courts has sought to understand why, despite this weakness, the courts generally tend to
enjoy a great deal of acquiescence from the public. In fact, researchers have argued that
the only reason for the interest in perceptions of the courts lies in the fact that they are
postulated to be connected to acquiescence behaviors (Gibson, 1991). Although
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compliance is unquestionably the most commonly discussed trust behavior regarding the
courts (Gibson, 1991; Mondak, 1993; Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2008; Robinson &
Bowers, 2011; Tyler, 1997), associations between trust bases and decision acceptance
(Gibson & Caldeira, 2003; Mondak, 1994; Tyler, 2006b), outcome favorability (Tyler,
1989), and general support have also been identified (Mondak , 1997).
Summary
Trust in government is the final major area of literature discussed in this review.
Trust in government is critical to its effective function because of the importance of
accepting the vulnerability at either a policy or a process level. The bases of this trust are
myriad, but three important ones in the context of government generally are satisfaction,
legitimacy, and encapsulated interests. The outcomes of this trust are also numerous, but
an important consideration in this literature is the lack of connection between trust and
relevant behavioral outcomes. In particular, trust seems to be a poor motivator of political
behavior, but when individuals are otherwise motivated, trust plays a role in the choices
made. An important subset of government research regards the courts which, although
institutions of government, have a very distinct role in American life. Despite this
different role however, trust in these institutions is often based on very similar constructs
like perceptions of legitimacy, procedural fairness, and confidence and is typically
associated with similar acquiescence constructs like compliance and the acceptance of
court decisions.
General Discussion
The preceding reviews the trust scholarship in the three primary bodies of relevant
literature. As summarized in Table 1, the review presents the conceptualizations of
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attitudinal trust from each literature, the major bases of that attitudinal trust, and
intentional/behavioral trusting outcomes with which attitudinal trust has been associated
in that literature. Despite superficial differences, these literatures tell a largely consistent
story in that each literature shares central aspects of their conceptualizations of trust,
identifies varied bases for that trust that share an ability to decrease or assuage
vulnerability, and have provided evidence for associations with a number of trust
behaviors and intentions.
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
************************************************************************
The conceptualizations of trust in the three literatures are presented in the second
column of Table 1. Although the targets and specific vulnerabilities vary, the three
conceptualizations share a premise in the vulnerability inherent in the uncertainty
involved in an “other” with agency over something relevant to the trustor. In the context
of organizations, the targets are usually other people within the organization with whom
the trustor has personal contact. The relationships are somewhat more removed in the risk
management literature in that many individuals do not have direct contact with risk
managers like those responsible for managing risks related to nuclear energy, forest fires,
genetically modified foods, cellular towers, etc. The relationships in the trust in
government literature may be considered even slightly more distal in that even citizens
who are very concerned about political issues often have very little direct contact with
government officials. Unquestionably, these interactions are possible (especially in light
of efforts like Obama’s Open Government Initiative), but they are certainly less common
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than in the risk management context where small risk management entities (e.g., park
rangers) are often very accessible and even larger entities (e.g., state natural resource
authorities) often invite stakeholders’ input via public participation efforts. Despite these
differences, however, some level of vulnerability is inherent in each of these interactions
and trust is one important avenue for decreasing – or acting in spite of – this
vulnerability. Within the organizational context, the shared goals of the individuals
within the organization do not preclude the potential that by working to achieve a group
goal, individuals may experience personal loss because of the exploitative behaviors of
others (Lind, 2001). For risk management, the risk that is managed itself provides some
level of probability of harm that the entity is tasked with managing (e.g., fire damage,
health problems, and personal safety). Finally, government’s role in directing individual
action for the good of its constituency as a whole requires that individuals defer to its
direction and accept that this deference may bring with it some vulnerability to harm
from the inappropriate (e.g., fluke jury convictions or corrupt legislation) or even
appropriate application of its authority (e.g., personal financial losses from compliance to
an objectively good regulation). Thus, in each of these contexts, attitudinal trust is the
individual’s willingness to accept the vulnerability inherent in the agency of the target.
All three of these literatures also present a number of bases for this trusting
attitude. The potential reasons that an individual would espouse this willingness to accept
vulnerability are myriad and could certainly include anything from socialization to a
seemingly random whim, but for any given situation, there are likely to be a set of bases
that are consistently identified as important for most people, most of the time. Within the
organizational literature, trustworthiness, organizational justice, and anticipatory injustice
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have all been consistently identified as important bases. In the risk management
literature, confidence, salient values similarity, the “dimensions of trust,” and fairness are
common, while satisfaction, legitimacy, encapsulated interests, procedural fairness and
confidence are important in government research. Even on their face, these constructs are
similar across the literatures with common emphases on justice, characteristics of the
trustor that inspire trust (e.g., ability and care), and expectations about the behavior of the
trusted entity. Beneath the surface, all of these bases share an ability to objectively or
subjectively reduce some of the vulnerability inherent in dealing with an “other.”
Expectations or experiences of justice signal to the trustor that her interactions with the
entity will occur on a level playing field and, although the outcome is not certain, there
can be some belief that a fair and equitable outcome is possible or even likely.
Characteristics of the target like benevolence, care and integrity indicate to the trustor
that, regardless of the outcome, the entity is motivated to act in his or her best interests.
Competence and ability, on the other hand, indicate that the target is capable of
accomplishing its task. Finally, even though the outcome remains unknown, satisfaction
with the target’s previous performance and confident expectations of future interactions
increase the perception of the probability that the trustor’s vulnerability will not be
exploited.
Finally, all three literatures identify important associations between attitudinal
trust and behavioral or intentional trust. Within the organizational literature, these
outcomes usually center on notions of cooperative behavior that advances the common
goal of the organization (e.g., team member cooperation, obedience to authority,
citizenship behavior). For risk management, these behaviors are usually ones that
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increase managers’ ability to work without obstruction (e.g., compliance with regulatory
schemes, decreased willingness to protest and increased participation). In the
governmental context, the trusting behaviors and intentions are focused on the efficient
operation of both government generally and of the administration in particular through
the presence of support and the absence of dissent and, even though trust may not be a
major motivator of political behavior, it is thought to be an important determinant of
political choices. In all three literatures then, trusting behaviors are those that involve
accepting some vulnerability and working with, or at least not against, the target.
Conclusion
Trust is a construct of critical importance to researchers in practically every
discipline. Because of its role in reducing or assuaging the vulnerability in interacting
with others that arises from the uncertainty inherent in their agency, it is applicable to
virtually every human interaction. As a result of this global importance, a great deal of
trust research exists, but this literature is somewhat fragmented. This review identified
the three major divisions (organizations, risk managers, and government) and, through
the lens of an integrative framework of trust, shows that this literature, although
somewhat disparate, tells a remarkably consistent story. Specifically, “trust” can be
understood as driven by a collection of constructs that share an ability to reduce the
actual or perceived vulnerability inherent in human interaction (bases of trust) and
influence a global attitudinal willingness to accept the vulnerability inherent in human
interactions (attitudinal trust) that, in turn, influences an intention to act in ways that
accept vulnerability and the actual behaviors themselves (intentional and behavioral
trust).
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CHAPTER THREE: TRUST AND VOLUNTARY COOPERATION WITH NATURAL
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Natural resources management in the United States has undergone a major
paradigm shift over the last few decades (Pahl-Wostl, Craps, Dewulf, Mostert, Tabara &
Taillieu, 2007; Sabatier, Focht, Lubell, Trachtenberg, Vedlitz & Matlock, 2005).
Previously, natural resources management efforts were typified by instrumental,
“command and control” approaches whereby natural resources managers, using their
ostensibly superior expertise, set priorities and determined actions with little to no input
from the broader public. This approach to natural resources management is premised
upon the belief that natural resources “can be predicted and controlled” (Pahl-Wostl et
al., 2007, p. 1) and that the inevitable consequence of an absence of this top-down
regulation is exploitation (Hardin, 1968; Pretty, 2003). Recently, however, this so-called,
“engineering” approach has been challenged by a resilience-based approach. Resilience
theory, at its most fundamental, essentially posits that socio-ecological systems (SES)
exist in one of many possible stable states that are held in balance by a plethora of
existing drivers (Holling, 1973). The theory argues that in periods of high resilience, an
SES is capable of withstanding perturbations while maintaining its essential function. In
periods of low resilience, however, the SES is vulnerable to perturbation and, upon
reaching and crossing a critical threshold, will self-reorganize into a new and potentially
distinct stable state. This theory, therefore, calls for managers to 1) be wary of potential
thresholds in their SESs and 2) work to increase the resilience of their systems to
perturbation (Allen, Fontaine, Pope, & Garmestani, 2011). Additionally, unlike most
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engineering approaches, resilience approaches typically explicitly acknowledge the
uncertainty in natural resources management, leading many to emphasize management
options that more explicitly account for this uncertainty, notably including adaptive
management, an iterative process through which managers can directly address
uncertainty by “learning by doing” (Walters, 1997).
Somewhat in parallel to this movement towards resilience-based adaptive natural
resources management strategies, many have called for the more explicit incorporation of
the broader public in natural resources management. Following in large part from work
by Ostrom (e.g., 1997; Vollan & Ostrom, 2010), this resource co-management approach
explicitly acknowledges that numerous stakeholders play important roles in common pool
resources management. Their inclusion is important in part because their involvement
legitimizes the process (Duram & Brown, 1999), but more importantly, because of the
noteworthy increases in knowledge that have been identified (e.g., Berkes, 2009),
arguably because collaborative processes are more conducive to social learning (PahlWostl, et al., 2007; Selin, Pierskalla, Smaldone, & Robinson, 2007). Another noteworthy
benefit of co-managing ecosystem services is the increase of trust among the comanagers within the SES (Armitage, Plummer, Berkes, Arthur, Charles, Davidson-Hunt,
Diduck, Doubleday, Johnson, Marschke, McConney, Pinkerton, & Wollenberg, 2009;
Berkes, 2009; Pahl-Wostl, et al., 2007; Pretty, 2003; Selin, et al., 2007), but trust is also
important in its own right because it is often a prerequisite of effective ecosystem
management (Flitcrift, Dedrick, Smith, Thieman, & Bolte, 2010). Indeed, research has
found that a requisite level of trust is critical for participation in the process (Yandle,
Hajj, & Raciborski, 2011), but management more generally is also postulated to rely
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heavily on trust (Leahy & Anderson, 2008; Liljeblad, Watson & Borrie, 2007), especially
because it influences the “perceived efficacy and approval of planned or proposed
[management] actions” (Winter & Cvetkovich, 2010, p. 218)
Trust in the Natural Resource Management Context
Trust is, therefore, an important part of natural resources management. Critically,
however, the widely accepted importance of trust in this context has no more resulted in a
generally accepted definition of the construct or approach to its measurement than it has
in the broader trust literature (Kramer, 1999; Nannestad, 2008). Some coherence,
however, can be obtained by applying the framework proposed in Chapter Two (see
Figure 1) that argues that attitudinal trust, as a willingness to accept vulnerability in
interactions with the trust target, drives intention to act trustingly, and that trust behavior
is itself driven by various bases which are constructs that lend themselves to lessening,
but not removing, the vulnerability itself or increasing its acceptability.
In the natural resources context, much of the vulnerability is economic (e.g.,
farmers’ vulnerability to reduced yields from an unfavorable water allocation) but there
are also important vulnerabilities like the loss of autonomy (e.g., land owners’
vulnerability to regulations limiting how they can use their land) and an even broader
vulnerability to natural resource institutions potential to disregard the public’s interests in
these resources that are intended to be held in public trust (e.g., the public’s vulnerability
to permitting industrial activity on aesthetically or culturally important land). Research
has found support for the importance of several potential bases of or reasons for the
acceptance of the vulnerabilities in the natural resources management context specifically
(e.g., Cvetkovich & Nakayachi, 2007; Earle & Siegrist, 2008; Poortinga & Pidgeon 2006;
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Stern 2008; Winter & Cvetkovich, 2008; 2010). Evaluation of the relevant literature
reveals six major constructs that provide reasons why the trustor may accept the
vulnerability: namely, dispositional trust, care, competence, confidence, procedural
fairness, and salient values similarity.
Dispositional trust is the willingness to trust others across situations and contexts
(e.g., Leahy & Anderson, 2008) and is therefore likely to be the default level of trust
afforded institutions. In the absence of other information about the institution, it is likely
to be trusted to the extent that the trustor trusts people in general. In a test of the role of
dispositional trust in predicting intended compliance with a water allocation with a
student sample, Hamm and colleagues (2013b) found evidence that dispositional trust is
most critical when participants know the least about the situation, a finding conceptually
replicated in other contexts (Hamm, et al., 2013a). In the context of natural resources
management, dispositional trust likely increases the acceptability of the vulnerability
inherent in working with a natural resources manager because the trustor is generally
willing to be vulnerable in working with others.
Care is an evaluation about whether the institution is motivated out of care for the
trustor or self-interest, while competence is the belief that the institution has the technical
competency to do its job (Barber, 1983). Together these evaluations make up what is
sometimes referred to as the “dimensional” approach to trust (e.g., Cvetkovich &
Nakayachi, 2007; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2006). Qualitative research investigating the
important factors of trust in natural resources managers consistently identifies these
concerns as important for the public (e.g., Davenport, Leahy, Anderson, & Jakes, 2007;
Leahy & Anderson, 2008), a finding also corroborated in quantitative research (e.g.,
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Cvetkovich & Nakayachi, 2007). Care and competence both reduce the vulnerability
involved in working with a natural resources institution by, in the case of care, reassuring
the land owner that the institution is considering her interests and, in the case of
competence, is actually capable of doing its job.
Although it often suffers from a lack of conceptual distinction from trust and the
two are frequently used interchangeably (as discussed supra), some have proposed a
distinction that suggests that confidence is a positive expectation about working with the
target as based upon previous experience. This understanding is then contrasted with
trust, which is operationalized as salient values similarity (Earle & Siegrist, 2006;
Siegrist, 2010). In this research, confidence and salient values similarity are considered
separate pathways to cooperation in the Trust, Confidence and Cooperation model (Earle,
Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2007), which has been well supported in the broader risk
management literature (e.g., Siegrist, Earle & Gutscher, 2003). In the natural resources
context, confidence is likely to reduce the perception of vulnerability by increasing the
perceived likelihood that working with the institution will go well for the trustor.
Procedural fairness is the participant’s belief that he or she would be treated
fairly by the institution (see, Tyler, 2006a) and has also been consistently identified as
important in both qualitative (Leahy & Anderson, 2008) and quantitative (Earle &
Siegrist, 2008) natural resources management scholarship. In particular, procedural
fairness evaluations appear to have direct influences on the perceptions of both
management actions (Syme, Nancarrow & McCreddin, 1999) and managers themselves
(Cvetkovich & Nakayachi, 2003). In the natural resources management context,
procedural fairness reduces the vulnerability of the trustor by suggesting that the
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decisions are being made on a level playing field where both the institution and land
owners’ concerns are taken into account.
Finally, salient values similarity is the trustor’s perception that he or she shares
important values with the institution. In this context, salient values similarity decreases
the vulnerability in working with the institution because the fact that the institution shares
the important values of the trustor makes it more likely that the institution and the
individual would act similarly. For example, a natural resources institution that shares
land owners’ value of profit is unlikely to ignore issues of productivity in favor of
potentially less salient values like biodiversity. Relevant research has consistently found
that the perception of shared values between institutions and the public are important
aspects of trust evaluations (e.g., Cvetkovich & Nakayahci, 2007; Siegrist, Cvetkovich, &
Roth, 2000). In a qualitative inquiry, Leahy and Anderson (2008) identify the perception
of shared values as an important theme in responses from participants asked simply to
discuss their trust in a natural resources manager. Further, Winter and Cvetkovich’s
(2010) quantitative analysis suggests that trust operationalized as salient values similarity
is significantly related to perceptions of the efficacy of the USDA Forest Service’s efforts
to increase conservation behaviors.
Despite the unquestionable importance of this research literature, it is limited in
three critical ways. The first and most important is that no research to date has
investigated the influence of even the majority of the relevant attitudinal trust constructs
simultaneously. Researchers instead tend to investigate only a subset of the constructs
and therefore, no explicit understanding exists regarding their interrelationships or
relative influence on trust intention or behavior. Second, previous work in natural
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resources has typically measured trust exclusively in moderately to highly sophisticated
(knowledgeable and experienced) individuals. The logic for these samples is typically
that individuals who are most involved in and knowledgeable about natural resources
issues are the most likely to act both in the assistance of and opposition to natural
resource institutions’ actions. Despite the soundness of this logic, the increasingly crosscutting nature of natural resources issues implicates persons who would not otherwise
have had contact with the natural resource institutions. Especially in the case of voluntary
cooperation on private land, natural resource institutions are increasingly reliant upon
these persons of lower sophistication for cooperation behaviors like granting access to
private land and engaging in conservation-oriented land management on their property,
but the relationship of the attitudinal trust constructs to these behaviors is not yet well
understood for these individuals. A third limitation in this literature is a lack of sufficient
attention to psychometric concerns in the existing measures. The great deal of conceptual
overlap between these correlated constructs demands a careful psychometric attention to
their development that has typically been overlooked. Although some researchers tend to
use similar measures across their work, there are no generally accepted measures of these
six constructs with strong evidence for validity. Instead most research typically either
uses only single item measures – thereby exacerbating potential measurement error
concerns – or a series of face valid items for which only limited measures of reliability or
dimensionality are reported (e.g., Cronbach’s Alpha and exploratory factor analyses; but
see Smith, Leahy, Anderson, & Davenport, 2013). In order to address these limitations in
the existing literature, the proposed research presents a model of trust in natural resource
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institutions that explicitly hypothesizes the relationships of the six major attitudinal trust
constructs identified in the literature (see Figure 2).
************************************************************************
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
************************************************************************
Drawing upon the relevant literature and previous work (e.g., Bornstein et al.,
2013; Hamm et al., 2011; Hamm, PytlikZillig, Herian, Bornstein, Tomkins & Hoffman,
2013; Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, PytlikZillig, 2012; PytlikZillig et al., 2012), this research
addresses three hypotheses embedded within the proposed model: 1) That the trust items
used here will be reliable and unidimensional indicators of the six distinct constructs. 2)
That the six attitudinal trust constructs will be significantly related to cooperation with a
natural resources institution. 3) That the relationships between the attitudinal trust
constructs and cooperation will be moderated by the sophistication – operationalized as
knowledge and experience – of the trustor. Stated differently, cooperation is expected to
be differentially predicted by the trust bases as a function of the sophistication of the
trustor, such that for persons of limited sophistication, dispositional trust will be most
predictive. With increased sophistication, however, salient values similarity, competence
of the institution, care, procedural fairness, and confidence are expected to become more
predictive at the expense of dispositional trust (see Hamm et al., 2013a; 2013b; Earle et
al., 2007). The following two studies test the proportions of this model though a large
random sample test of the relationships and distinctions among trust constructs and their
independent influence on intention to cooperate with Nebraska Game and Parks by
joining voluntary land owner programs as moderated by sophistication (Study 1) and a
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smaller, more targeted sample test of the influence of the trust constructs on actual
behavioral cooperation with natural resources management (Study 2).
Study 1
As discussed above, contemporary natural resource institutions, as stewards of
common pool resources (Vollan & Ostrom, 2010), typically rely heavily upon the public
in managing natural resources. Natural resource institutions in Nebraska, however, stand
in an especially complicated position because more than 95% of the state’s land area is
privately owned. Therefore, Nebraska’s natural resource institutions often lack the legal
jurisdiction to levy punishments against land owners who fail to cooperate with their
efforts. This, coupled with the substantial resources necessary for incentivizing land
owners’ behavior, suggests that these institutions are typically best served by encouraging
internally motivated cooperation, for example, through trust.
One natural resource institution in Nebraska that is particularly reliant upon
voluntary cooperation in its efforts is the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission. The
Commission is responsible for the “stewardship of the state's fish, wildlife, park, and
outdoor recreation resources in the best long-term interests of the people and those
resources” (Nebraska Game and Parks Commission, n.d.). One of the areas within the
Commission’s purview that is especially reliant on voluntary cooperation is land owner
willingness to grant the Commission access to privately owned land for conservation
action or to open the land for recreational use managed by the Commission. Land
owners’ willingness to grant access to the Commission is critical to its ability to
effectively manage Nebraska’s natural resources, especially in the rural areas of 44
Nebraska counties that the Commission has identified as its Target Areas (See Table 2),
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but these kinds of programs have a long history throughout the United States (e.g.,
Wigley & Melchoirs, 1987).
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
************************************************************************
Method
Participants
Land owners with more than 20 acres of land were identified by Survey Sampling
International from two lists of land owners within the targeted Nebraska counties. The
first was a list of residences in the counties and the second was a list of farms that have
used the United States government for a loan in the targeted counties. Both lists were
limited to lots larger than 20 acres. Rural land owners were then identified by excluding
all Nebraska urban areas by Zip Code (see Table 3; the excluded areas had an average
population of 31,062 with a minimum of 2,631 and a maximum of 656,462). Duplicate
addresses were eliminated, and a sample of 1716 was selected randomly from the
remaining names (the sample size was chosen to achieve 600 responders as
recommended by a power analysis, assuming a response rate of approximately 30%). The
sample was then mailed a cover letter, a copy of the survey, a $1 cash incentive, and a
business reply envelope.6 All non-responders were mailed a reminder postcard ten days
later and a replacement survey packet, without the incentive, ten days after the postcard.
Six hundred forty-five land owners returned the survey (a response rate of 38%). The
majority of the resulting sample self-reported as male (77%), white (96%), and owned

6

Data collection for Study 1 was conducted by the University of Nebraska-Bureau of Sociological
Research (http://bosr.unl.edu).
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more than 100 acres of rural land (75%). The plurality of the sample was Republican
(50%) and conservative (37%) or leaning conservative (an additional 17%), and the
sample had an average age of 61.
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
************************************************************************
Measures
Land owners completed an 8-page paper survey that included measures of the
participant’s sophistication (knowledge and experience) with, trust in, and intention to
cooperate with the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission as well as questions regarding
perception of risk in cooperating with the Commission (see Appendix A for a complete
list of Study 1 items). Participants also completed questions about their own
environmental concern, perceptions of the trustworthiness of others generally, political
leanings, and other demographics discussed above (e.g., age, gender, number of rural
acres owned). The following section presents the construct measures and limited
evaluations of their reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) and dimensionality (Exploratory
Factor Analysis). Model based evaluations are reported later in the results section.
Sophistication. Sophistication was measured by assessing the land owner’s subjective and
objective knowledge about the Commission and experience with it. Subjective knowledge
was assessed with four items that asked participants to respond to how well they felt they
knew the Commission generally as well as its practices, policies, and goals on five-point
scales labeled from “not at all knowledgeable” (1) to “extremely knowledgeable” (5).
The four items exhibited good internal consistency (α = .92; see Table 4) and, in a

77

Principal Axis Factor analysis, loaded on a single factor (loadings > .8) that accounted for
74% of the variance in responses. A scale was created by averaging the four items which
yielded a slightly low mean of 2.29 (roughly corresponding to slightly knowledgeable)
and a standard deviation of 0.79 (skew = 0.33 and kurtosis = 0.01).
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
************************************************************************
Objective knowledge was assessed using three factual questions about the
Commission. The questions asked which of three potential options were actual sources of
funding for the Commission (correct response was “all of the above”), which of four
areas the Commission could set legally enforceable regulations (correct response was “all
land in the state of Nebraska, including privately owned land”), and how members of the
Commissions’ Board of Commissioners are selected (correct response was “appointed by
the governor”). The three questions revealed poor internal consistency (α = .10), which
was not surprising given that the items measured three different areas of knowledge about
the commission – its funding, jurisdiction, and leadership. Evaluation of the individual
questions indicated that the funding question was most difficult with 62% of participants
responding incorrectly. The responses to the remaining two objective knowledge
questions were somewhat more accurate with 42% and 49% of participants responding
incorrectly to the jurisdiction and leadership questions, respectively. Overall, participants
largely reported low objective knowledge, with the majority of the sample getting one or
no questions correct (55%). Only 34% of the sample was able to answer two correctly
and 12% answered all three. Because the three items failed to cohere sufficiently to be
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treated as a scale both here and in the model reported below, the subsequent analyses
focus only on the single item regarding the Commission’s jurisdiction. This item was
chosen because of its roughly even distribution of accurate and inaccurate responses and
its greater conceptual relevance to knowledge about the institution (as compared to the
institution’s funding and leadership which were more difficult to answer correctly for the
current sample).
Experience was measured using four items that asked how often the participant
attended meetings of, was personally financially affected by, has personal contact with,
or recreationally uses the land of the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission. Responses
were scored on a 1 (“never”) to 5 (“weekly”) scale (2 = “once every few years;” 3 =
“once every year;” 4 = “monthly”). The majority of the sample had little experience with
the Commission, with the majority or plurality of participants indicating they “never”
attended Commission meetings (90%), have been financially affected by its decisions
(63%), or personally interact with the staff (44%). Twenty-seven percent of the sample
also indicated that they never used Commission land for recreation, but the majority
(67%) indicated that they recreationally used Commission land once every few years
(28%), once a year (24%) or monthly (16%). These items also failed to yield good
internal consistency here (α = .58) and in the model reported below and thus were not
averaged to create a scale. Instead the analyses focus only on the item that measured the
participant’s experience with the Commission’s staff because of its conceptual relevance
to experience with the institution.
Trust. Trust was measured next as the participant’s agreement with a series of 20
statements. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert-Type scale which was labeled
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from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7) with “neither agree nor disagree” at
the mid-point (4; 2 = “disagree;” 3 = “somewhat disagree;” 5 = “somewhat disagree;” 6 =
“agree”). Statements within this block were randomized but presented in the same order
to all participants. The scales were evaluated as part of a larger grant which started with a
large bank of 109 items from the relevant literature and was developed by the researchers
(Tomkins, Bornstein, Herian, & PytlikZillig, 2011-2014). In this grant, the items were
completed by university students and community members and evaluated via
Confirmatory and Item Factor Analytic approaches to identify the shorter series measures
used here.
Dispositional trust was measured using three items modified from the General
Social Survey and previous work (Hamm, et al., 2011; Hamm, et al., 2013a). The items
asked participants to report their agreement with three statements that “most people” can
be trusted, try to be fair, and try to be helpful on the 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree) scale described above. The three items yielded good internal consistency (α = .81)
and loaded on a single factor (loadings > .55) that accounted for 64% of the variance in a
PAF analysis. The items were averaged to create an item-total scale that had a mean of
5.02 (roughly corresponding to “somewhat agree”), standard deviation of 0.91 and was
largely normal in the third and fourth moments of its distribution (skew = -1.00; kurtosis
= 1.07).
Care was measured using a 3-item scale assembled by the researchers. The items
asked the participant to respond regarding their agreement with the notion that the
Commission cares about local residents generally, makes its decisions out of concern for
local residents, and puts aside its interests in making decisions that are right for the
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community. The items yielded a Cronbach’s Alpha of .80 and loaded on a single factor
(loadings > .65) that accounted for 58% of the variance in responses. The resulting item
average scale had a mean of 4.49 (roughly corresponding to “somewhat agree”), standard
deviation of 1.10, skewness of -0.72, and kurtosis of 0.69.
Competence was measured using a 4-item scale assembled by the researchers
which asked participants to respond to their agreement regarding statements about the
Commission’s decision makers; namely, their having the requisite competence, skills,
and knowledge to do their jobs and their status as highly qualified. The four items were
internally valid as assessed via Cronbach’s alpha (α = .92) and loaded on a single factor
(loadings > .8) that accounted for 75% of the variance in responses. The resulting item
average scale had a mean of 4.69 (roughly corresponding to “somewhat agree”) and
standard deviation of 1.09 (skew = -0.60; kurtosis = 0.58).
Confidence was measured using a 4- item scale assembled by the researchers.
Participants rated their agreement with statements that argued that their confidence in the
Commission was high, they were confident the Commission would do its job, believed
that the Commission would perform its functions as it should, and that the Commission
does its job well. The items were internally reliable (α = .94), loaded on a single factor
(loadings > .85) that accounted for 79% of the variance in responses and yielded an itemtotal scale with a mean of 4.79 (roughly corresponding to “somewhat agree”), standard
deviation of 1.20, skew of -0.95 and kurtosis of 0.81.
Procedural fairness was measured using a 3- item scale assembled by the
researchers. The scale included items that assessed the perceived fairness of the
Commission’s procedures generally, its dealings with the community, and the
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Commission’s treatment of the participant specifically. The items were internally reliable
(α = .85) and loaded on a single factor (loadings > .75) which accounted for 67% of the
variance in responses. Averaging the items yielded a scale which had a mean of 4.73
(roughly corresponding to “somewhat agree”) and standard deviation of 1.07 and was
roughly normal in the third and fourth moments of its distribution (skew = -0.69; kurtosis
= 0.93).
Salient values similarity was measured using three items from Cvetkovich and
Winter (2003) as amended to address the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission. The
items asked participants to respond regarding their agreement with statements indicating
that they believe the Commission shares their values, that they share the Commission’s
values and that they believe that the Commission supports their values about natural
resource regulation. The items yielded good internal consistency (α = .89) and loaded on
a single factor (loadings > .8) that accounted for 74% of the variance in responses in a
Principal Axis Factor analysis. The three items were therefore averaged to create a single
scale that had a mean of 4.59 (roughly corresponding to “somewhat agree”) and standard
deviation of 1.21 (skew = -0.80; kurtosis = 0.56).
Intent to Cooperate. Cooperation intention was measured next in the survey with items
that assessed willingness to cooperate with the efforts of the Commission to effectively
manage Nebraska’s natural resources. Participants were asked to complete four questions
regarding how likely they felt they were, as of when they completed the survey, to
participate in voluntary Commission land owner programs that allowed the Commission
direct access to their land for conservation action or allowed the Commission to manage
public access for recreation. Note that both questions were asked with and without
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financial incentive, creating four questions. Importantly, in actuality, these two land
owner programs only exist with financial incentive, but because of an interest in the role
of trust in predicting cooperation without financial incentive, the extra two questions
were included. Roughly ¼ of participants indicated that they were “undecided” on all
four questions (see Table 5). Forty-nine percent and 58% indicated that they were very
unlikely, unlikely, or somewhat unlikely to participate in the non-incentivized
conservation and access programs, respectively. Forty-four percent, however, indicated
that they were very likely, likely, or somewhat likely to participate in the conservation
program with financial incentive, while 42% indicated that they were still very unlikely,
unlikely, or somewhat unlikely to participate in the access program even with the
financial incentive. Repeated measures t-tests indicated that all six mean comparisons
were significant, such that participants were always more likely to cooperate in the
presence of financial incentive, but when incentive was held constant, conservation
programs were favored over access.
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
************************************************************************
Cooperation Risk. Participants were also asked if they perceived any risk in participating
in the access or conservation programs. The responses were roughly equivalent regarding
the perception of risk in the conservation program (yes = 51%; no = 49%), with most
participants indicating that the risk was “very important” for their decision (54%; 12% =
“not important”). A higher percentage of participants perceived risk in the access
program (versus the conservation program), with 61% indicating some level of risk in
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participation, and 59% indicated that this risk was “very important” to their decision to
participate (“not important” = 13%). To better understand the perceived risks,
participants were also asked to include examples. Consistent with previous research, the
most common risks identified for both programs concerned liability and control over the
land (see Wigley & Melchiors, 1987).
Environmental Attitudes. Participants finally completed the revised New Environmental
Paradigm scale (rNEP; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig & Jones, 2000). The scale includes 15
items and is an update to the older NEP scale (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978) which
measures “beliefs about humanity’s ability to upset the balance of nature, the existence of
limits to growth for human societies, and humanity’s right to rule over the rest of nature”
(Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig & Jones, 2000, p. 427). The previous scale has been used
extensively to measure environmental worldviews and has been found to distinguish
reliably between environmentalists and the general public or non-environmental interest
groups and is predictive of relevant behavior and behavioral intention (see, Dunlap, Van
Liere, Mertig & Jones, 2000). The revised scale improves on the original scale in three
ways: “(1) it taps a wider range of facets of an ecological worldview, (2) it offers a
balanced set of pro- and anti-NEP items, and (3) it avoids outmoded terminology” (p.
425). After reverse coding negative items, the 15 items yielded good internal consistency
(α = .87), but an Exploratory Factor Analysis with oblique rotation and PAF extraction
revealed a four-factor solution. Because of the high internal consistency, however, the
items were averaged to create a single scale with a mean of 4.20 (roughly corresponding
to “neither agree nor disagree”), standard deviation of 0.93, skew of 0.09, and kurtosis of
0.73.
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Results
Missing Data Analysis
The far majority of participants had complete data (n = 583; 90%), but missing
data analyses were conducted to evaluate the influence of demographics, trust, and
sophistication on missingness in the variables of interest. Three count variables were
constructed to account for the number of missing data points on the trust, sophistication
and cooperation/risk variables. All three variables had a minimum of zero and a
maximum such that all of the items counted were missing and, as would be expected in a
count variable, were significantly positively skewed and kurtotic. The count missing
variables were then regressed on demographics and item total scales of the trust and
sophistication constructs via generalized models. None of the resulting models was
significant, so the data were assumed to be MAR and appropriate for the subsequent
analyses.
Attitudinal Trust Construct Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In order to evaluate the dimensionality and reliability of the attitudinal trust items,
the trust items were next subjected to confirmatory factor analysis using Mplus v.7.
These models directly account for potential measurement error by explicitly modeling the
covariance in items such that any variance shared by items is deemed “true score” and
any unshared variance, “error.” Statistically, then, individual scores are modeled as
follows,
,
where an individual’s (i) observed score (Yis) is made up of its intercept (μi) plus the
individual’s factor score (Fs) weighted by its loading on, or relationship to, the factor (λi)
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and any error of the item and subject (eis). Importantly, confirmatory factor analyses
permit p-value tests of the hypothesized dimensionality of measures by essentially
subtracting an observed matrix of the covariance in the items from a hypothesized matrix
based on the relationships specified by the researcher. The result of these subtracted
matrices is the fit index that provides the basis for the x2 test of exact fit by testing
whether the fit index is statistically different from zero. As a x2 test, however, this fit
statistic is particularly influenced by sample size and model complexity. Therefore, many
researchers suggest relying on alternative fit indices like the Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI; for which values greater than .95 are recommended), the
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; for which values less than .08 are
recommended) and its accompanying test of close fit (for which non-significance is
indicative of good fit), and the Standardized Root Mean-Square Residual (SRMR; for
which values less than .05 are recommended; Hu & Bentler, 1998).
In the first trust item Confirmatory Factor Analysis model, the items were
estimated as indicators of their latent construct in a six-factor model, saturated such that
all correlations among the six factors were estimated. The latent constructs were
identified by setting the factor means to 0 and their variances to 1 (i.e., a z-score
approach), thereby allowing all of the loadings to be estimated freely. The model was
estimated using Maximum Likelihood-Robust (MLR), which differs from the more
common Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator only in its inclusion of a correction factor
for non-normal data. Importantly, when the data are normal (correction factor = 1), the
results converge to those of ML. The model fit moderately to the data, x2(155) = 514.11,
p < .001; CFI = .95; TLI = .94; SRMR = .04; RMSEA = .06, p = .002, and indicated that
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all 20 items loaded significantly on their hypothesized factors (standardized loadings >
.55, p’s < .001, S.E.’s ≤ .04). Evaluation of the normalized residual covariances revealed
none greater than 3 and only four positive residuals greater than 2 (dt3 and icon3; dt3 and
icon4; care3 and dt3; dt3 and svs3), indicating that they were somewhat more related
than hypothesized by the model. Evaluation of the modification indices indicated three
changes to the model that would result in a chi-square change greater than 30,
specifically one additional loading (care by comp3 = 36) and two error covariances
(comp4 with icon2 = 36; and comp3 with comp2 = 80). Because of the relatively high
expected increase in fit and its conceptual and statistical redundancy with comp4 (“most
Commission decision makers have the skills to do their job”), comp3 (“most Commission
decision makers have the knowledge necessary to do their jobs”) was removed from the
model. The model was re-estimated with the remaining 19 items specified and identified
as before. The model fit well to the data, x2(137) = 381.03, p < .001; CFI = .96; TLI =
.95; SRMR = .03; RMSEA = .05, p = .22, and as before, all items’ standardized loadings
were significant on their hypothesized factors at or greater than .6 (see Table 6).
Evaluation of the normalized residual covariance matrix indicated no values over 3 but
the same four positive values greater than 2 as in the previous model (dt3 and icon3; dt3
and icon4; care3 and dt3; dt3 and svs3), indicating stronger relationships than those
hypothesized by the model. Note that all four residual covariances included item dt3 (“I
would say that most of the time people try to be helpful”), but given the good fit of the
model and its necessity for local identification of the dispositional trust factor, it was
included in subsequent analyses. The modification indices revealed only one
recommended modification that would result in a chi-square increase greater than 30
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(comp2 with pf1), but the good fit of the model made its inclusion unnecessary. All six
latent constructs yielded good evidence of reliability in model based reliability estimates
(ω; see Table 7).
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
************************************************************************
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
************************************************************************
Most of the latent constructs were significantly correlated with the exception of
care and dispositional trust (r = .10; p = .05). In fact, dispositional trust’s correlations
with all five other latent constructs were relatively low (r’s < .20; p’s > .008) as
compared to the other five trust constructs (confidence, care, competence, values
similarity, and procedural fairness) which were all very strongly correlated (r’s > .85, p’s
< .001; see Table 7). This extreme covariance among constructs meant that there was
little independent covariance in the constructs, thus meaning that there would likely be
insufficient independent covariance to identify significant independent predictive effects
on outcomes in a structural regression. Conceptually, this suggests that the constructs did
not seem to tap truly independent ideas in participants, challenging the conceptual
distinctness of the items. Importantly, however, evaluation of the item wording shows
that the constructs do, in fact, measure somewhat ostensibly different concepts. For
example, questions about the similarity of the values of the Commission regarding
natural resource regulation are distinct from the Commission’s having the requisite
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knowledge to manage resources which are, in turn, distinct from questions about the
Commission’s treatment of the participant. We, therefore, estimated another model which
accounted for the potential distinctions among constructs while accounting for the
extreme covariance among five of them through the inclusion of a higher order factor
(see Figure 3). In this model, the five excessively correlated constructs are included as
indicators of a latent, more global institutional evaluation that underlies them. Because of
the addition of the higher order factor, the lower-order latent factors were identified using
the marker item approach in which the loading of the item with the highest loading from
the previous model was set to one (see Table 6), and the higher order factor was
identified using the z-score approach allowing for the estimation of all five of its
loadings. The resulting model fit well to the data, x2(146) = 401.74, p < .001; CFI = .96;
TLI = .95; SRMR = .03; RMSEA = .05, p = .30, and left all 19 items significant on their
hypothesized factors (standardized loadings ≥ 0.60, S.E.’s < 0.05, p’s < .001). The latent
constructs also loaded significantly on the higher order factor (see Table 8) which was
significantly correlated with latent dispositional trust (r = .13, p = .008). The normalized
residual covariance matrix revealed the same four residual covariances over 2 as the
previous model, and the modification indices recommended the same error correlation
between comp2 and pf1. Although the model fit well to the data, it is important to note
that its fit was statistically significantly worse than a model in which all six latent
constructs were directly correlated (-2LLΔ (9) = 20.96, p = .01; see Table 9), but the use
of a scaled (-2) log-likelihood test (scaled to approximate a chi-square value) with a large
sample and complex model increased the probability that small (arguably not
meaningful) differences would be significant.
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************************************************************************
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
************************************************************************
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
************************************************************************
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
************************************************************************
Given the excessive correlations of the model and the statistically poorer fit of the
higher order factor model, a third model was also tested in which the indicators of the
five highly correlated factors were estimated as indicators of a single factor (dispositional
trust was again included as a correlated latent factor). The model fit moderately to the
data, x2(151) = 528.36, p < .001; CFI = .94; TLI = .93; SRMR = .04; RMSEA = .06, p <
.001, and revealed significant loadings for each of the 16 items on the single factor
greater than 0.60 (see Table 10). The model revealed the same four large (> |2|) residual
covariances involving dt3 (“I would say that most of the time people try to be helpful”) as
in the correlated factors model and revealed 8 recommended error covariances that would
result in large (x2Δ > 20) increases in model fit (see Table 10). Five of the error
covariances were recommended between items originally hypothesized to be indicators of
the same construct (icon4 with icon3, pf3 with pf3, svs1 with svs3, svs2 with svs3, comp1
with comp4), and three were recommended between items hypothesized to indicate
different factors (pf1 with icon2, comp2 with pf1, comp2 with svs1). Like the previous,
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higher order factor, the model fit significantly worse than the correlated constructs model
(-2LLΔ (14) = 129.92, p < .001; -2LLΔ/df = 9.28; see Table 9), but the difference in fit
between this model and the correlated constructs model was substantially larger than the
difference between the higher order and the correlated factors models (-2LLΔ (9) =
20.96), especially when considered in light of the changes in model parameters (2LLΔ/df = 2.33). The excessive covariance in the correlated factors solution made it
untenable. Given this, the fact that the higher order factor model fit well, and the fact that
the single factor solution fit was more worse than the higher order factor model, the
higher order model was accepted as the best representation of the data.
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE
************************************************************************
Trust and Cooperation
To test the influence of the trust constructs on cooperation, a confirmatory factor
model was estimated next that differed from the previous higher order factor model in the
inclusion of the four cooperation variables as indicators of a latent cooperation factor.
The cooperation factor was identified using the z-score approach in order to allow the
estimation of the item loadings. The resulting model provided limited fit to the data,
x2(222) = 768.93, p < .001; CFI = .93; TLI = .92; SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .06, p < .001,
though all four cooperation items loaded significantly on their factor (standardized
loadings > 0.65, p’s < 0.001, S.E. < .05). Evaluation of the residual covariance matrix
revealed one large residual covariance involving the cooperation items and an item on
another scale (coaccfin [cooperation with the access program with financial incentive]
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and svs3 = 2.03), but three among the items on the cooperation factor (coaccfin and
coconno [cooperation with the conservation program without incentive] = -3.55; coconfin
[cooperation with the conservation program with financial incentive] and coaccno
[cooperation with the access program without incentive] = -2.75; coaccfin and coconfin =
2.92), indicating that the two items that included financial incentive were more strongly
related to each other than argued by the model, while the items that did include financial
incentive were less related to those without financial incentive than expected by the
model. These relationships were corroborated by the modification indices which
suggested large (x2Δ > 100) chi-square increases for the inclusion of error correlations
between coconfin and coaccfin (x2Δ = 148.78) and between coaccno and coconno (x2Δ =
154.96).
The model was, therefore, re-estimated with the four items as separate but
correlated criterion variables. The resulting model fit well to the data, x2(214) = 503.25, p
< .001; CFI = .96; TLI = .96; SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .05, p = .89, and revealed that
while the higher order factor was significantly correlated with all of the cooperation
variables (r’s > .2), dispositional trust never was (p’s > .5). A structural equation model
was then estimated in which the higher order factor and dispositional trust were entered
as predictors of the four cooperation constructs with correlated error terms. As an
equivalent model, it again fit well to the data and, as hypothesized, revealed the same
pattern of relationships as the correlations model above (see Table 11). The higher order
factor significantly predicted coconno, coaccno, coconfin, and coaccfin but dispositional
trust was never a significant predictor. The variance accounted for by the regressions was
significant but somewhat limited (see Table 11).
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************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE
************************************************************************
Next, in order to understand the influence of attitudinal trust in light of other
potential drivers, a second model was estimated in which the average of the four
subjective knowledge items, objective knowledge about the institution’s jurisdiction
(coded 0 = wrong; 1 = correct), reported experience with staff, whether the participant
perceived any risk in the specific program (coded 0 = no risk; 1 = risk), and
environmental concern (operationalized as the average of the rNEP items) were entered
as additional observed predictors of the cooperation variables. Model fit was somewhat
limited, x2(334) = 759.75, p < .001; CFI = .94; TLI = .93; SRMR = .08; RMSEA = .05, p
= .41, but revealed that the higher order factor maintained its significant independent
predictive influence on all four cooperation constructs (see Table 12), while dispositional
trust’s influence remained non-significant. Across models, perceived risk was also
typically predictive (with the exception of cooperation with a conservation program with
financial incentive), such that those who perceived risk were less likely to cooperate.
Importantly, perceived risk was most predictive of cooperation with the access programs
(for which participants reported more perceived risk). Objective and subjective
knowledge and experience were not significant except in predicting cooperation with a
conservation program with financial incentive for which subjective knowledge emerged
with a significant independent effect, such that individuals with more subjective
knowledge were more likely to indicate they would cooperate. Environmental concern
was also only predictive of cooperation with the conservation program with financial
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incentive, such that participants who reported more environmental concern were more
likely to indicate an intention to cooperate. The variance accounted for by these
regressions was only slightly increased as compared to the previous models.
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE
************************************************************************
Sophistication Variable Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In order to best operationalize sophistication for the sophistication moderation
test, the sophistication variables were next subjected to latent factor analysis. The 11
items were entered as indicators of their respective latent constructs, but because of the
binary nature of the objective knowledge questions (coded 0 = wrong, 1 = correct), item
factor analysis was utilized (see Wirth & Edwards, 2007). Item factor models explicitly
account for categorical data by assuming that the categorical responses represent an
underlying continuous latent trait, in this case, objective knowledge. These models
assume that at a certain point along the distribution of the latent construct lies a threshold
at which individuals above the threshold and individuals below the threshold will respond
differently. Thus, in these models, these thresholds are modeled as,
,
where the observed response (xij) is the categorical responses (c), if the observed response
falls between the lower (

) and upper threshold bounds (

). Importantly, these

models do not account for error which is held constant at 1. As with the previous models,
the fit of these models was evaluated primarily via the CFI and TLI (values greater than
.95 are recommended for good fit) and the RMSEA (values less than .08 are
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recommended for good fit) along with its accompanying test of close fit (non-significance
is recommended for good fit; Hu & Bentler, 1998). In addition, the Weighted Root-Mean
Residual was also evaluated, a fit statistic specific to binary or continuous models (values
less than 1 are recommended for good fit; Muthén & Muthén, 1998)
The model was estimated using the Weighted Least Squares-Mean and Variance
correction estimator (WLSMV). The model fit well to the data, x2(41) = 77.59, p < .001;
CFI = .96; TLI = .95; WRMR = .75; RMSEA = .04, p = .95, but left only the subjective
knowledge and experience items significant on their factors. Subjective knowledge’s
factor structure was largely unremarkable (standardized loadings > .75; p’s < .001), but
experience included one relatively high (standardized loadingexp3 = .68) and one relatively
low loading (standardized loadingexp4 = .45). Objective knowledge, however, yielded no
significant loadings. Given this additional evidence that these items were poor candidates
for a scale, the analyses focused on the single objective knowledge and experience
questions most conceptually relevant to sophistication with an institution (objective
knowledge about its jurisdiction and experience with its staff). An additional model was,
therefore, estimated with subjective knowledge modeled as before (a latent factor with
four item-level indicators). Objective knowledge and experience were entered as single
observed variables (categorical and continuous respectively) and were correlated with
subjective knowledge. The model fit well to the data, x2(8) = 25.71, p = .001; CFI = .97;
TLI = .95; WRMR = .42; RMSEA = .06, p = .25, and revealed significant correlations
among all three sophistication measures (rsubjective knowledge.objective knowledge = .27, p < .001;
rsubjective knowledge.experience = .57, p < .001; robjective knowledge.experience = .34, p < .001).
Moderation Model
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To test the sophistication moderation hypothesis, a series of invariance tests were
conducted that estimated separate models for individuals who were high and low on each
sophistication construct (objective knowledge regarding the institution’s jurisdiction,
subjective knowledge, and experience with its staff). To that end, two binary variables
were created which indicated participants who were above or below the mean of the item
average scale for the subjective knowledge and the single experience item. Because the
objective knowledge item was already dichotomous (correct/incorrect) it was not
recoded. The three variables roughly divided the sample in half with 55% below the
mean of subjective knowledge (M = 2.29). Fifty-eight percent of the sample was correct
on the objective knowledge question and 59% was above the mean of experience (M =
2.33).
Before testing the moderating influence of each of the sophistication constructs on
the regression coefficients, metric (indicator loadings), scalar (indicator means), and
residual (indicator error) invariance were first tested between groups for each
sophistication variable. By systematically constraining the relevant model parameters to
be equivalent across groups, invariance tests identify the extent to which the model
parameters are statistically equivalent across groups. Thus, if a parameter constraint
results in a significant decrease in model fit, it indicates that the parameters are not
statistically equivalent. In the current situation, invariance testing is important because it
determines the extent to which the latent factors can be reasonably assumed to be the
same thing for both groups and simplifies the interpretation of the moderation test that
follows.
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As reported in the top panel of Table 13, the lower order factor model was fully
invariant for individuals above and below the mean of subjective knowledge at the metric
(factor loading) level. At the scalar (item mean) level, however, constraints resulted in a
significant decrease in model fit which was indicative of non-invariance. The
modification indices suggested freeing the item mean for pf3 (“I have generally been
treated fairly by Game and Parks”; x2Δ = 8.42) for which individuals below the mean of
subjective knowledge had less positive responses (M = 4.80) than individuals above the
mean (M = 5.24). After freeing the item mean to be different across models, both partial
scalar and partial residual7 (error variance) invariance held for the models. The invariance
of the higher order model was tested next (see the middle panel of Table 13). For
identification, marker items were added to the lower order factors, and pf3’s mean and
error variance were not constrained. Metric invariance held as did scalar invariance, but it
is important to note that because the latent factor means had been set to zero, the metric
and scalar invariance models were equivalent (and thus not testable). Residual invariance,
however, failed for the model, but after freeing the latent procedural fairness error
variance (x2Δ = 10.18), partial residual invariance was achieved for the higher order
model. Having tested the invariance of the lower and higher order models, the
moderation of the effects of the higher order factor and dispositional trust on cooperation
by subjective knowledge was tested next. As reported in the bottom panel of Table 13,
none of these comparisons was significant, indicating that the pathways were statistically
equivalent for individuals above and below the mean of subjective knowledge.
************************************************************************
7

Note that a finding of non-invariance at a lower level requires that the model parameter be freed at all
subsequent levels. Therefore, when testing residual invariance, both the mean and the error variance for
item pf3 were freed.
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INSERT TABLE 13 HERE
************************************************************************
Next the invariance of the model across levels of objective knowledge of the
institution’s jurisdiction was tested. As reported in the top two panels of Table 14, lower
order invariance held through the residual level and the higher order invariance held up to
residual invariance. The modification indices recommended freeing the error variance for
the latent care factor (x2Δ = 7.35) and upon doing so, the model achieved partial residual
invariance. Objective knowledge’s moderation of the higher order and dispositional trust
regression coefficients was then tested. As reported in the bottom panel of Table 14, three
of these effects were significant. For the regression of the higher order factor on
cooperation with access programs without financial incentive, the model revealed that
individuals who responded incorrectly to the objective knowledge question about the
Commission’s jurisdiction had a weaker effect for the higher order factor on cooperation
(β = .16; p = .02) than did individuals who responded correctly (β = .34; p < .001).
Additionally, individuals who responded incorrectly had a stronger, albeit nonsignificant, effect for dispositional trust on cooperation with the conservation program
without financial incentive (β = -.11; p = .12; βcorrect = .05; p = .29) and on cooperation
with the access program without financial incentive (β = -.12; p = .09; βcorrect = .06; p =
.22).
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 14 HERE
************************************************************************
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Finally, model invariance across levels of experience with the institution’s staff
was tested. As reported in the top panel of Table 15, the metric invariance held, but
constraining the item means resulted in a significant decrease in model fit. Following the
suggestions of the modification indices, both pf3 (“I have generally been treated fairly by
Game and Parks”; Mless experienced = 4.80; Mmore experienced = 5.25; x2Δ = 12.27) and care2
(“Most decision makers of Game and Parks care about residents in the area they
regulate”; Mless experienced = 4.56; Mmore experienced = 4.88; x2Δ = 9.45) were freed and the
both the lower order and higher order models achieved invariance through the residual
level. After testing the invariance of the models, the moderation of the effects of the
higher order factor and dispositional trust on the four conservation items was tested. As
reported in the bottom panel of Table 15, only the effect of the higher order factor on
cooperation with the access program without financial incentive was significant, such that
individuals below the mean of experience had a weaker (non-significant) effect (β = .15;
p = .14) than that for individuals above the mean (β = .41; p < .001).
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 15 HERE
************************************************************************
Discussion
The results here shed some light on the major questions posed by this research.
Regarding the reliability of the measures, the results indicate that the 19 items are reliable
measures of the six constructs. All six scales had model-based reliability estimates
greater than .80, indicating that more than 60% of the variance in the items was shared.
Regarding the dimensionality of the constructs, although the good fit of the
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multidimensional confirmatory factor models indicates that the constructs are in fact,
statistically separable, the results are somewhat more complicated than this. Specifically,
the excessive correlations between five of the constructs indicate that although the
relationships between the items can be explained by the relationships between latent
constructs, the latent constructs themselves are roughly singular. Thus, the data argue that
these five constructs might be most usefully conceptualized as indicators of an underlying
higher order factor. Conceptually, this argues that for most people, most of the time,
people will rely heavily on the underlying (in this case, higher order) evaluation in
determining their evaluations of the five constructs. This makes sense because
participants who lack salient information distinguishing these ideas from each other
would, presumably, use what information they do have in responding to the other items.
For example, participants who cannot recall specific positive or negative treatment or do
not know how competent the Commission is might answer based on how well they feel
the Commission represents their values or more inclusive evaluations like confident
expectations about the Commission.
The results also shed light on the relative influence of the attitudinal trust
constructs on cooperation intention. Although the lack of independent variance in the five
constructs makes their sharing significant independent predictive variance with
cooperation functionally impossible, the higher order factor was independently predictive
of cooperation intention. Conversely, dispositional trust was neither significantly
correlated nor independently predictive in any of the models reported here. These results
indicate that in the context of access and conservation programs both with and without
financial incentive, the participants’ willingness to say they would participate is driven

100

only by the institution specific evaluations and is not related to the participant’s
dispositional willingness to trust others across situations. Notably, however, the variance
accounted for by the higher order factor was limited (less than 10% of the variance in all
four cooperation variables). Importantly, though, the effect of the higher order trust factor
persisted even when the perception of risk in the specific program, sophistication, and
environmental concern were entered into the model and, in fact, remained the strongest
predictor (but note that the use of latent factors would eliminate some error variance,
thereby increasing their relationship as compared to observed variables).
Finally, the results shed light on the hypothesized sophistication moderation.
Following the lead of previous work, it was hypothesized that the predictive ability of the
attitudinal trust constructs would depend on the level of the participant’s sophistication.
Although the results do provide some support for this hypothesis, the support is very
limited. In place of the cleanly hypothesized increases in predictive ability for the
institution specific constructs (in this case, the higher order factor) and decreases for
dispositional trust as a function of increased sophistication, only individual relationships
were moderated when any were moderated at all. In the case of subjective knowledge, the
invariance tests revealed no significant interactions. Objective knowledge, however, did
moderate the influence of the institution specific evaluations and dispositional trust on
cooperation with access (and, in the case of dispositional trust, conservation) programs
without financial incentive. As hypothesized, more knowledgeable participants had a
stronger relationship between institution specific evaluations and cooperation and a
weaker relationship for dispositional trust. For experience, only the influence of the
institution specific constructs on cooperation with the access program without financial
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incentive was moderated. It is important to note that although all four of these significant
moderations are in line with the hypotheses, they represent 17% of the expected
moderations and, although significant, only once changed the significance of the effect
moderated (the higher order factor was almost always a significant predictor while the
effect of dispositional trust was almost always non-significant). It is possible that the
hypothesized moderation only occurs for some of the sophistication constructs in the face
of non-incentivized cooperation, but even if this is the case, the results here provide less
than sweeping evidence of the hypothesized sophistication moderation.
Study 2
Study 2 was conducted to extend the results of Study 1 by incorporating measures
of actual cooperation behavior. To that end, a survey of Nebraska land owners whose
land is of importance to the Southeast Nebraska Flagship Initiative was conducted. The
Initiative is a cooperative effort of the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission, the
Northern Prairies Land Trust, the Spring Creek Audubon, and the Nature Conservancy
that provides technical assistance and monies to land owners for conservation projects.
Although these projects can include any agreed upon conservation efforts, the far
majority of the Initiative’s efforts surround the prevention of arboreal incursion into
Nebraska’s native tallgrass prairie. While the program is often able to accomplish its
short term goals in these restoration actions (usually tree removal), the continued
conservation oriented land management of the land owners beyond the scope of the
program is vital. Most critically, these land owners must burn the grassland on their
property periodically in order to preserve the native prairie ecosystem and prevent
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arboreal incursion (Lett & Knapp, 2005), thus making land owner cooperation critical in
this context (Morton, Regen, Engle, Miller, & Harr, 2010).
Method
The Study 2 survey was mailed to 223 Nebraska land owners whose land had
been identified by the Initiative as important to their efforts. Initial survey packets were
sent in January and February of 2013 with a reminder postcard sent out to all nonresponders in April. Of the complete sample, 59 individuals returned the survey for a
response rate of 26%. Because of an interest in cooperation, this study also included a
longitudinal portion. As part of their normal operations, the Initiative provided an
assessment of each participant’s cooperation with their efforts in November of 2013 and
simply identified whether the participant was currently cooperating with their efforts (n =
31; yes = 74%; no = 26%).8 Note that within these broader two categories, cooperating
individuals were further categorized into two additional groups (cooperating because they
truly seem to understand the importance of conservation focused land management [n =
11] and cooperating simply because they agreed to [n = 12]) and two additional noncooperation groups (appeared to intend to cooperate but failed to follow through [n = 6]
and never intended to follow through [n = 2]). This variable is inherently subjective from
the point of view of the institution, but it is important to consider for exactly that reason.
Participants
Participants self-identified as mostly male (64%), white (91%), and owning more
than 100 acres of land (79%). A plurality identified as Republican (37%) or leaning
Republican (7%; 10% independent, 20% Democrat, 7% leaning Democrat, 10% non-

8

Note that for some participants (n = 28) this could not be reliably assessed for lack of information.
Responses for these individuals were coded as missing.
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political, 9% missing) and conservative (31%) or leaning conservative (17%; 19%
moderate, 5% liberal, 12% leaning liberal, 9% non-political, 9% missing). The sample
was roughly evenly divided on whether they had a previous contract with the Initiative
(yes = 49%; no = 51%), and the average age was 62.7.
Survey Measures
Participants completed much the same measures as in Study 1 with a few changes.
First, because the survey was intended to address the Southeast Nebraska Flagship
Initiative, the trust and sophistication questions were amended to target the Initiative.
Additionally, because the Initiative is a cooperative effort of several environmental
groups, trust and sophistication questions about the most salient partner (Nebraska Game
and Parks Commission) were also included. This group was argued to be most salient
because much of the Initiative’s equipment (e.g., trucks) prominently displays
Commission logos. Other than the addition of the items addressing the Initiative, the trust
items used were identical to those in Study 1 and yielded comparable means and
reliability (see Table 16). Notably, Study 2 participants reported significantly higher
evaluations of competence, confidence, procedural fairness, and salient values similarity
for the Initiative than the Commission. Also note that, as in Study 1, objective knowledge
and experience failed to yield good reliability in assessing the Initiative (αobk = .27; αexp =
.43) or the Commission (αobk = .41; αexp = .43), so the analyses again focused on the
single items most relevant to sophistication with the institution. For the Commission, the
objective knowledge questions that focused on the institution’s jurisdiction and
experience with staff were again used. For the Initiative, however, the objective
knowledge question about the institutions who partnered together to create the Initiative
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was used (because the Initiative has no binding jurisdiction) in addition to the experience
with staff question.
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 16 HERE
************************************************************************
The second major change from the Study 1 survey was the inclusion of questions
about cooperation behavior and attitudes toward the critical land management technique.
As discussed above, the majority of the Initiative’s efforts surround the prevention or
remediation of arboreal incursion into the native Nebraska prairie. Tree removal is often
the first step of these projects, but the trees’ return is likely unless land owners adopt
intentional land management strategies, most importantly including periodic burning.
Periodic burning is therefore a critical cooperative behavior for the Initiative and was
assessed in questions that asked whether land owners currently engaged in periodic
burning on their land, whether they intended to engage in periodic burning in the future,
whether they perceived any risks to themselves in engaging in periodic burning, and a
series of questions about their attitudes towards burning as a land management practice.
As reported in Table 17, most participants were currently engaging in periodic burning
(70%) and intended to do so into the future (80%) despite overwhelmingly perceiving
some level of risk in doing so (87% perceived some risk). As before, participants were
asked to write in examples of the perceived risks, and the most common responses
involved the unpredictability of fire and resultant damage to intentionally or
unintentionally burned property. Although periodic burning is a major part of cooperation
for most land owners, the institutional cooperation variable discussed above may take
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much more into account. Therefore the congruence of the two measures was tested. A
chi-square analysis revealed a non-significant relationship between the two variables
(x(1) = 0.35, p < 1.00; r = .11) but did show that only one individual who indicated that
he/she was not currently burning was identified as cooperating with the Initiative.
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 17 HERE
************************************************************************
In addition to these burning questions, the survey also asked participants a series
of questions to assess their attitudes towards periodic burning as a land management tool.
Participants were asked to report their agreement with seven statements: periodic burning
is an important tool, periodic burning has benefits beyond prairie restoration, periodic
burning is too dangerous, I engage or would engage in periodic burning only because I
have been asked to, periodic burning causes a financial strain, periodic burning is
inconvenient, and I have felt the benefits of periodic burning on my land. After reverse
scoring negatively worded items, the scale revealed high internal consistency (α = .80)
and so was averaged to create a single scale score (M = 5.02; SD = 1.15; Skew = -0.63;
Kurtosis = 0.11). Importantly however, a PAF analysis of the seven items failed to
converge (a Heywood case, likely because of the small sample size). Evaluation of the
item correlations indicated that despite the good internal consistency, several of the items
were not significantly correlated. To address this, a second, limited scale was computed
with only three of the positively worded items (burnstts1, burnstts3, and burnstts7; α =
.81; M = 5.22; SD = 1.44; Skew = -1.19; Kurtosis = 0.90; see Table 16).
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Results
Trust Variable Correlations
We first evaluated the correlations between the trust construct scales. As
mentioned above, the trust scales were administered twice within the survey, once
targeting the Initiative and once targeting the Commission. As in Study 1, construct
correlations within institutions were high (see top left and bottom right quadrants of
Table 18) with the exception of dispositional trust which, as in Study 1, was less
correlated with the other trust constructs (bottom row of Table 18). Correlations across
institutions, however, were much more limited (see bottom left quadrant of Table 18),
indicating that participants had somewhat distinct impressions of the two institutions.
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 18 HERE
************************************************************************
Relationships with Cooperation
We next evaluated the relationship between trust, sophistication, perceived risk,
relevant attitudes, and cooperation. Because of the small sample, the analyses focused on
the evaluation of the bivariate relationship of each of the constructs with the two
cooperation measures (self-reported burning behavior and dichotomous institutional
assessments of cooperation). Latent variable analyses were not used because they require
sufficient power to detect ill-fit and so would be biased towards indicating good fit with
such limited samples. Multiple regressions, however, are more likely to fail to yield
significant effects when underpowered, and thus could be thought of as more trustworthy,
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but because of the small sample and the highly correlated nature of the trust constructs,
they are not reported here.
Regarding self-reported burning, a series of one-way ANOVAs and chi-square
tests were conducted to determine whether participants who reported engaging in
periodic burning differed from those who did not on any of the relevant measures. As
reported in Table 19, mean values of objective knowledge of the Commission; care,
competence, confidence in the Initiative, and procedural fairness; and the limited scale of
attitudes towards burning were significantly different between groups, such that land
owners who were more accurate regarding the Commission, more trusting in the
Initiative, and had more positive attitudes towards burning were more likely to report
engaging in periodic burning on their land with the strongest effect being for attitudes
towards burning. The dichotomous institutional cooperation assessment variable was
evaluated next. As reported in Table 20, none of the investigated constructs was
significantly different across groups, but evaluation of the effect sizes suggests that for
subjective knowledge of the Initiative (d = 0.47) and the limited scale of the burning
attitudes (d = 0.99), the lack of effects was likely due to the small sample.
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 19 HERE
************************************************************************
************************************************************************
INSERT TABLE 20 HERE
************************************************************************
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Discussion
Study 2 was conducted to extend the results of Study 1 to actual behavior which
was operationalized as self-reported periodic burning behavior and a dichotomous
cooperation assessment from the Initiative. Regarding burning behavior, the results show
that objective knowledge of the Commission’s jurisdiction; perceptions of the Initiative’s
care, process farness, competence, and confidence; and attitudes towards burning differed
significantly across groups. As in Study 1, however, dispositional trust was not
significantly different across groups. Regarding the dichotomous cooperation assessment
from the Initiative, none of the comparisons was significant, but it is important to
remember that the sample size for this measure was particularly small (23 were
cooperating and just 8 were not). Evaluation of the effect sizes suggests that the effect of
burning attitudes was large and those of subjective knowledge about the Initiative and its
competence were just shy of moderate. A power analysis (Cohen, 1988), suggested that
with slightly larger conditions (10/condition for burning attitudes, 25/condition for
subjective knowledge, and 35/condition for competence) these effects would likely be
significant.
General Discussion
This research provides some, albeit complicated, support for the proposed model.
As presented in Figure 2, the model hypothesizes that 1) the six major trust bases from
the natural resources management literature are distinct constructs that can be reliably
measured using these items, 2) these constructs significantly influence intention to
cooperate and cooperation behavior, and 3) this influence is moderated by sophistication,
such that for low sophisticates, dispositional trusting tendencies are most important,
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while for more sophisticated individuals, the influence of these dispositional tendencies
diminishes in favor of more institution-specific constructs.
Hypothesis 1 – Six Separable and Reliably Measured Constructs
Regarding the first hypothesis, Study 1 does indeed find support for the reliability
of the items and separability of the constructs. The 19 items were subjected to a
confirmatory factor analysis in which the items were entered as indicators of their
hypothesized factors. The analysis revealed that the hypothesized factor structure
sufficiently accounted for the covariance in the data. Additionally, the models yielded
good evidence of reliability, such that at least 66% of the items’ variance was shared.
Importantly, however, both Study 1 and Study 2 provided evidence that five of the
constructs are especially highly correlated. Specifically, latent care, competence,
confidence, procedural fairness, and salient values similarity were all correlated greater
than .85 in Study 1. It is important to note that because of their ability to partial shared
from unshared variance, latent analyses do tend to increase relationships between
constructs, but in Study 2 item average correlations among the five institution-specific
constructs were still greater than .75 for the Initiative and .65 for the Commission. These
findings challenge the separability of the constructs in that even though the covariance
among the items could be sufficiently accounted for by the hypothesized factor structure
in the confirmatory factor analysis, the constructs underlying those item responses are
correlated to the point that they have little independent variance. This lack of independent
variance undermines any treatment of the constructs as distinct constructs, but their
conceptual distinctiveness, the good fit of the five factor model, and the poor fit of a
single factor model suggest that combining the items as indicators of a single latent
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construct would result in the loss of some important variance. Instead, the analyses tested
and found support for a higher order factor solution that models the covariance in the
latent factors as a separate factor. While this factor solution did result in statistically
poorer fit than the correlated factors solution, the untenable nature of a model with such
highly correlated factors, coupled with the even poorer fit of the single factor solution,
suggests that this may be the best representation of the constructs.
Thus it seems that although the six trust bases are distinct constructs statistically
and conceptually, participants tended to respond very similarly to at least five of them,
potentially because they are relying on a more global evaluation of the institution as
represented by the higher order factor (e.g., “I think they are generally good so sure, they
are fair and competent.”). For natural resources institutions, these findings suggest that
although the “business as usual” approach of treating trust as a unitary construct is likely
to produce somewhat convergent results, there are important distinctions to be made. The
primary distinction seems to be between institution-specific and general trusting
tendencies. Encouragingly, but somewhat unsurprisingly, this suggests that our relatively
unsophisticated participants did have sufficient information about these institutions to
distinguish their evaluations of them from their broader, more general evaluations of
others. Additionally, the results from Study 2 provide some evidence that participants can
successfully distinguish between two similar and even somewhat overlapping institutions
as will be discussed further in the next section.
Hypothesis 2 – Trust and Cooperation
As hypothesized, both Study 1 and Study 2 provide relatively clear evidence for a
statistically significant effect of trust on cooperation. In Study 1, the institution-specific
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higher order trust factor significantly predicted intention to cooperate with conservation
or access programs regardless of financial incentive and whether sophistication,
perceived risk, or environmental concern were included as controls. Importantly, though,
the effects, although significant, were small. As an example, the strongest effect of trust
in the SEM analysis was on cooperation with the conservation program without financial
incentive where a one standard deviation increase in the higher order factor corresponded
to a 0.38 increase in cooperation (a little more than a third of a step between options on
the 7pt scale). The situation was much the same in Study 2, where perceptions of the
Initiative’s care, procedural fairness, competence, and confidence were all significantly
related to self-reported current periodic burning status. Although the effect sizes were
noteworthy (d’s > 0.60), none was large, again suggesting a significant, but not especially
large effect. Regarding the institutional assessment of cooperation, none of the trust
constructs means was significantly different, and competence’s slightly less than
moderate effect was the largest by far (d = 0.41). The results regarding dispositional trust,
however, are much clearer in that it was never significantly associated with cooperation
or cooperation intention. In the Study 1 latent correlations and structural regressions, its
effect was small and insignificant and, in the Study 2 means tests, its non-significant
comparisons consistently had small effect sizes (d’s < 0.30). Thus it seems that trust in
the institution, but not trust in others generally, is a significant but small predictor of
cooperation intention and behavior.
For natural resources institutions, this distinction between institution-specific and
tendencies to trust is encouraging because it allows for cooperation from generally
untrusting individuals if the institution itself is trusted, an evaluation over which they
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have much more control (Hamm et al., 2013b). Regarding the institution-specific base(s)
most important for cooperation, however, the suggestions from this research are less
clear. On one hand, the high correlations among the constructs seem to indicate that most
of the time, for most people, there might not be important differences in focusing on one
construct or another as they seem to be highly correlated. On the other hand, though, the
conceptual and statistical distinctiveness argue that there might be specific situations or
individuals for whom specific constructs are more or less important (though this does not
seem to happen as a function of the sophistication of the trustor, as will be discussed in
more detail later). It is easy to see how specific situations may create an impetus for the
importance of some constructs over others. For example, once it has been determined to
be necessary, the building of a dam that can successfully regulate stream flow is likely to
encourage an emphasis on competence that it might not for salient values similarity or
care. Previous research seems to support this postulation in that distinct trust constructs
have been shown to be more or less important under some situations (e.g., Earle &
Siegrist, 2008; Hamm et al., 2013a; Herian, Hamm, PytlikZillig, & Tomkins, 2012).
Importantly, however, the small percentage of variance accounted for by
institution-specific trust does underscore the need for considering other potential drivers
of cooperation behavior. Indeed, in the Study 1 structural regressions, all 7 predictors
together accounted for no more than 12% of cooperation intention. This small percentage
of the variance is not unexpected as human behavior is often multiply determined.
Everything from diet to whim can play important roles and decisions like voluntary
cooperation may well rely on important situational or social factors. Nevertheless, the
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identification of significant psychological drivers of cooperation like attitudes and
perceptions is important and, of those constructs, trust is clearly important.
Additionally, the results provide some evidence that it matters in which specific
institution trust is held. In Study 2, participants rated their trust in both the Commission
and the Initiative. Although the Initiative was responsible for the included programs, the
Commission is likely to be an especially salient partner in the Initiative’s activities
especially because of the prominence of its logos on the Initiative’s equipment (e.g., truck
doors). Despite this overlap, participants did seem very able to distinguish their
perceptions of the two institutions as indicated by the small, if existent, correlations
between constructs addressing the Initiative and Commission. As tests of the rank order
of variables, these small and insignificant correlations suggest that individuals who trust
the Initiative do not necessarily trust the Commission. The subsequent cooperation
analyses further suggest that trust in the Commission was much less important than trust
in the Initiative, especially for self-reported burning but also to a lesser degree for
institutional cooperation assessments. This finding is also encouraging for natural
resource partnerships like the Initiative, as it suggests that what is most critical is not trust
in related natural resources management institutions, but trust in the institution asking for
cooperation specifically.
Hypothesis 3 – Sophistication Moderation Hypothesis
Building upon previous work (Hamm et al., 2013a; 2013b), the final hypothesis
was that sophistication would significantly moderate the effect of trust on cooperation,
such that institution-specific constructs would be more important for more sophisticated
individuals, while more general constructs would be more important for less sophisticated
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individuals. The rationale for this hypothesis lies in the expectation that less sophisticated
individuals are likely to have less relevant information upon which to base their
evaluations and will therefore have to rely more on their predispositions to trust
generally. Although the research provides some evidence of this moderating relationship,
it falls considerably short of providing strong support. Study 1tested this moderating
influence of subjective knowledge about the Commission, objective knowledge about the
Commission’s jurisdiction, and experience with the Commission’s staff. Invariance tests
revealed that for individuals above and below the mean of subjective knowledge the
relationships of trust and cooperation intention were not statistically different from each
other. The same was true for most of the comparisons for objective knowledge and
experience with the exception of four specific relationships (see Tables 14 and 15).
Interestingly three of the four relationships involved an effect on cooperation with an
access program without financial incentive, suggesting that the sophistication moderation
hypothesis may exist only for this situation (relatively risky situations that have no
incentive and thus low cooperation) and these more objective measures of sophistication.
It is not unreasonable that these relatively limited situations may best lend themselves to
differences by objective and not subjectively perceived sophistication, as when
cooperation is less likely (no financial incentive) and harder (more perceived risk),
individuals are likely to be more dissimilar as a function of their objectively measured
sophistication (objective knowledge and experience). That is to say, it is possible that in
the face of this more difficult cooperation, when evaluations of the institution might be
especially important, individuals who spend more time with the institution may have
more relevant information upon which to base their perceptions of the institution (e.g.,
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fair and respectful treatment or evaluations of competence) than those who spend less
time with it. Contrastingly though, increases in subjective knowledge may not reflect any
actual increase in trust relevant data, making individuals who are more and less
subjectively knowledgeable more similar. Although this explanation is unquestionably
tenuous, it is somewhat bolstered by evaluation in light of the previous research. In the
studies where the sophistication moderation hypothesis was identified, individuals were
likely in more risky situations. Hamm and colleagues (2013a) investigated perceptions of
the courts that have considerable jurisdiction over individual liberty, while Hamm and
colleagues (2013b) investigated compliance with water allocations which are likely to
have direct impacts on livelihoods. Problematically, however, neither study measured
perceived risk, and Hamm and colleagues (2013b) utilized a student sample to
approximate farmer behavior which is likely to attenuate the difficulty and risk that may
have been perceived by an actual farmer.
A second, more likely explanation for the lack of moderation in this sample may
lie in the current operationalization of sophistication. In both previous studies,
sophistication was conceptualized or operationalized in ways that were especially
relevant to the situation. Across the courts inquiries (Hamm et al., 2011, 2013a),
sophistication was conceptualized as the difference between students (some of whom
reported little contact with the courts) and recent defendants who, by definition, had been
in contact with the courts recently. In the water allocation study, sophistication was the
information the participant received about the allocation decision in the vignette itself. In
this dissertation, however, sophistication was measured using 11 items that were
hypothesized to be important to achieving a level of general knowledge and experience
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with an institution. If the current measures of sophistication in this study failed to tap this
more general level of sophistication with the institution and instead targeted only
peripheral aspects, it is not surprising that they would not significantly moderate the
effect of trust.
Conclusion
The research was conducted to test a model of trust in and cooperation with
natural resources institutions. Embedded within the model were three specific hypotheses
that received mixed support. Regarding the separability of the constructs, the results here
do provide support but also suggest that five of the constructs may be particularly
strongly correlated, potentially because they are all driven by an underlying evaluation of
the institution. Regarding the influence of trust on cooperation, the results consistently
show that institution-specific constructs do have a small but significant influence on trust
but that this influence is specific to trust in the institution requesting cooperation and is
attenuated for trust in other institutions or the participant’s tendency to trust others
generally. Regarding the sophistication moderation hypothesis, the results provide scant
support, finding a significant moderation in only 17% of the effects hypothesized. The
lack of moderation could be evidence of a boundary condition of the effect, such that it
only occurs in relatively low likelihood, risky cooperation situations but is more likely
evidence that only specific operationalizations of sophistication will result in the
expected moderation.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION

Trust is a critical part of every human interaction. Because of the fundamental
human dilemma (Lind, 2001), all human interaction involves some level of vulnerability
such that at any time, the “other” may act in favor of or against the trustor’s interests. As
argued here, this importance holds true in the context of natural resources governance.
This dissertation explores this importance by investigating trust and cooperation within
the context of natural resources management. Chapter One suggests that a fundamental
conflict in land owner and natural resource institutions’ interests in natural resources may
be less optimally negotiated via formal challenges in court without an emphasis on
procedural fairness, a construct of trust that is likely to be especially important in this
context. Chapter Two argued that while the critical importance of trust across contexts
has spawned a great deal of relevant scholarship, it has not resulted in a generally
accepted understanding of trust across contexts. To address this, Chapter Two proposed a
framework of trust which, by incorporating existing understandings of trust, has the
potential to integrate the existing bodies of relevant scholarship and provide some clarity
to understanding the construct. Specifically, the framework argues that attitudinal trust is
a willingness to be vulnerable in dealings with an “other” and is driven by a considerable
number of potential bases that lend themselves to the lessening of the trustor’s
vulnerability or increasing its acceptability. Further, the framework hypothesizes that
attitudinal trust is itself a driver of an intention to act trustingly and trusting behavior.
Application of the framework to the three major trust literatures reveals considerable
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congruence, such that although the major bases and specific understandings vary across
domains, the central arguments of the framework are generally supported.
Using this framework as a basis, Chapter Three went on to present and test a
model of trust in natural resources governance that incorporates the six major bases of
vulnerability in this context and argued that they are predictive of an intention to act
trustingly (operationalized as intention to cooperate) or trusting behavior (operationalized
as cooperation behavior). To these postulations of the proposed framework, however, the
model added the sophistication moderation hypothesis (Hamm et al., 2013a), which
argues that the bases of trust should themselves be moderated by the knowledge and
experience (i.e., sophistication) of the trustor, such that with limited sophistication, more
general constructs like dispositional trust should be most predictive. With increased
sophistication, however, more specific constructs are expected to increase in predictive
ability.
The Chapter Three results both challenge and support its hypothesized model.
Study 1 provides support for the hypothesized dimensionality of the constructs in that the
confirmatory factor analysis of the six trust bases confirmed that the covariance among
constructs was adequately accounted for by the relationships among the latent factors.
Importantly, however, the five institution-specific constructs (care, competence,
confidence, procedural fairness, and salient values similarity) were all strongly
correlated, not only in the latent analyses of Study 1 (which can increase construct
correlations by partialing out measurement error) but also in the observed variable
correlations of Study 2. Functionally, this extreme covariance precludes the evaluation of
the independent effects of the constructs in a regression analysis, but, more importantly, it
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challenges the statistical distinctiveness of the constructs themselves. If the constructs are
so highly correlated as to share virtually all of their variance (more than 75% in the latent
analyses), they are functionally equivalent, suggesting that the model may have been
over-parameterized. Importantly, however, the constructs themselves are conceptually
distinct. Despite the likely conceptual overlap in constructs like perceptions of care and
salient values similarity or procedural fairness, it is certainly possible for an institution to
care about the public generally, but neither share the values of the trustor nor offer the
opportunity for voice in a decision making process. Perceptions of competence are likely
even more distinct because it is not hard to imagine an institution that is especially
competent but cares little for the public. Indeed, some of the most limited trust construct
correlations identified in the analyses here were between competence and the other bases
of trust. Even so, other constructs are likely to overlap conceptually with competence.
Confidence, for example, likely overlaps in that institutions are likely to do their jobs
well when they are sufficiently competent to do so. Importantly, though, a single factor
model of the constructs fit especially poorly to the data, and most of the requested model
changes suggested recombining items into their previous scales. This suggests that,
despite the conceptual overlap, the constructs are somewhat distinct statistically.
The subsequent inclusion of a higher order factor was intended, primarily, to
address the functional issue of insufficient independent variance for a structural
regression, but it also suggests a potential conceptual development to the understanding
of trust. It may be that when responding about specific perceptions of an institution,
individuals rely heavily upon a more global evaluation of it. Thus institutions that are
perceived positively overall may also be perceived as caring, competent, fair, et cetera,
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not because the trustor has evaluated and responded to each construct individually but
because of the positive overall impression. This, however, does not preclude the
potentiality that in some specific situations, individuals may have distinct perceptions of
the various constructs (e.g., immediately after learning competence relevant information).
Indeed the separability of the constructs in this research and the differential effects of
various bases in other research seem to suggest this (e.g., Hamm et al., 2013a; 2013b).
What it does suggest, though, is that for most individuals, most of the time, the
institution-specific bases of trust cohere strongly, and at least one reasonable explanation
for this is because of their basis in an underlying, more global evaluation.
Given this, the next logical question regards the nature of this underlying global
evaluation for which some guidance can be elicited by applying the more general
framework of trust presented in Chapter Two. This framework suggests that the bases of
trust are drivers of a willingness to accept vulnerability in dealings with an “other.”
Given the statistical evidence suggesting that participants may be relying on a broader
evaluation of the institution, this might mean that individuals’ broader evaluation of the
institution may be their willingness to be vulnerable to it and that this in turn may be a
driver of their responses to the bases of trust themselves. Importantly, the causality
suggested in the final model of natural resources trust in Chapter Three (Figure 3) is the
opposite of that suggested by the more global framework of trust in Chapter Two (Figure
1), but it stands to reason that these relationships may be somewhat recursive. In the
context of a novel institution, it is likely that the bases would drive the willingness to be
vulnerable in dealing with the institution. In this situation, the trustor would be expected
to be determining his or her level of willingness to accept vulnerability to the institution,
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and one would expect this determination to be based on the information (bases) available.
As this willingness becomes more settled, however, it also stands to reason that it could
be itself used as a, and potentially the, basis for specific evaluations of the institution,
especially those for which more relevant information is not readily available.
Consider, for example, a land owner who is approached by a new natural
resources partnership in his area that is seeking his voluntary cooperation by requesting
that he engage in patch burning on land that he uses for grazing. The process will require
the land owner to select some percentage of his land to be burned periodically and thus be
unavailable for grazing. Although the process is expected to increase the suitability of the
land for future grazing (e.g., by increasing biodiversity and controlling trees), it is not
without its own risk of decreased productivity if the grasses fail to return or if too much
land is unintentionally burned by an out of control grass fire. Assume that the partnership
has presented itself as particularly caring and has convinced the land owner that they
espouse his most salient value of productivity. In determining his willingness to
cooperate, the land owner is likely to take what information is available to him, which in
this case is likely to be the evaluation of its care and salient values similarity. In this
situation, the causal direction of the relationship between the constructs and the
willingness to be vulnerable is likely to follow that suggested in the Chapter Two
framework. Assume now, however, that the land owner has no information regarding the
competence or procedural fairness of the institution but is asked about his perceptions of
these bases. It stands to reason that these responses may themselves now be driven by the
underlying willingness to accept vulnerability in dealing with the institution, such that if
he is now generally willing to be vulnerable to the institution, he would also be motivated
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to feel that it is more competent and more procedurally fair. This would flip the causal
direction of the relationship to follow that suggested in the Chapter Three model. Thus
the underlying evaluation may function as both a driver and result of the relevant bases as
a function of the situation.
The second major proposition of the proposed model is the influence of trust on
cooperation and intention to cooperate which is largely supported in both Chapter Three
studies, such that both find a small but statistically significant effect for trust on
cooperation. Critically, it seems that it is trust in the specific institution requesting
cooperation that matters most and not trust in other closely related institutions or trust in
others generally. This stands to reason in that when determining whether to cooperate, the
most salient evaluations upon which to base that decision are likely the evaluations of the
institution asking for cooperation. In both Study 1 and Study 2, these institution-specific
evaluations were significantly related to cooperation intention and also to cooperation
behavior, but only when cooperation behavior was operationalized as self-report and not
when operationalized as the cooperation assessment of the institution. Part of the reason
for the lack of effect on institutional cooperation assessments is likely statistical in that
these assessments included a great deal of missing data (responses for almost half of the
participants were coded as missing by the Initiative for lack of sufficient information),
but the issue may also be conceptual or methodological. Conceptually, burning behavior
and institutional cooperation may simply not be the same thing. Although periodic
burning is an important part of advancing the Initiative’s interests, its cooperation
assessment was necessarily much broader. Indeed, a chi-square analysis of the
congruence between the measures of self-report burning behavior and institutional

123

cooperation assessments revealed a non-significant relationship, such that burning
behavior did not completely overlap with the institutional cooperation assessment.
Notably, however, this lack of congruence seems to have been mostly for individuals
who reported that they were currently burning, as only one individual who reported not
burning was identified as cooperating. Methodologically, it is also possible that responses
to the self-report burning questions were less accurate as a result of either demand
characteristics or unintentionally inaccurate reporting, but it is not clear why respondents
would have been dishonest about their behavior in a third-party survey, and it is unlikely
that they would not know if periodic burning was being used on their land. Additionally,
the similarities between the results regarding self-report burning behavior in Study 2 and
intention to cooperate in Study 1 permit some confidence in the measures because of the
similarity in relationships across studies. This is especially true when considered in light
of the effect sizes of the analyses with the institutional cooperation assessments in Study
2 which suggested that with a slightly larger sample, many of the same effects would
likely become significant.
The final proposition of the proposed model is the sophistication moderation
hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, less sophisticated (i.e., less knowledgeable and
experienced) individuals are expected to rely more heavily upon more general tendencies
to trust others, while more sophisticated individuals are expected to rely more heavily
upon more target-specific information, and the hypothesis has been supported in research
(Hamm et al, 2013a; 2013b; but see Lubell, 2007, who finds an opposite effect such that
dispositional trust becomes more important with increased sophistication). Study 1 tested
the hypothesis that the predictive ability of trust on cooperation would differ for
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individuals as a function of their subjective knowledge, objective knowledge about the
institution’s jurisdiction, or experience with the institution’s staff. Overall, despite a few
hypothesis consistent findings, the results failed to support this hypothesis and suggest
that individuals rely roughly equivalently on the bases of trust regardless of their
sophistication. There are a few potential reasons for this lack of an effect, including the
possibility that the moderation effect is constrained to cooperation/compliance in a
relatively risky and difficult situation. More likely, however, the lack of an effect in the
research here was a result of the more peripheral measures of sophistication used. Unlike
the previous research (Hamm et al, 2013a; 2013b; Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, &
PytlikZillig, 2012), the measures used here may have targeted relatively peripheral
aspects of sophistication and missed the more global understanding of the construct
relevant to the moderation proposed here. For example, is knowing enough about an
institution to have perceptions of it distinct from your tendency to trust others really
reasonably indicated by knowledge of its jurisdiction?
The rationale for the sophistication moderation hypothesis is that when
unsophisticated individuals interact with a novel other, their lack of knowledge and
experience with the novel target suggests that they will have only their tendency to trust
others generally upon which to rely. Despite the relative failure of the analyses here to
support this hypothesis, reason dictates that individuals cannot base evaluations on
information they do not have. As a result, unsophisticated individuals cannot base their
evaluations of an institution on their evaluations of institution-specific bases. Thus, these
results likely provide less evidence of the inaccuracy of the hypothesis but instead
indicate that, as suggested above, the kind of sophistication necessary for the moderation
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is somewhat particular as may be the requisite sophistication level. Unlike this research,
the previous research that supported the hypothesized moderation (Hamm et al., 2013a;
2013b) compared individuals who were moderately to highly sophisticated regarding
aspects of the institution salient to the institutional evaluation (e.g., defendants who had
contact with the courts and students who had received specific information about a water
allocation) to very unsophisticated individuals (students who reported very little contact
with the courts and students who had not yet received the information about the water
allocation). These samples represent relatively ideal comparisons for the hypothesized
moderation in that the unsophisticated individuals are especially lacking in relevant
knowledge and experience and the more sophisticated individuals would have had
information that was especially relevant; a situation which is arguably untrue in the
present research, where the participants who were identified as more and less
sophisticated were much more similar in terms of both the kind and level of their
sophistication.
Limitations
Despite the contribution of this research, there are important limitations,
especially in terms of generalizability. Study 2 used an extremely limited sample of
geographically limited land owners and although Study 1 utilized a random, and therefore
presumably representative sample of Nebraska land owners, it is necessarily limited to
land owners who were willing to complete a survey about natural resources regulation in
the state. While this is likely to include individuals who were both especially happy (and
thus cooperative) and especially unhappy (and thus motivated to express their discontent)
with natural resources regulation in Nebraska, this sample, like all survey samples, is
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necessarily limited to respondents who are more willing to comply with our participation
request. Thus this survey may well have over-sampled individuals who are
dispositionally more willing to indicate that they would be willing to comply. It is
important to note that our intended cooperation rates were not especially high, but none
of the data collected in this research is able to speak directly to this potential problem.
Implications
From biodiversity to food production and ecosystem services, effectively meeting
the plethora of natural resources challenges is a critical responsibility of modern society.
Thus, effective natural resources governance is of critical import in today’s world. After
decades of “command and control” management, modern natural resources institutions
have generally begun to recognize that more collaborative approaches are typically
preferable and that trust may, therefore, have an important role to play in their success.
This dissertation investigates the role of trust in this context and in so doing, suggests
three important policy implications. Regarding the role of trust, this dissertation suggests
that natural resources institutions are, in fact, likely to be well-served by enhancing
public trust. Importantly, however, the “kind” of trust most critical to this benefit is likely
to be trust in the institution itself. Although some research has suggested that bonds
among wider communities like social capital might be important drivers of effective
natural resources management (e.g., Pretty, 2003), this research suggests that these more
diffuse constructs may be less important than more institution-specific evaluations. This
is encouraging for natural resources institutions because it is likely these evaluations that
institutions will have the most control over. It is hard to see how an institution could
reasonably affect the level of trust that land owners have in each other generally, but it is
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much easier to conceive of efforts that these institutions could engage in to improve
perceptions of themselves. From efforts to increase public knowledge about the
institutions that focus on their competence and track record to meeting with land owners
individually or in groups to discuss salient values similarity to public input events that
provide land owners with real voice, these institutions will likely experience increased
land owner cooperation, at least in so much as these events actually result in increases in
perceived trust in the institution.
Unfortunately, however, the guidance that this dissertation provides regarding the
specific constructs most critical to land owner cooperation is somewhat complicated.
Instead of identifying one or two constructs that most significantly predict cooperation,
the analyses identified a few constructs that are too correlated to permit testing their
independent effects. To address this concern, a latent construct made up of the covariance
in these institution specific constructs was added to the model and the analyses revealed
that it had the strongest influence on cooperation. As discussed above, this suggests that
these institution-specific evaluations may be the most important for cooperation but also
suggests that it may, in fact, be a broader institutional evaluation underlying the more
specific constructs that is most relevant to cooperation decisions and that the specific
bases may be important only in so much as they overlap with the underlying evaluation.
This would suggest that natural resources institutions may be best served by targeting this
evaluation specifically, making an understanding of the nature of this evaluation
especially important. While these analyses themselves provide precious little guidance as
to the nature of the construct, the proposed framework from Chapter Two suggests that it
might be a willingness to accept vulnerability. If true, this would suggest that natural
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resources institutions may most efficiently increase cooperation by increasing public
willingness to be vulnerable to them. Such efforts would likely focus on institutionspecific bases of trust like competence and salient values similarity, but the recognition of
vulnerability as the critical construct would encourage natural resources institutions to
work to identify the perceived vulnerabilities and focus their efforts there. For example, if
a specific land owner group of importance to a specific natural resources institution
perceives an especially salient vulnerability in terms of lost productivity, efforts to
address the bases of trust in light of these productivity issues are likely to be much more
effective in increasing cooperation than efforts focused on less salient vulnerabilities like
saving the environment.
The final policy implication of this dissertation regards the role of sophistication.
Previous research has suggested that sophistication may play an important role in the
importance of the bases of trust as predictors of cooperation, such that more institutionspecific constructs are most important for more sophisticated individuals (e.g., Hamm et
al., 2013a; 2013b). This has been argued to be ideal for natural resources institutions
because by increasing the sophistication of the individual, natural resources institutions
could reduce the importance of trust in others, which they are unlikely to be able to
increase efficiently, in favor of an increased importance for trust in the institution, which
is far more under their control (Hamm et al., 2013b). Although it fails to provide strong
support for the hypothesis, this dissertation, when considered in light of the previous
work, does suggest that the level of sophistication required for institution-specific
constructs to dominate models predicting cooperation is relatively low and/or fairly
global. Across the relevant analyses, only those including students who reported little
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contact with the courts (Hamm et al., 2013a) or who had not yet been given specific
information about a water allocation (Hamm et al., 2013b) identified dispositional trust as
a major predictor of the relevant criterion. When the sample was highly (e.g., defendants;
Hamm et al., 2013) or moderately sophisticated, however, the importance of dispositional
trust was lost in favor of institution-specific bases, as was the case in this dissertation.
This is also encouraging for natural resources institutions because it suggests that efforts
to increase public sophistication regarding them need only to result in relatively low
increases in relevant knowledge or experience. Indeed, just a few paragraphs of
information were sufficient to eliminate the influence of dispositional trust in a water
allocation vignette study (Hamm et al., 2013b), and the means of the sophistication
variables were typically well below the midpoint in this dissertation, where dispositional
trust was never a significant predictor.
In conclusion, the dissertation contributes to the literature an evaluation of the
role of trust in cooperation by proposing a framework of trust and an evaluation of a
model of trust and cooperation in the natural resources context. The results provide mixed
support for the hypotheses by 1) confirming that trust is important for cooperation, 2)
suggesting that the constructs of trust, though separable, are often highly correlated, and
3) failing to provide convincing support for the sophistication moderation hypothesis.
The results suggest three implications for policy: 1) Trust does matter for cooperation but
that the target of that trust is critical. 2) Natural resources institutions may be best served
by identifying and targeting the construct underlying the institution specific trust bases.
3) If sophistication is an important moderator of the effects of the bases of trust, it is
likely to require only a very low level of very general sophistication with the institution.
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Table 1 – Summary of Understandings of Attitudinal Trust, its Major Bases, and
Intentional/Behavioral Trust in Each Major Body of Literature
Body of Literature

Attitudinal Trust

An acceptance of the
vulnerability in
Organizations
working with others
towards a common
goal
An acceptance of the
vulnerability in
Risk Management allowing another to
manage a risk to the
trustor
An acceptance of the
vulnerability in
allowing the
Government/Courts
government/court to
have authority over
the trustor

Major Bases
Trustworthiness,
Organizational Justice,
Anticipatory Justice

Intentional/
Behavioral Trust
Cooperative
behavior that
advances the
common goal of
the organization

Confidence, Salient
Values Similarity,
Dimensions of Trust,
Fairness

Allowing managers
to manage risks
with limited
obstruction

Satisfaction,
Legitimacy,
Encapsulated
Interests, Procedural
fairness, Confidence

The efficient and
effective
functioning of
governance
institutions
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Table 2 – Nebraska Game and Parks Commission Target Area Counties
Adams
Buffalo
Burt
Butler
Cass
Colfax
Cuming
Dakota
Dawson
Dodge
Douglas

44 Targeted Nebraska Counties (in alphabetical order)
Gage
Lincoln
Richardson
Garden
Madison
Saline
Gosper
Merrick
Sarpy
Hall
Morrill
Saunders
Hamilton
Nance
Scotts Bluff
Howard
Nemaha
Seward
Jefferson
Otoe
Stanton
Johnson
Pawnee
Thurston
Kearney
Phelps
Washington
Keith
Platte
Wayne
Lancaster
Polk
York
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Table 3 – Excluded Urban Areas
43 Urban Areas Excluded by ZIP Code (in alphabetical order)
Alliance
Crete
Lincoln
Scottsbluff
Ashland
David City
McCook
Seward
Auburn
Fairbury
Minden
Sidney
Aurora
Falls City
Nebraska City
Sioux City
Beatrice
Fremont
Norfolk
Valentine
Blair
Gothenburg
North Platte
Wahoo
Broken Bow
Grand Island
Ogallala
Waverly
Central City
Hastings
Omaha
Wayne
Chadron
Holdrege
O'Neill
West Point
Columbus
Kearney
Plattsmouth
York
Cozad
Lexington
Schuyler
Scottsbluff

Note. Not all of these urban areas are within the Target Area Counties.
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Table 4 – Observed Variable Scales Evaluation
N of
items

α

Subjective
Knowledge

4

.92

Dispositional Trust

3

.81

Care

3

.80

Competence

4

.92

Confidence

4

.94

Procedural Fairness

3

.85

Salient Values
Similarity

3

.89

NEP

15

.87

Construct

EFA Results
1 Factor – 74% of the
variance
1 Factor – 64% of the
variance
1 Factor – 58% of the
variance
1 Factor – 75% of the
variance
1 Factor – 79% of the
variance
1 Factor – 67% of the
variance
1 Factor – 76% of the
variance
4 Factors – 48% of the
variance

M

Averages Across Items
SD Skew Kurtosis

2.29 0.79

0.33

0.01

5.02 0.91

-1.00

1.07

4.49 1.10

-0.72

0.69

4.69 1.09

-0.60

0.58

4.79 1.20

-0.95

0.81

4.73 1.07

-0.69

0.93

4.59 1.21

-0.80

0.56

4.20 0.93

0.09

0.73
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Table 5 – Cooperation Variables
Variable
Conservation (no
financial incentive)
Conservation (with
financial incentive)
Access
(no financial incentive)
Access
(with financial incentive)
Perceived risk in
Conservation programs
Perceived risk in Access
programs

Response Option (%)
VU (22)

U (16)

SU (11) UD (30) SL (13)

L (6)

VL (2)

VU (11)

U (11)

SU (8)

VU (25)

U (21)

SU (12) UD (29)

SL (8)

L (3)

VL (1)

VU (16)

U (16)

SU (10) UD (30) SL (18)

L (8)

VL (2)

UD (25) SL (27) L (13) VL (4)

Yes (51) No (49)
Yes (61) No (39)

Note. VU = very unlikely, U = unlikely, SU = somewhat unlikely, UD = undecided, SL =
somewhat likely, L = likely, VL = very likely. Row totals may not equal 100 because of
rounding.
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Table 6 – Trust Construct CFA Model Items
Dimension
Dispositional
Trust
Care

Competence

Confidence

Procedural
Fairness
Salient Values
Similarity

Variable
Name
dt1
dt2a
dt3
care1a
care2
care3
comp1a
comp2
comp4
icon1
icon2
icon3a
icon4
pf1a
pf2
pf3
svs1
svs2
svs3a

Stdyx
Loading
.79***
.97***
.60***
.86***
.65***
.76***
.88***
.85***
.84***
.89***
.87***
.91***
.90***
.87***
.81***
.74***
.84***
.83***
.90***

Note. *** p < .001; a marker items (when used)

S.E.

vare

.04
.04
.04
.02
.04
.02
.02
.02
.02
.01
.01
.01
.01
.01
.03
.03
.02
.02
.02

.38***
.06***
.64***
.26***
.57***
.42***
.23***
.28***
.30***
.21***
.24***
.18***
.19***
.24***
.34***
.45***
.30***
.32***
.19***
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Table 7 – Trust Construct CFA Model Latent Variable Correlations (Reliability [ω] in
the Diagonal)
1-Dispositional Trust
2-Care
3-Competence
4-Confidence
5-Procedural Fairness
6-Salient Values
Similarity

1
ω = .84
.10+
.13*
.14*
.14*
.12*

2

3

4

5

6

ω = 81
.95*** ω = .89
.98*** .94*** ω = .94
.94*** .95*** .94*** ω = .85
.93*** .87*** .92*** .92*** ω = .89

Note. *** p < .001, * p < .05, + p < .10
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Table 8 – Trust Construct CFA Higher Order Factor Loadings
Latent Factor
Care
Competence
Confidence
Procedural Fairness
Salient Values Similarity

StdYX
Loading
.99***
.96***
.98***
.97***
.94***

Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01

S.E.

R2

Vare

.01
.01
.01
.01
.01

.98***
.91***
.96***
.94***
.88***

.02
.09***
.04**
.07**
.12***
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Table 9 – Trust Construct CFA Model Fit Comparisons
Model
1- Correlated
Factors
2- Higher
Order
3- Single
Factor

x2

DF

CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR

H0 LL

Comparison
to Model #1
-

381.03*** 137

.96

.95

.05

.03

-13873.06

401.74*** 146

.96

.95

.05

.03

-13888.97

528.36*** 151

.94

.93

.06***

.04

-13985.31

Note. *** p < .001, * p < .05

-2LLΔ (9)
= 20.96*
-2LLΔ (14) =
129.92***
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Table 10 – Trust Construct CFA Single Factor Model Items
Dimension
Dispositional
Trust

Single Factor

Note. *** p < .001

Variable
Name
dt1
dt2@1
dt3
care1
care2
care3
comp1
comp2
comp4
icon1
icon2
icon3
icon4
pf1
pf2
pf3
svs1
svs2
svs3

Stdyx
Loading
.79***
.97***
.60***
.85***
.65***
.75***
.84***
.82***
.80***
.89***
.86***
.89***
.89***
.85***
.79***
.72***
.80***
.79***
.84***

S.E.

vare

.04
.04
.04
.02
.04
.02
.02
.02
.02
.01
.01
.01
.01
.02
.03
.03
.02
.02
.02

.38***
.06
.64***
.28***
.58***
.43***
.30***
.33***
.35***
.26***
.26***
.20***
.21***
.28***
.38***
.49***
.35***
.38***
.29***

Recommended
cove with:
comp4
pf1/svs1
comp1
pf1
icon4
icon3
icon2/comp2
svs3/comp2
svs3
svs1/svs2
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Table 11 – SEM Cooperation Intention on Trust
Criterion

Variance
Accounted

Conservation
(no financial
incentive)

R2 = .06,
p = .007

Access (no
financial incentive)

R2 = .07,
p = .001

Conservation
(with financial
incentive)

R2 = .07,
p = .005

Access (with
financial incentive)

R2 = .08,
p = .001

Predictor
Higher Order
Dispositional
Trust
Higher Order
Dispositional
Trust
Higher Order
Dispositional
Trust
Higher Order
Dispositional
Trust

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient
.25***

Note. *** p < .001; bolded constructs are significant predictors

S.E.

pvalue

.05

<.001

-.01

.04

.88

.27***

.04

<.001

-.01

.04

.76

.26***

.05

<.001

-.02

.04

.73

.29***

.04

<.001

-.03

.04

.47
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Table 12 – SEM Cooperation Intention on Trust, Sophistication, Perceived Risk and
Environmental Concern (significant predictors italicized)
Criterion

Conservation
(no financial
incentive)

Access
(no financial
incentive)

Conservation
(with financial
incentive)

Access
(with financial
incentive)

Variance
Accounted

R2 = .08,
p = .001

R2 = .12,
p < .001

2

R = .08,
p = .001

R2 = .09,
p < .001

Predictor
Higher Order
Dispositional Trust
Perceived Risk in
Conservation Programs
rNEP
Obj. Knowledge (juris.)
Subj. Knowledge
Experience
(staff)
Higher Order
Dispositional Trust
Perceived Risk in
Access Programs
rNEP
Obj. Knowledge (juris.)
Subj. Knowledge
Experience
(staff)
Higher Order
Dispositional Trust
Perceived Risk in
Conservation Programs
rNEP
Obj. Knowledge (juris.)
Subj. Knowledge
Experience
(staff)
Higher Order
Dispositional Trust
Perceived Risk in
Access Programs
rNEP
Obj. Knowledge (juris.)
Subj. Knowledge
Experience
(staff)

Stdyx
Regression
Coefficient
.24
-.01

S.E.

p-value

.05
.05

< .001
.90

-.09

.04

.03

.08
-.05
.08

.05
.05
.05

.10
.32
.14

.03

.05

.55

.21
.01

.06
.05

< .001
.79

-.25

.04

< .001

.05
-.07
.02

.03
.04
.05

.12
.17
.63

-.03

.05

.55

.21
-.001

.06
.05

< .001
.98

-.08

.04

.06

.08
-.03
.11

.04
.05
.05

.03
.52
.04

.07

.05

.21

.21
.01

.05
.05

< .001
.88

-.17

.04

< .001

.06
-.08
.07

.03
.05
.05

.054
.09
.19

-.07

.05

.21

Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10; bolded constructs are significant
predictors
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Table 13 – Subjective Knowledge Measurement Invariance Tests
Model

x2

df

CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR

Relevant
Comparison

Subjective Knowledge – Lower Order Factors
Configural Invar.
Model

580.09

274

.96

.95

.06*

.04

Metric Invar. Model

600.97

287

.96

.95

.06*

.04

Scalar Invar. Model

625.14

300

.95

.95

.06*

.05

616.29

299

.95

.95

.06*

.05

626.083 317

.96

.95

.06

.05

Partial Scalar Invar.
Model
Partial Residual Invar.
Model

-2LLΔ (13) =
20.74; p = .07
-2LLΔ (13) =
23.34; p = .04
-2LLΔ (12) =
12.64; p = .40
-2LLΔ (18) =
19.68; p = .35

Subjective Knowledge – Higher Order Factor
Configural Invar.
Model

657.32

336

.95

.95

.06

.05

Metric Invar. Model

665.75

340

.95

.95

.06

.05

Scalar Invar. Model

665.75

340

.95

.95

.06

.05

Residual Invar. Model

681.02

345

.95

.95

.06

.05

Partial Residual
Invar. Model

669.33

344

.95

.95

.06

.05

-2LLΔ (4) = 8.52; p
= .07
-2LLΔ (5) = 14.93;
p = .01
-2LLΔ (4) = 4.31; p
= .37

Subjective Knowledge Moderation Tests
coconno on the Higher
Order Factor
coaccno on the Higher
Order Factor
coconfin on the Higher
Order Factor
coaccfin on the Higher
Order Factor
coconno on
Dispositional Trust
coaccno on
Dispositional Trust
coconfin on
Dispositional Trust
coaccfin on
Dispositional Trust

862.47

481

.95

.95

.05

.05

862.88

481

.95

.95

.05

.05

862.43

481

.95

.95

.05

.05

862.92

481

.95

.95

.05

.05

865.13

481

.95

.95

.05

.05

862.65

481

.95

.95

.05

.05

863.23

481

.95

.95

.05

.05

862.79

481

.95

.95

.05

.05

-2LLΔ (1) = 0.02;
p = .89
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.04;
p = .84
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.04;
p = .84
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.34;
p = .56
-2LLΔ (1) = 2.90;
p = .09
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.00;
p > .99
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.67;
p = .41
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.24;
p = .62

Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10; bolded rows are significantly different
from the previous model

146

Table 14 – Objective Knowledge Measurement Invariance Tests
Model

Configural Invar. Model

x2

df

CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR

Objective Knowledge – Lower Order Factors
579.55 274 .95 .94
.06**
.04

Metric Invar. Model

597.94 287

.95

.94

.06*

.05

Scalar Invar. Model

619.54 300

.95

.94

.06*

.06

Residual Invar. Model

609.77 319

.96

.95

.05

.06

Objective Knowledge – Higher Order Factor
Configural Invar. Model
639.29 338 .96 .96
.05
.06
Metric Invar. Model

647.78 342

.96

.96

.06

.05

Scalar Invar. Model

647.78 342

.96

.96

.06

.05

Residual Invar. Model

663.81 347

.95

.95

.05

.06

Partial Residual
Invar. Model

656.34 346

.95

.96

.05

.06

Relevant
Comparison

-2LLΔ (13) =
19.35; p = .11
-2LLΔ (13) =
19.98; p = .10
-2LLΔ (19) = 8.41;
p = .98

-2LLΔ (4) = 8.65; p
= .07
-2LLΔ (5) = 14.96;
p = .01
-2LLΔ (4) = 8.43; p
= .08

Objective Knowledge Moderation Tests
coconno on the Higher
Order Factor
coaccno on the Higher
Order Factor
coconfin on the Higher
Order Factor
coaccfin on the Higher
Order Factor
coconno on
Dispositional Trust
coaccno on
Dispositional Trust
coconfin on Dispositional
Trust
coaccfin on Dispositional
Trust

859.26 483

.95

.95

.05

.06

862.00 483

.95

.95

.05

.06

860.85 483

.95

.95

.05

.06

861.00 483

.95

.95

.05

.06

862.42 483

.95

.95

.05

.06

862.99 483

.95

.95

.05

.06

859.65 483

.95

.95

.05

.06

.95

.95

.05

.06

859.00 483

+

-2LLΔ (1) = 0.17; p
= .68
-2LLΔ (1) = 3.99;
p < .05
-2LLΔ (1) = 2.13; p
= .14
-2LLΔ (1) = 2.33; p
= .13
-2LLΔ (1) = 4.53;
p = .03
-2LLΔ (1) = 5.37;
p = .02
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.79; p
= .37
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.01; p
= .94

Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, p < .10; bolded rows are significantly different
from the previous model
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Table 15 – Experience Measurement Invariance Tests
Model

x2

df

CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR

Configural Invar. Model

Experience – Lower Order Factors
559.38 274 .96 .95
.06*

.04

Metric Invar. Model

570.81 287

.96

.95

.06

.05

Scalar Invar. Model

610.28 300

.96

.95

.06*

.05

597.64 299

.96

.95

.06

.05

587.61 298

.96

.95

.06

.04

598.98 315

.96

.96

.05

.04

Partial Scalar
Invar. Model
Partial Scalar Invar.
Model
Partial Residual Invar.
Model

Configural Invar. Model

Experience – Higher Order Factor
625.06 334 .96 .96
.05

.05

Metric Invar. Model

629.01 338

.96

.96

.05

.05

Scalar Invar. Model

629.01 338

.96

.96

.05

.05

Residual Invar. Model

632.94 343

.96

.96

.05

.05

Relevant
Comparison

-2LLΔ (13) =
11.86; p = .54
-2LLΔ (13) =
43.14; p < .001
-2LLΔ (12) =
27.69; p = .006
-2LLΔ (11) =
15.39; p = .17
-2LLΔ (17) =
19.15; p = .32

-2LLΔ (4) = 3.59; p
= .46
-2LLΔ (5) = 4.64; p
= .46

Experience Moderation Tests
coconno on the Higher
Order Factor
coaccno on the Higher
Order Factor
coconfin on the Higher
Order Factor
coaccfin on the Higher
Order Factor
coconno on
Dispositional Trust
coaccno on
Dispositional Trust
coconfin on
Dispositional Trust
coaccfin on
Dispositional Trust

825.29 480

.96

.96

.05

.05

829.38 480

.96

.96

.05

.06

823.45 480

.96

.96

.05

.05

822.68 480

.96

.96

.05

.05

822.88 480

.96

.96

.05

.05

822.64 480

.96

.96

.05

.05

822.84 480

.96

.96

.05

.05

822.09 480

.96

.96

.05

.05

-2LLΔ (1) = 3.28; p
= .07
-2LLΔ (1) = 10.75;
p = .001
-2LLΔ (1) = 1.50; p
= .22
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.67; p
= .41
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.81; p
= .37
-2LLΔ (1) = 2.30; p
= .13
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.74; p
= .39
-2LLΔ (1) = 0.00; p
> .99

Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10; bolded rows are significantly different
from the previous model
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Table 16 – Study 2 Observed Variable Scales Evaluation

Initiative

Commission

Construct
Subjective Knowledge
Care
Competence
Confidence
Procedural Fairness
Salient Values Similarity
Subjective Knowledge
Care
Competence
Confidence
Procedural Fairness
Salient Values Similarity

rNEP
Dispositional Trust
Periodic Burning Attitudes (limited)

N of items

α

4
3
3
4
3
3
4
3
3
4
3
3
15
3
3

.91
.83
.88
.95
.88
.93
.96
.85
.92
.91
.86
.94
.89
.74
.81

M
2.69
4.69
4.96*
4.79*
4.97*
4.88*
2.68
5.00
5.42*
5.29*
5.22*
5.29*
4.52
5.51
5.22

Averages Across Items
SD
Skew Kurtosis
0.75
0.50
0.54
1.19
-0.39
-0.34
1.12
-1.03
1.79
1.31
-0.63
-0.08
1.03
-0.12
-0.72
1.33
-0.57
-0.67
1.07
-0.04
-0.63
1.15
-1.78
6.22
0.89
-0.59
-0.98
0.94
-0.41
-0.99
0.90
-0.25
-1.34
1.05
-0.96
1.09
1.02
-0.11
1.04
0.64
-0.83
0.29
1.44
-1.19
0.90

Note. * indicates significant differences across institutions (p < .05).
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Table 17 – Burning Questions
Variable
Burn Now
Burn Future
Risk in Burning

Response Options (%)
No (23)
VU (11)
No (13)

Yes (70)
U (4)
Yes (87%)

SU (2)

UD (4)

SL (17)

L (26%)

VL (36)

Note. VU = very unlikely, U = unlikely, SU = somewhat unlikely, UD = undecided, SL
= somewhat likely, L = likely, VL = very likely. Row totals may not equal 100 because
of rounding.
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Table 18 – Trust Construct Item Average Score Correlations
Construct
1- GP Care
2- GP Competence
3- GP Confidence
4- GP Procedural Fairness
5- GP Salient Values
Similarity
6- FI Care
7- FI Competence
8- FI Confidence
9- FI Procedural Fairness
10- FI Salient Values
Similarity
11- Dispositional Trust

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

.80**
.88** .84**
.88** .76** .84**
.82** .65** .79** .84**
.19
.30*
.22
.21

.08
.13
.04
.06

.12
.28
.24
.24

.16
.37*
.29*
.30*

.20
.38** .90**
.24 .82** .85**
.23 .82** .78** .85**

.22

.07

.21

.31*

.31*

.31*

.28*

.28*

.36**

.33*

.82** .78** .88** .88**
.12

.24

.24

.27

Note. GP = Nebraska Game and Parks Commission, FI = Southeast Nebraska Flagship
Initiative; ** p < .01, * p < .05

.23
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Table 19 – Bivariate Self-Report Burn Now Comparisons
Construct

Comparison

Does Not
Burn (n = 12)

Does Burn
(n = 41)

Effect
Size

Subjective
Knowledge
Obj. Knowledge
(jurisdiction)

F(1,51) = 0.06, p =
.80

M = 2.65

M = 2.71

d = 0.07

x(1) = 6.31, p = .02*

% correct =
25

% correct =
66

r = .33

M = 2.63

M = 2.60

d = 0.03

M = 4.61

M = 4.66

d = 0.04

M = 5.09

M = 4.90

d = 0.13

M = 4.48

M = 4.86

d = 0.23

M = 4.82

M = 4.96

d = 0.11

M = 4.45

M = 4.94

d = 0.30

M = 2.38

M = 2.76

d = 0.30

% correct =
17

% correct =
10

r = .08

M = 2.09

M = 2.60

d = 0.37

M = 4.27

M = 5.24

d = 0.69

M = 4.83

M = 5.57

d = 0.65

M = 4.73

M = 5.45

d = 0.60

M = 4.63

M = 5.39

d = 0.67

M = 4.87

M = 5.41

d = 0.39

M = 4.61

M = 4.48

d = 0.10

M = 5.31

M = 5.55

d = 0.32

x(1) = 0.65, p = .65

% perceive
risk = 83

% perceive
risk = 88

r = .10

F(1,51) = 27.96,
p < .001

M = 3.64

M = 5.68

d = 1.45

x(1) = 8.14, p = .07

% with
contract = 17

% perceive
risk = 63

r = .37

Commission

Experience (staff)
Care
Competence
Confidence
Procedural Fairness
Salient Values
Similarity
Subjective
Knowledge
Obj. Knowledge
(partner orgs.)

Initiative

Experience (staff)
Care
Competence
Confidence
Procedural Fairness
Salient Values
Similarity
rNEP
Dispositional Trust
Burn Risk
Periodic Burning
Attitudes (limited)
Previous contract with the
Initiative

F(1,51) = 0.01, p =
.93
F(1,51) = 0.02, p =
.90
F(1,51) = 0.24, p =
.63
F(1,51) = 0.70, p =
.41
F(1,51) = 0.15, p =
.70
F(1,51) = 1.16, p =
.29
F(1,51) = 1.18, p =
.28
x(1) = 0.36, p = .62
F(1,45) = 1.65, p =
.21
F(1,51) = 6.32, p =
.02*
F(1,51) = 5.66, p =
.02*
F(1,51) = 4.80, p =
.03*
F(1,51) = 5.88, p =
.02*
F(1,51) = 2.05, p =
.16
F(1,51) = 0.13, p =
.72
F(1,51) = 1.32, p =
.26

Note. Bolded constructs are significantly different by Burn Now condition. d (Cohen’s d),
d = 0.20 (small), d = 0.50 (medium), d = 0.80 (large); r (Pearson’s r), r = .10 (small), r =
.30 (medium), r = .50 (large)
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Commission

Table 20 – Bivariate Dichotomous Objective Cooperation Comparisons
Construct

Comparison

Not
Cooperating
(n = 8)

Cooperating
(n = 23)

Effect
Size

Subjective
Knowledge
Obj. Knowledge
(jurisdiction)

F(1,28) = 0.51, p =
.48

M = 2.34

M = 2.57

d = 0.26

x(1) = 0.34, p = .68

% correct = 75

% correct =
64

r = .10

M = 2.38

M = 2.73

d = 0.36

M = 4.79

M = 4.64

d = 0.11

M = 5.13

M = 4.86

d = 0.21

M = 5.00

M = 4.87

d = 0.09

M = 4.96

M = 5.07

d = 0.10

M = 4.83

M = 5.12

d = 0.19

M = 2.66

M = 3.19

d = 0.47

% correct = 0

% correct =
15

r = .21

M = 2.86

M = 2.70

d = 0.15

M = 5.33

M = 5.17

d = 0.11

M = 5.58

M = 5.88

d = 0.41

M = 5.69

M = 5.70

d = 0.00

M = 5.67

M = 5.58

d = 0.12

M = 5.67

M = 5.70

d = 0.05

M = 4.63

M = 4.50

d = 0.10

M = 5.58

M = 5.67

d = 0.12

Experience (staff)
Care
Competence
Confidence
Procedural Fairness
Salient Values
Similarity
Subjective
Knowledge
Obj. Knowledge
(partner orgs.)

Initiative

Experience (staff)
Care
Competence
Confidence
Procedural Fairness
Salient Values
Similarity
rNEP
Dispositional Trust

F(1,28) = 0.98, p =
.33
F(1,28) = 0.09, p =
.77
F(1,28) = 0.34 p = .57
F(1,28) = 0.06, p =
.80
F(1,28) = 0.07, p =
.79
F(1,28) = 0.28, p =
.60
F(1,28) = 1.67, p =
.21
x(1) = 1.34, p = .54
F(1,26) = 0.15, p =
.70
F(1,28) = 0.09, p =
.76
F(1,27) = 1.23, p =
.28
F(1,27) < 0.00, p =
.95
F(1,26) = 0.10, p =
.76
F(1,26) = 0.02, p =
.90
F(1,29) = 0.07, p =
.80
F(1,29) = 0.12, p =
.74

Burn Risk

x(1) = 0.72, p = .44

% perceive
risk = 86

% perceive
risk = 95

r = .15

Periodic Burning Attitudes
(limited)
Previous contract with the
Initiative

F(1,27) = 2.22, p =
.15

M = 6.17

M = 5.73

d = 0.99

x(1) = 0.10, p < 1.00

% with
contract = 88

% perceive
risk = 91

r = .06

Note. Bolded constructs are significantly different by Burn Now condition. d (Cohen’s d),
d = 0.20 (small), d = 0.50 (medium), d = 0.80 (large); r (Pearson’s r), r = .10 (small), r =
.30 (medium), r = .50 (large)
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APPENDIX A – CHAPTER 3 STUDY 1 ITEM NAME AND WORDING LIST
Item
Name
subjk1
subjk2
subkj3
subjk4
objk1
objk2
objk3
exp1
exp2
exp3
exp4
dt1
dt2
dt3
care1
care2
care3
svs1
svs2
svs3
comp1
comp2
comp3
comp4
icon1
icon2
icon3
icon4
pf1
pf2
pf3
ricons
q16
riacce

Item Wording
How knowledgeable do you feel you are about the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission
generally?
How knowledgeable do you feel you are about the practices of the Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission?
How knowledgeable do you feel you are about the policies of the Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission?
How knowledgeable do you feel you are about the goals of the Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission?
Where does Nebraska Game and Parks Commission obtain its funding? (mark all that apply)
The Nebraska Game and Parks Commission can set legally enforceable regulations in what
areas? (select the single best answer)
Members of the Game and Parks Board of Commissioners are: (select the single best answer)
How often to you attend meetings held by the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission?
How often have you or your family been financially affected by a decision of the Nebraska
Game and Parks Commission?
How often do you personally have contact with the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission
staff?
How often do you use Nebraska Game and Parks Commission land for recreation (hunting,
boating, fishing, hiking, etc.)?
Generally speaking, I would say that most people can be trusted.
I think that most people would try to be fair.
I would say that most of the time people try to be helpful.
For the most part, the decisions made by Game and Parks are made out of care and concern for
area residents.
Most decision makers of Game and Parks care about residents in the area they regulate.
The decision makers of Game and Parks put aside their own personal interests in making
decisions that are right for the community.
I believe Game and Parks shares my values about how natural resources should be regulated.
To the extent that I understand them, I share Game and Park's values about how natural
resources should be regulated.
I believe that Game and Parks supports my values about natural resources allocation.
Most decision makers of Game and Parks are competent to do their jobs.
Most decision makers of Game and Parks are highly qualified individuals.
Most Game and Parks decision makers have the knowledge necessary to do their jobs.
Most Game and Parks decision makers have the skills necessary to do their jobs.
My confidence in Game and Parks is high.
Game and Parks does its job well.
I have confidence in Game and Parks to do its job.
I believe Game and Parks will perform its functions as it should.
The procedures by which Game and Parks decision makers make decisions are fair.
In my experience, Game and Parks generally has been fair in their dealings with the
community.
I have generally been treated fair by Game and Parks
Do you believe that there is any risk to you involved in granting the Game and Parks access to
your land for the conservation programs? (Note that we are interested in any risk you might
perceive regardless of how likely or problematic you believe it is.) Y/N
How important is this risk to your decision to participate in the conservation programs? 3pt
Do you believe that there is any risk to you involved in granting the Game and Parks access to
your land for the access programs? (Note that we are interested in any risk you might perceive

170
q19
coconno
coconfin
coaccno
coconfin
nep1
nep2
nep3
nep4
nep5
nep6
nep7
nep8
nep9
nep10
nep11
nep12
nep13
nep14
nep15

regardless of how likely or problematic you believe it is.) Y/N
How important is this risk to your decision to participate in the access programs? 3pt
As of today, how likely are you to voluntarily participate in Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission conservation programs that do NOT provide financial incentive?
As of today, how likely are you to voluntarily participate in Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission conservation programs that DO provide financial incentive?
As of today, how likely are you to voluntarily participate in Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission access programs that do NOT provide financial incentive?
As of today, how likely are you to voluntarily participate in Nebraska Game and Parks
Commission access programs that DO provide financial incentive?
We are approaching the limit of people the earth can support.
Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs.
When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences.
Human ingenuity will ensure that we do NOT make the earth unlivable.
Humans are severely abusing the environment.
The earth has plenty of natural resources if we learn how to develop them.
Plants and animals have as much right to as humans to exist.
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.
Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature.
The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated.
The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.
Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature.
The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.
Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it.
If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological
catastrophe.

